I haven’t done an update on Kyrgyzstan in several days.  While things seemed to have calmed in the southern part of the country, tensions are high, the humanitarian crisis is deep, and the political outcomes are uncertain.

Two questions have been occupying most commentators:  Why the violence, or, specifically why didn’t we see it coming? and What are the international ramifications, particularly for the US and Russia?  I’m personally less interested in the second question, and for the most part discussion on this has ranged from the ludicrous (for how ludicrous see Michael Hancock’s undressing on Registan), the paranoiac and uninformed, the all too typical, to the regurgitated.  Basically, I’ll leave it to the foreign policy wоnks to untangle this mess.  I just hope to hear something new as they do.

The “why” question, however, is the thing that seems to be occupying the minds of most Central Asia watchers.  This is an observation based on discussions on Registan and articles on Eurasianet.org.  The debates on Registan are informed, measured, fresh and invaluable.  Posts by Sarah Kendzior, Michael Hancock, and Christian Bleuer are must reads.

As I noted in my last post on Kyrgyzstan, there are a lot of people skeptical of the ethnic roots of the violence.  It’s not that they are saying that ethnicity doesn’t matter.  It does.  Rather, skeptics of the ethnic conflict thesis are questioning the tendency to reduce everything to ethnicity.  As always, media commentary tends to engage in this reductionism thereby making ethnic conflict, and therefore the idea of ethnicity or nationality itself, into something that is primordial and eternal.  One interesting thing I’ve noticed in some articles is to locate the origin of the conflict in how Stalin drew the borders of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan as a means to realize some kind of “divide and conquer” strategy.  For example, Peter Zeihan writes, “Kyrgyzstan is an artificial construct created by none other than Stalin, who rearranged internal Soviet borders in the region to maximize the chances of dislocation, dispute and disruption among the indigenous populations in case the Soviet provinces ever gained independence.”  Or, Edward Stourton, “The way Stalin designed the region ensured that it would regularly be shaken by inter-ethnic violence.”  And the Economist, “In 1924 Stalin divided the region into different Soviet republics. The borders were drawn up rather arbitrarily without following strict ethnic lines or even the guidelines of geography.”  These statements misunderstand the history of ethnicity as a concept of identity in this region.  True, the borders were drawn by Stalin, as Commissar of Nationalities, but, as Francine Hirsch contends, these borders were to purposely create these nations since the Bolsheviks believed in their evolutionary teleology that becoming a nation was necessary in order for “backward people” to overcome nationality.*  Was it a colonial strategy?  Most certainly since what Hirsch calls “state-sponsored evolutionism” was the Bolsheviks’ own version of White Man’s Burden.  Ironically, in their efforts to destroy nationality and nationalism, the Bolsheviks were their midwives.  So if there is anything to blame Stalin for it was playing a pivotal role in creating the geographical foundation for “Kyrgyz” and “Uzbeks” were none “existed” in the first place.

The roots of the conflict, therefore, are quite recent, and though there were tensions between the two groups in the Soviet period, they have exacerbated since the collapse of the Soviet Union.  In particular, thanks to the widening gap between rich and poor.  Inevitably, class and ethnicity became intertwined as the Kyrgyz majority saw themselves losing out to the Uzbek minority.  The conflict therefore has local and international economic motors.  One of the more interesting analyses on this point is Balihar Sanghera’s “Why are Kyrgyzstan’s slum dwellers so angry?” which puts the inter-ethnic violence in a global economic frame.  I found this passage very revealing:

The International Monetary Fund, World Bank and World Trade Organisation have imposed upon Kyrgyzstan and many other developing countries a package of neo-liberal economic policies. Powerless to resist, governments have had to sign up to these structural adjustment programmes in return for international loans, foreign direct investment and other financial support. Since independence in 1991, Kyrgyzstan has undergone an extensive programme of liberal marketisation and privatisation: privatisation of land and property, a break-up of kolkhozes, reductions in subsidies and import tariffs, liberalisation of commodity prices, cuts in state expenditure, relaxation of foreign ownership rules in key sectors (such as gold mines), opening up of home markets to imports, floating the exchange rate and so on. The shock therapy approach to the ‘transition’ to a market economy has had negative consequences on the Kyrgyzstani agricultural sector, and indirectly on urban slums and land invasions.

