Not Much to Gawk About
By Sean at 6 September, 2009, 5:11 pm
Scott Anderson’s article “Vladimir Putin’s Dark Rise to Power” is a throwback to the 1990s when ex-KGBmen turned mafioso, private security, or hired hands to execute nefarious plots. It is also a showcase of bygone figures. Once powerful, influential, or at least in the public eye who have since drifted into memory only to be periodically conjured up as partisan weaponry of high politics. You know the names: Boris Berezovsky, Alex Goldfarb, Aleksandr Litvinenko, and Mikhail Trepashkin. The latter serves as the hero of Anderson’s tale. The gatekeeper of a longstanding conspiracy that many Russians know well: The FSB carried out the apartment bombings on Guryanova St. in Moscow that brought down eight floors and killed ninety-four residents in their beds.
It’s been a while since Trepashkin’s name graced an English language publication. He’s spent the last several years serving two stints in the clank. In 2003, he was arrested for illegal arms possession and divulging state secrets (the former charge was eventually dropped, the latter stuck). And then just as he was freed in September 2005, he was scooped up again. He was released in 2007. Four years for likely trumped up charges. Such is what happens when you piss off the wrong people in Russia.
But now Trepashkin has come out of the woodwork to tell his story to Scott Anderson. But the details of the story aren’t really the issue. Anyone who’s familiar with the apartment bombings already knows the in-outs of the incident and the conspiracy theories behind them. Anderson didn’t even have to go to Russia. He could have just watched that horrible Rebellion: The Litvinenko Case documentary and got the story there.
The real story, however, is really the story itself. Indeed, as many Russia watchers discovered last week, Conde Nast, the company that owns GQ in Russia, made an executive decision to not run the story there. According to the NPR report on the matter:
“Conde Nast management has decided that the September issue of U.S. GQ magazine containing Scott Anderson’s article ‘Vladimir Putin’s Dark Rise to Power’ should not be distributed in Russia,” Birenz wrote.
He ordered that the article could not be posted to the magazine’s Web site. No copies of the American edition of the magazine could be sent to Russia or shown in any country to Russian government officials, journalists or advertisers. Additionally, the piece could not be published in other Conde Nast magazines abroad, nor publicized in any way.
The story doesn’t even exist on GQ’s English site. The only place you can read the story is on Gawker and a site called Ratafia Currant. So what made Conde Nast pull the plug? Self-censorship? Commercial interests? Or was it a plain PR stunt to bring attention to an article that would most likely be ignored? Who knows. I am more inclined to think the latter.
But the thing I find funny about all of this is Gawker’s self-appointed mission to translate the article into Russian “as a public service” because “Condé Nast has gone to extraordinary lengths to prevent Russians from reading a GQ article criticizing Vladimir Putin.” I mean, really what planet are they from? Um, the Iron Curtain, like, fell eighteen years ago. There isn’t a cloak of darkness over Russia that filers out anything anti-Putin. Take it from me, the Russians don’t need Americans to save them from themselves. The last time that happened, it didn’t work out to well for the Russians.
The truth is that this conspiracy isn’t new by any means. Nor does Anderson shed any new light on it. An internet search will turn up all sorts of versions of it. Hell, even the Russian wikipedia entry on the bombings chronicles the “unofficial versions” of the story. Yet Gawker is all ecstatic that a few Russian sites have picked up their Russian translation. One is a blog on LJ. The other is one of those creepy Russian nationalist forums. Now Russian news outlets have picked up on the story and adding their own conspiracies to explain the conspiracy. But the thing is there might not even be one. According to a statement from Nikolai Uskov, the editor-in-chief of GQ Russia, published in Nezavisimaya gazeta:
It is hard for me to comprehend how this company can prevent the distribution of its own magazine anywhere. What has reverberated on Ekho Moskvy and then repeatedly said on the Internet, is not completely correct: a Russian publisher, like any other media company, is an independent product. We’re not obligated to reprint American material, and moreover receive recommendations not to do so. I have personally not received any prohibitions or directions whatsoever from management about not translating or reprinting this article. But it would also not enter my head to do it. . . . Similar material in the Russian media would appear quite strange today. There is nothing in this article that is sensational.