Given the small allocation of land that each family received in the 1990s in South Kyrgyzstan, most farmers struggle to eke a living, and are unable to absorb family labour, resulting in rural unemployment and underemployment. In addition, marginal and small farmers lack funds to buy adequate fertilisers, to invest into a proper irrigation system, to pay for effective livestock immunisation, or to capitalise their farms for future growth. Many farmers survive by pooling their resources, reviving some aspects of the Soviet kolkhozes. Some have abandoned farming, either by leasing their land rights to larger farmers, who possess the capital to undertake successful commercial farming, or by giving back their tenancy rights to ayil okomotu (local state administration), who then lease them to rich farmers. As a result, the rural society has become pauperised.

How many times have we seen this around the world?

Boris Petric also places the violence in the context of privatization (along with political clan and mafia struggles and the drug trade thrown in the mix):

As the free market ideology gained ground internationally, Kyrgyzstan launched massive privatization initiatives and opened its borders. This led to the collapse of industry and the agricultural sector, as well as causing increased social inequality. With new opportunities in cross-border trading, a new upper class formed, while most of the population lived below the poverty threshold. Structural adjustment policies, which Akayev followed to the letter, encouraged the emergence of new familial economic powers. In the south of the country, and particularly in Osh, many Kyrgyz often associated these economic powers with urban Uzbeks.

After the 2005 Tulip Revolution, Kurmanbek Bakiyev quickly put an end to the advantages gained by some Uzbeks in Osh during the privatization period. These politico-economic entrepreneurs, of which Deputy Batyrov is a good example, were gradually marginalized. The Bakiyev brothers then set about gaining control of the economy, and encouraged other “Uzbeks” to monopolize major economic resources from the Akayev administration’s former protégés. Control of the economy passed into the hands of Bakiyev’s allies. These new economic leaders were soon required to set up various dummy companies benefiting the presidential entourage.

Events took another turn when Roza Otunbayeva came to power in April 2010. President Bakiyev’s allies in the Osh region were quickly dispossessed of the advantages they had enjoyed. The situation deteriorated rapidly and tensions arose between different groups which aspired to control economic activities. An Uzbek businessman, Aibek Mirsidikov, was murdered in mysterious circumstances. According to rumor, Mirsidikov was involved in Mafia and other criminal activities. He was closely linked to the Bakiyev family, and it was even said that the President’s brother put him in charge of the lucrative Afghan drug trade and reorganizing economic relations in Osh. The fall of President Bakiyev therefore led to a new politico-economic shakeup in the region. The current conflict was probably triggered by the rise to power of some politico-Mafia groups, and the fall of others. The groups that had flourished under the previous government were not willing to accept defeat. Adopting extremely violent tactics, they began settling scores, aided and abetted by the Bakiyev brothers. The extent of these retaliations meant the conflict finally took an interethnic turn.

In her “The ethnicisation of violence in Southern Kyrgyzstan,” Madeleine Reeves notes some of the ways these social conflicts have become ethnicized in the Ferghana Valley:

In recent weeks, political tensions, economic anxieties, criminal violence, the freezing of legal process, and what seems to be a quite concerted attempt at ethnic mobilisation and provocation by supporters of ousted former-president Bakiev mean that in southern Kyrgyzstan, mothers, brothers, school-friends, colleagues, neighbours and drinking partners have been “pinned to the wall” of nationhood, reduced to the single category, “Kyrgyz” or “Uzbek” in this historically most complex and socially variegated of regions.

Writing to me a few weeks ago, a tri-lingual (Kyrgyz, Uzbek and Russian-speaking), “Kyrgyz”-identifying friend, with Uzbek and Uighur heritage on his mother’s side, described how his “Uzbek”-identifying wife was increasingly conscious of the appearance of ethnic slurs in the playground when she took her (ethnically “mixed”) children out to play.   An Uzbek-identifying friend from Jalalabat noted in the same period a growing sense of disillusion amongst Jalalabat Uzbeks, as ethnically-marked political-criminal groupings sought to take advantage of the change of leadership in the wake of Bakiev’s ouster to seize control of businesses traditionally dominated by Uzbek elites in the city.  For both of these acquaintances, ethnicity was a constitutive part of their identity, just as was their age, their gender, their education, and their identification with a cosmopolitan, urban Ferghana culture.  Each, in different ways, has written of the horror of being reduced in recent days to that single dimension, “Kyrgyz” or “Uzbek”.  Talking of this as an “ethnic conflict” misses that essentially processual dimension:  it is essentialising; it is depoliticising and it acts as an analytical “stop”.  It takes ethnicity as being analytically causal, rather than asking about the complex, messy, deeply political dynamics through which, in a moment of state crisis, conflict has come to be ethnicised.

. . . What we have been witnessing in Osh and Jalalabat over the last few days is a disturbing and distressing spiral of violence.  Much of this has been articulated in ethnic terms: evident in targeted attacks on property, homes and in the brutal wounding of those perceived as ethnically “other” whether they be Kyrgyz or Uzbek.

Less reported are the multiple instances where ethnicity has been irrelevant to action: when property has been looted because “they” represent wealth and opportunity that is inaccessible to “us”; when Kyrgyz have sheltered Uzbeks and vice versa; when neighbours have sought to defend their street or their mosque from attack not because they are of the same ethnicity, but because they live in the same neighbourhood and want to have the chance of continuing to do so.

Reeves goes on to add that ethnicity in this case is more like poisonious silly-puddy with its ability to be molded and graft onto a multitude of existing social processes.

“Inter-ethnic conflict” as an explanatory frame is problematic, then, not because ethnicity doesn’t matter, but because the “ethnic group” by itself doesn’t do any meaningful explanatory work (unless, of course, we assume that some ethnic groups are “naturally” pre-disposed to violence).  Ethnicity in Osh is socially constituted, as well as socially and spatially organised.  It is produced and reproduced in a host of domestic, educational, social and political institutions, from schools to television broadcasts, from religious celebrations to the organisation of domestic and neighbourhood space.  Critically, moreover, it is reproduced in a host of business networks, patronage relations, and crimino-political groupings, the activity and violence of which has increased dramatically in the weeks since former president Bakiev was ousted in an uprising on April 7th.

Perhaps it is this hornet’s nest which has made Russia hesitant to dive in military first despite the pleads of the Kyrgyz interim government.  Indeed, I agree with the view that the US and Russia just hope the crisis goes away.  But crises like this rarely do.  Unfortunately for the Kyrgyz, the situation remains dire and continued destabilization may generate the very things that Russia and the US fear the most: regional civil war, increased drug trafficking, and Islamism.

The big test is coming in the next week.  The continued “state of emergency” threatens to put the June 27 referendum on a new constitution on hold.  The interim government hopes that turning Kyrgyzstan into a parliamentary republic will bring political stability.  However, if RFE/RL correspondent Bruce Pannier is right it could only exacerbate ethnic tensions.  According to him:

“Everyone that I’ve talked to in these Uzbek neighborhoods points out that they don’t have any representation in the government at all — the soldiers are Kyrgyz, all the police are Kyrgyz.  If they hold the referendum and then there is something the Uzbeks don’t like, they are going to say, ‘This isn’t our constitution. This is a Kyrgyz constitution.”

*Francine Hirsch, “Toward an Empire of Nations: Border-Making and the Formation of Soviet National Identities,” Russian Review, Vol. 59, No. 2 (Apr., 2000), 202-203.

I have little love for Russian liberals.  Readers of this blog probably know that well.  Boris Nemtsov and Vladimir Milov in particular, as one can sense from my take down of their 2008 anti-Putin screed for the now defunct and sorely missed The eXile. I even giggled when Nashi threw piss in Nemtsov’s face.

The dynamic duo is back with a new Putin obsessed treatise, elegantly entitled Putin. The Results. Ten Years.  So much for creativity.  It is sure to get more media attention than it deserves.  I have yet to read it, and probably won’t.  I’m sure my eXile piece applies just as well to this one.  According to reports in the Russian media, the text evaluates Putin’s decade long run and the tandem’s two year performance.  Vedomosti writes that Nemtsov characterized the text this way on his blog:

In Russian society there are persistent myths imposed by official propaganda.  There are many: the myth that Putin pacified the Caucuses and defeated terrorism, the myth about the increased birth and decreased mortality rates, the myth that he defeated the oligarchs and successfully solved the social problems of society.  In our report all of these false claims are debunked with figures and facts from available sources.

Boring.  Somehow I can’t help thinking that I’ve heard this song before.  But, hey, I’ll let you be the judge.  A million copies have been printed up and shipped off to Moscow and Petersburg.

Well, make that 900,000 copies.  The Russian news is reporting that police seized a shipment of 100,000 copies in a traffic stop in St. Petersburg, for, get this “irregularities in the documentation for cargo.”  Reports Gazeta, citing the police:

A truck with the MAN make with Smolensk plates was stopped by traffic police at 9:30 am on Shpalernaya Street (a Yabloko branch office is located there). The cop issued a ticket for the violation of the article 16.12 of the Administrative Code (the violation of traffic signals or road markings): Heavy vehicles are prohibited from entering the center of St. Petersburg without the proper permits,” the police department stated.  “When the inspector went to check the load, it became clear that the invoice on the copies stated a Smolensk printing press, while the publishers imprint on the actual books was a the Moscow press. The goods will be temporarily detained and checked.

Not sure why the discrepancy between the invoice and the copies matters.  Nevertheless, it was enough for the cops to pinch it.  I can see tomorrow’s headlines: “Putin Impounds Critics.”  Yep, because no one gets pulled over for traffic violations in Russia. Or harassed for not have the million stamps and forms needed to do anything.  And, well, opportunists always have their shit together because they are, like, honest and principled just like us in America.  One would think they would have their papers in order considering the big target Russian liberals have on their back.  They do, after all, live in Russia.  Despite how silly all of this sounds, we should score one for Nemstov and Milov. The cops just gave them the best advertising in town: claims of repression.

Update

It’s funny how things become clearer in just a few hours.  Now Gazeta.ru is reporting that the cops have finished their check of the 100,000 copies of Putin. The Results. Ten Years and dutifully shipped them off to the MVD’s Center “E” for inspection.  For those who don’t know, Center “E” is the outfit devoted to combating “extremism.”  Nemtsov and Milov may be a lot of things, but being extremists is definitely not one of them.

This means that my above cynicism is now dashed, making me actually think that something is indeed rotten in St. Petersburg.  I hate it when the Russian authorities’ sheer idiocy and paranoia make me sympathize with the liberals.  I just hate it.

And if you need more proof that this seizure is convenient, not to mention downright suspicious, check this out: It comes a mere day before the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum.  Over the next few days, Medvedev is set to hobnob with businessmen from around the world to ensure them that Russia is worth their bucks.  Apparently the chance that one of Nemtsov and Milov’s pamphlets falls into an unsuspecting businessman’s hands and they learn there’s mass corruption (shock!) in Russia is just too risky.  As Dr. Smith used to say in Lost in Space, “Oh the pain. The pain.”

This whole incident also proves that Nemtsov can be right every once in a while.  “In his opinion,” says Gazeta, “now the report will be read by more than a million people.”  All too true. Score: Team Solidarity 2 : 0 Putin.

From Ferghana.ru.

h/t Lyndon.

The more I educate myself about events in Kyrgyzstan, it’s becoming apparent that people who actually know something about the place are skeptical of the “longstanding ethnic strife” narrative.  Michael Anderson, a Dutch journalist who covers the region, put it this way in an interview with Ferghana.ru., “Unfortunately, Western media fall back on stereotypes, describing events in Osh such as “interethnic violence” and “interethnic problems”, although you and I know that that is not really what is happening.’  He went on to add this: “I am ashamed that western media pay so little attention and produce such poor coverage. This is bad. Another bad thing is the constant use of stereotypes – often wrong.”  For an example, see this piece on Slate which goes with the deep seeded ethnic strife thesis.

Not all are taken with the marketable stereotypes that Anderson decries.  It’s nice to see that at least the NY Times does better job of capturing the nuances of Kyrgyzstan better than it does on Russia.  The Times actually learned a new word: class.

“I don’t believe in a narrative of long-simmering ethnic tension,” Alexander A. Cooley, a professor at Columbia University’s Harriman Institute and an authority on Central Asia, said in a telephone interview.

Indeed, ethnic distinctions between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz are so slight as to be hardly distinguishable, Professor Cooley and others say. Both are predominantly Muslim and they speak a mutually comprehensible Turkic language.

The most notable distinction, the one that is most responsible for the animosities that led to the recent violence, Central Asian experts say, is economic: Kyrgyz are traditional nomads, while Uzbeks are farmers.

That divide has translated today into a wide class distinction, as Uzbeks have prospered and now own many of the businesses in southern Kyrgyzstan, which has engendered resentment. Among the first buildings to burn in rioting over the weekend was the “People’s Friendship University,” singled out apparently because it was built with donations by wealthy Uzbek businessmen.

Eugene Huskey, a political scientist at Stetson University, also doubts the longstanding ethnic strife thesis.  He had this to say in an interview with CBC:

Has there been longstanding tension between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz?

Huskey: Uzbeks and Kyrgyz have lived peacefully in the region’s main Ferghana Valley for centuries.

It was only as the Soviet Union collapsed in 1990 that one witnessed a major outbreak of violence between ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbeks. This conflict grew out of a land dispute that was poorly handled by local authorities.

As a young country still uncertain of its identity, there is an ongoing struggle between those who favour a Kyrgyzstan for the Kyrgyz and those who support a multi-ethnic state with equal opportunities for all.

Although all governments of Kyrgyzstan have been publicly committed to the latter approach, many daily decisions of government move against this ideal. For example, hiring practices in defence and law enforcement institutions have led to the virtual exclusion of non-Kyrgyz from the ranks.

Huskey rejects the idea that the outbreak of ethnic violence was spontaneous.  Rather, it was “a well-orchestrated and well-financed effort by armed groups to provoke conflict between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks.”  Who, then, is behind it?

Huskey: We don’t know for sure who is behind it at this point, but it seems likely that local drug lords and criminal groups joined forces with individuals close to the ousted president, Kurmanbek Bakiyev.

Both groups have an interest in destabilizing the situation and not permitting the holding of a planned constitutional referendum on June 27.

The referendum in two weeks would almost certainly have solidified the position and legitimacy of the current government and paved the way for democratic parliamentary elections in the fall.

It is now doubtful that the referendum can be held on time and ballot papers that had been scheduled for delivery to the south are now being retained in the capital.

There is also speculation in some quarters that certain countries in the region, perhaps Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan or even Russia, would themselves benefit from a destabilization of a regime that has sought to distance itself from the authoritarian politics dominant in the region.

Christian Bleuer tackles the “third party” thesis on Registan:

So now can you see it? Uzbeks and Kyrgyz are not killing each other, rather “bandits” are killing Uzbeks and Kyrgyz as agents provocateurs in part of some elaborate, finely executed conspiracy. This is, of course, BS. Uzbeks and Kyrgyz were completely capable of being killed by each other without the aid of criminals and bandits in 1990, and they still are now. For example, read Valery Tishkov’s article “`Don’t Kill Me, I’m a Kyrgyz!’: An Anthropological Analysis of Violence in the Osh Ethnic Conflict.” To put too much stress on criminal groups is to avoid, or lead the reader to miss, a discussion of ongoing tensions and conflicts in the community, whether they be based on elite-level politics, resentment over another group’s perceived economoic or political success, or the competition for land, water and a good spot in the bazaar (all of which are contentious at the ethnic level in Osh), or the meeting of these levels of competition in mutually beneficial mobilization.

Politicians and opposition leaders especially love the criminal version, as they can portray their opposing rivals as criminal leaders, or the tools/masters of criminals. But what was/is always needed in the Soviet Union and its successor states is the idea of a master manipulator.

I suggest reading the whole post for other insightful comments.

Meanwhile the humanitarian crisis rolls on, with the distribution of aid possibly exacerbating the tensions:

Cargo planes carrying food, medical supplies and other essentials were arriving at Osh Airport throughout June 14. The Ministry of Emergency Situations confirmed that the Osh Mayor’s office was trying to coordinate aid distribution. “At the moment we are receiving humanitarian aid from Bishkek. The aid came from businessmen, political parties and residents of Bishkek,” a spokesman for the Osh mayor told EurasiaNet.org.

“Neighborhood committees have lists of people who need aid the most and aid distributing takes place according to those lists. Regarding the barricaded neighborhoods, the distribution and delivery of aid to those neighborhoods will be taking place with the help of the [police],” he added. The city official did not provide any information about how the lists were created.

Rather than alleviate needs, some ethnic Uzbeks are complaining that the distribution of aid is exacerbating tension. Uzbek witnesses alleged that ethnic Kyrgyz officials were distributing much of the aid in areas that Uzbeks consider unsafe. As a result, some Uzbek neighborhoods are reportedly not receiving any aid.

“I haven’t seen any humanitarian aid. If it is coming, it is being distributed among the Kyrgyz, not the Uzbeks. We can’t even get outside our [neighborhoods],” said Husanboy Abdugofur, an ethnic Uzbek.

Some Kyrgyz in Uzbek neighborhoods also said they felt isolated. “We are all hungry because we haven’t eaten for days. Please come and rescue, if not us, then our children!” said one ethnic Kyrgyz living in a predominantly Uzbek neighborhood in the city.

Kyrgyz authorities reject accusations that discrimination is playing a role in the distribution of assistance. Several officials, in comments broadcast on state television June 14, attributed distribution difficulties to roadblocks and other obstacles that have been erected to protect various neighborhoods.

Kyrgyzstan, the small Central Asian country which sprung onto the global scene in April, boggling the minds of American news anchors, has returned.  What I then called the “red revolution” has turned redder as ethnic violence swept through the southern city of Osh and Jalal-Abad this weekend.  On Thursday, marauding gangs began rampaging, attacking Uzbeks, burning government buildings, banks, cafes, and even an Uzbek theater first in Osh and then in Jalal-Abad.  Uzbeks locked themselves in their homes as rumors spread they would be killed on the street.  Uzbeks, being the minority, fled over the border in the tens of thousands into Uzbekistan.  Interim president Roza Otunbayeva declared a state of emergency and countrywide curfew, dispatched troops with shoot-to-kill orders, pleaded to Russia for help, and blamed supporters of ousted president Kurmanbek Bakiev for the violence.  President Medvedev balked at sending a full force to stabilize the situation fearing that a large force could drag Russia into a much unwanted quagmire.  Instead he sent a contingent of 300 paratroopers to protect Russia’s Kant airbase.  On Sunday, RIA Novosti reported that Kyrgyz and Uzbek ethnic leaders were prepared for reconciliation talks.  We’ll see how prepared they are and whether they matter in the coming days.  The numbers as of now: 113 dead, 1292 wounded, an estimated 75,000 refugees have fled into Uzbekistan.  For up-to-date coverage and commentary, I point readers to Eurasianet and Registan.

As always, the Western commentary, while noting the facts and figures around the violence, has mostly focused on the geopolitical ramifications of the events.  The conservative Washington Times has already predictably declared the violence to be the result of Russia “work[ing] behind the scenes to influence Kyrgyzstan’s interim government.”  I’m not sure how inter-ethnic violence which some fear could turn Kyrgyzstan into the Balkans benefits Russia.  Apparently not having much to say, reports tend to give a rundown of events and then place them in the US-Russia context or add fears that Kyrgyzstan might fracture into the next Afghanistan.  In regard to explains for the outbreak, most have cited Bakiev’s possible hand to topple the intern government or the ethnic violence of twenty years ago.

Violence had been brewing in southern Kyrgyzstan since April.  In May, Bakiev holdouts staged protests and seized government buildings.  One person was killed and sixteen were injured in that flare-up, the second since Bakiev was ousted.  At the time, Azimbek Beknazarov, the interim government’s deputy head said, “We are waiting for the third wave. According to our information, a group of bribe-takers and supporters of Bakiyev are trying to provoke inter-ethnic clashes. We know who is behind this, but to preserve stability we will give them time to think again.”  Well, the third, and most violent to date, has arrived on que.  A mere ten days after the state of emergency and nationwide curfew were lifted.

Bakiev’s people behind the violence?  Possibly.  Probably.  Certainly.  Then again, maybe not.  One article published on Ferghana.ru suggests that the violence might be the result of southern mafia bosses struggling over the spoils after the murder of don Aibek Mirsidikov on June 7.  Writes Sanobar Shermatova:

Criminal heroes and the victims of revolution

The first official comment on the event was given by acting governor of the Jalal-Abad Oblast Bektur Asanov. The official explained the death of Mirsidikov by “the fights of the criminal world”. Three days earlier the General Ismail Isakov had to admit that criminal structures had become more active in southern Kyrgyzstan. This issue was raised by the entrepreneurs, concerned with pressure and expropriation of property in the southern regions. The experience of two previous revolutions says that the shift of political power in Kyrgyzstan inevitably leads to re-balance of power in criminal world, closely tied with politics and business. The mafia bosses continue to play important role, providing services to various political forces. Therefore, the political figures have to “pay bills” on time. The best example of patron-client relations between these two social groups is scandalous story of mafia boss Ryspek Akmatbaev that threatened to bombard the White House if Kurmanbek Bakiev did not meet his requirement. The president had to negotiate the criminal leader, producing public indignation. In the post-revolutionary Bishkek the criminal leaders were so unpunished that human rights advocates and dwellers had to organize the special meeting, demanding the president to end the games with criminals. Allegedly, Akmatbaev was assigned to organize the resignation of Prime-Minister Felix Kulov, not demanded by Bakiev anymore. In exchange Akmatbaev was promised to get rid of all convictions and allowed the access to deputy’s mandate. Due to external factors the plans did not come true while the issue was closed up after the murder of Akmatbaev.

The same happened to another Bakiev’s “problem” was Bayaman Erkinbaev. The prominent southern mafia boss and parliament’s deputy, which sponsored anti-Akaev meetings, very soon became the opponent of Kurmanbek Bakiev. The shift in the political position was simply reasoned: the new rulers wanted to have a piece of his property. Some sources report that after the death of Erkinbaev his resources were taken over by president’s brother Akhmat Bakiev that step by step established controlled over all illegal business in the South.

After the revolution and departure of Kurmanbek Bakiev all-mighty Akhmat was kidnapped by Bayman Erkinbaev’s teammates, say well-informed sources. They demanded to return the expropriated property. It is not clear yet whether Akhmat was able to resolve this issue. However, the redistribution of wealth, reasoned by the change of political power, is still going on. One of the versions is that current murder of Mirsidikov is the result of fights in the criminal circles. Whatever the reasons are this murder will be given political background; acting governor Asanov already said that “Bakiev’s team lost its criminal leader”.

Antipodes

For Asanov himself the murder of 36-year old Mirsidikov, “black Aibek”, is good news. Allegedly, people, armed by Mirsidikov, attempted to remove Asanov, appointed by interim government. Their attempt to take over the Oblast administration office and appoint “their own” governor failed; one of the reasons was the involvement of Uzbek community, led by Kadyrzhan Batyrov, that discarded the crowd.

Batyrov and Mirsidikov are Uzbeks, opposing each other. They are antipodes in the big Uzbek community. Batyrov is a businessman that made big money on legal business and made political career during Akaev’s rule. Mirsidikov is typical representative of the local criminal circles. Batyrov was not able to find the right approach to Bakiev’s regime and lost some of his property. On the other hand, Mirsidikov, properly fitting Bakiev’s system (the integration of official power and illegal business), was gaining power. Therefore, the conflict arose between them after the end of Bakiev’s rule. Batyrov provided the immediate support to interim government. Black Aibek played another game. At first, he blamed Batyrov in the burning the houses of ex-president and his relatives. He perfectly knew what he was doing: the news about burning Kyrgyz houses by Uzbeks produced the big annoyance among Kyrgyz.

The anonymous leaders (not typical for Kyrgyzstan) organized the meeting in Jalal-Abad. The crowd devastated the people’s friendship university, founded by Batyrov, demanding to bring him to trial “for inciting of inter-ethnic conflicts”. Uzbek factor was introduced in the political game in southern Kyrgyzstan – the situation became very serious. Under some circumstances the struggle for power may bear destructive nature due to inter-ethnic opposition.

Illusion of Osh tragedy

Negative scenario was demanded only by the supporters of ex-president. Minsk, hosting Bakiev and his family, proposed to send CSTO troops to Kyrgyzstan. It is hard to predict further events – the return of overthrown president with the purpose to rescue the republic, taken over by illegitimate power, not able to control the situation.

Twenty years ago, in order to suppress the riots in Osh Oblast, resulted in the massacre of hundreds of Uzbeks and Kyrgyz, the government decided to send troops. There is no doubt that the illusion of Osh tragedy was reminding the members of interim government about the significance of the problem when they were discussing the action plan for 6 hours in a row. The curfew, introduced in Jalal-Abad, demanded interim president status from Roza Otunbaeva and stabilized the situation for certain period. I believe the peaceful tactics, adopted by special representative of the government and general Ismail Isakov, was successful. He met few of the requirements, proposed by meeting leaders, and promised to consider others in the government. He did not detain the meeting leaders although 3 persons were killed and 70 were wounded in the bloody event. Isakov promised to bring Kadyrzhan Batyrov to trial; however, Batyrov is still not arrested.

What did Batyrov do, being blamed in inciting of interethnic conflicts? The interim government and Roza Otunbaeva blamed Bakiev’s people, but not Batyrov, in the organization of interethnic opposition. Obviously, the interim government did not change its attitude towards the leader of Uzbek community in Jalal-Abad, but it did not want to publicly protect him either. The relations between two ethnic groups are not easy. On one hand, there are many interethnic marriages. The separatist mood, present at the beginning of 1990s, disappeared thanks to policy of Askar Akaev and the slogan “Kyrgyzstan is our common house”. Nonetheless, we do not see the nation, unified by civic identity. Generally tolerant Kyrgyz are very perceptible for any ethnic independence trends, especially from Uzbek community, the second biggest ethnic group in the republic. Various sources say there are up to one million Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan; this is quite significant amount for the republic with total population of little over 5 million people. Batyrov’s proposal to include in the draft Constitution the official status of Uzbek language in the areas, populated by ethnic Uzbeks as well as appeal for Uzbeks to get involved in politics and defend their civil rights were very brave both for Uzbeks, traditionally distanced from political battles, and Kyrgyz, accepting any signs of ethnic minority self-support as the threat for titular nation’s rights. The riot leaders properly used common discontent in order to force the interim government to get rid of people, able to oppose.

All these games were controlled in Bishkek. Being advised by the rulers in Bishkek, Kadyrzhan Batyrov sent video message via local TV channel where he brought apologizes to Kyrgyz people for some statements. This significantly cooled down Kyrgyz.

After Isakov said that “the measures on conflict prevention in the south produced positive outcome” and “people feel that the republic is led by the government” the interim government faced the counter strike. Former emergency Minister Kamchibek Tashiev demanded the government to fulfill the requirements, set at the meeting in Jalal-Abad: to shut down the people’s friendship university, founded by Kadyrzhan Batyrov, bring Batyrov to trial and remove acting governor Asanov. The ultimatum deadline is June 7. Otherwise, he promised to bring new squads (i.e. militia units). Curiously enough, Black Aibek, the key player in the recent turmoil, was killed on June 7.

Contrary to what most people think, I see few signs of the neo-Sovietization of Russia.  What I have observed, however, is a return to Russian traditionalism, even a kind of re-embrace of Tsarist symbolism.  I’ve noticed this in several areas of Russian daily life: Christmas cards with the recently canonized last Romanov family, icons of the last Tsar sold in kiosks, large portraits of Petr Stolypin and Sergei Witte at the entrance of the International University, and book after book reevaluating the late Tsarist period, newly published volumes of Stolypin’s collected works, and the memoirs of not only Witte, but the diaries and biographies of princes and princesses in bookstores.

Let us also not forget the growing assertiveness of the Orthodox Church in cultural and political life, or the fact that Dmitri Medvedev’s inauguration looked like a Tsarist coronation more than anything.  They might as well had placed the Russian Constitution on his head rather than having him swear to it.  To me, “Sovereign democracy” is more reminiscent of Nicholas I’s “Official Nationality” with its cornerstones Autocracy, Orthodoxy, and Nationality.  Indeed, even the portraits of Putin and Medvedev hanging on chinovniki’s walls are more Tsarist in origin.  As is the “cult of personality” Putin recently denied he had.   This is not to say that Russia hasn’t changed.  It’s only to suggest that it takes from its Tsarist as much as its Soviet pasts as it negotiates the present contours of its national character.

Putin may deny that he  has a cult of personality all he wants.  The truth is that every Russian leader has had one, and in a way, this is to be expected in a culture where autocracy, whether in Tsarist or Communist form, has been the norm rather than the exception.  Russia is also a very patriarchal society, where the leader is seen more as a father of the nation that exhibits both awesomeness and piety.  This figure of the father is reproduced from the Kremlin all the way down to the household.

Given this historical and cultural context, it is not too surprising that organizers from Suvorov Military College distributed a “Prayer for the President” to children at their Children’s Day event.  Yelena Sakhno, one of the event’s organizers, told the Moscow Times, “We didn’t consider the inclusion of Orthodox literature among the presents to be reprehensible. The prayer for the head of state is traditional in the canons of the church service.  The Patriarch’s office was more circumspect:

“On the one hand, the church is aware of the capability of prayer for those in power. For example, before the Soviet regime there was a tradition to pray for the emperor and his family. There is nothing wrong with mentioning our President in our prayers. But on the other hand, there exists a public church confession when the patriarch blesses a prayer. That said, anyone can compose prayers and pray in their own way.  Again, I don’t think there is anything wrong with such a prayer, but I think it’s wrong distribute an unfavorable prayer to the public at large. I think that it is unlikely that this prayer will receive the patriarch’s approval in the future,” Alexander Volkov, Moscow Patriarchate’s press secretary, told Fontanka.

What is this “Prayer to the President”?  Here is a translation below.  Feel free to recite when necessary.

O Lord God, Great King, the Eternal One, Lord Thy Archangel Mikhail come to the aid of his servants Dimitri [Medvedev] and Vladimir [Putin] delivering them from enemies both visible and invisible. O Lord Great Archangel Mikhail, smiter of demons, prevent all their enemies who fight against them, who make enemies in the flock, smite them into ash before the face of the wind.  O Lord Great Archangel Mikhail, sixth angel, first Prince and Knight of Infamous Might of Cherubim and Seraphim. O Miraculous Archangel Mikhail, guardian of infinite secrets, be a Great helper providing a peaceful shelter to them from all insults, sorrow, sadness, and in deserts, at crossroads, in rivers and in seas.  Deliver them, Great Archangel Mikhail from every demoniacal temptation and listen to us, Your sinful slaves, who pray to You and call Your holy name to listen to our prayers and quickly come to our help.

O Great Archangel Mikhail defeat all those who oppose us with the might of the Holy Cross, the prayers of the Holy Virgin and the Holy Angel and Holy Apostle, Saint Nikolai the Miracle Worker, the Prophet Elijah, the Forty Martyrs of Sebaste, Saint Pantaleon, Nikita and Evstafiia and the venerable Father, and the newly martyred and confessor of Russia (Rossiiskii), the Passionate Tsar Nicholas and all the saints.

O, Great Archangel Mikhail, help us, the sinful, deliver us from cowardice, deluge, fire, the sword, from futile death and from all evil, and from every sycophantic enemy, and from crippling storms and from cunning saviors, Great Mikhail the Archangel of God, always present and eternal for all centuries. Amen.