Basically, the story is old news. And if there is an order to not translate and publish the story, Uskov hasn’t heard of it. That’s rather strange isn’t it?
So is Conde Nast’s act of “self-censorship” merely a back handed way to stir up criticism of Putin and the strangling of the press in Russia? Perhaps. But perhaps as Evgeny Morozov notes, it just might be pure incompetence on Conde Nast’s part and now they are suffering the whiplash of the Streisand Effect. After all, Conde Nast isn’t really getting anything from this but a bunch of negative press. But as they say even bad press is good press.
But the article and the whole stunt surrounding it might just be another opportunity to piss on Putin. Though the piss will come more in a trickle than a hot steady stream. His image among Americans is already so soiled that not even the toughest Tide Stain Release could wash it clean. One more story about a shadowy Putinist plot can’t make things any worse. Nevertheless, the timing is interesting. This week is tenth anniversary of the bombings and a month shy of ten years since Putin became Prime Minister. Digging up the conspiracy is just another reminder that the strongman of Russia might have gotten his power by exploiting a tragedy that was really carried out by his buds in the FSB.
Remember children, conspiracies happen over there in the dark shadowy world of Russia. It’s that whole “‘riddle wrapped up in an enigma” thang. Here in America, we rightfully dismiss our crackpot conspiracy theorists–from the 9/11 Truthers to the tin-foil wearing Trilateral Commission believers and Lyndon La Rouchites–for what they are: nutjobs. But their Slavic equivalents? Nah. Somehow they are bearers of the truth.
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Lol. It’s fun, that although I did not read that article, I was infuriated about GQ’s decision, and spent my time to find the article at Gawker.
I know well of the story and I disagree with Trepashkin’s views. But it’s the very attempt of censorship that drew me infuriated.
I guess, that’s alike what a number of Russian bloggers felt who helped the Gawker to prepare the Russian translation.
p.s. There’s nothing new, of course. Up to the moment there are at least three major websites which offer Russian translations of world press — InoSmi, InoForum, InoPressa.
One can speak not of the desire of Russians to learn from the West, but of the certain desire to break the Wall, and study the sources themselves.
Break what wall? Prokhanov wrote a whole novel about this theory. It’s a Zavtra mainstay.
Chris:
The good old one — “Another brick in the Wall”.
There’s no more Soviet Union; Russia and the U.S. are free democratic countries, but the wall stays.
You must be blind if you don’t see it every day.
I must be blind.
I think the wall is only visible to those outside of Russia. Once you’re inside it turns invisible. Come November I don’t expect to see it anymore either.
Sean, likely, we outside the United States do not know what to await from that country. And the possibility of a war is not the one to be neglected. Obama’s election helped the situation, but still the uncertainty stays.
Always question no.1, “Why now?”. There seems to be no rhyme nor reason to the timing.
As for question no.2 “Why did Scott Anderson take this on”, that is the real mystery.
As Sean has pointed out, none of this is new. Anderson is not some wet behind the ears journalist either looking to make his name with an easy piece on Russia. A quick web search shows that he has certain simplified views about Russia.:
Via On the Media http://www.onthemedia.org/yore/transcripts/transcripts_021403_battlefield.html
“Both sides have taken turns murdering journalists to ensure the story doesn’t get told. Chechnya, tiny little country, I think 16 or 17 journalists have been killed in an area the size of Connecticut, mostly by Russian soldiers. So– what that does is it ensures that Chechnya’s sort of off the radar. So the Russians can then characterize the conflict there however they want to.”
***
Brief bio via a restaurant website http://www.thehalfking.com/info/scott.htm
Scott Anderson
Scott Anderson is a war correspondent and novelist who has covered foreign conflicts on five continents over the past two decades. A contributing writer at the New York Times Magazine, his work has also appeared in Vanity Fair, Esquire, Harper’s, Outside, Men’s Journal and many other publications. Along with his journalism, he is the author of four non-fiction books, including The Man Who Tried to Save the World and, with his brother and fellow journalist Jon Lee Anderson, Inside The League and War Zones.
His first novel, Triage, was translated into eight languages, and his second novel, Moonlight Hotel was recently published by Doubleday.
A film inspired by his misadventures in Bosnia, in which he and several journalist friends were mistaken for a CIA hit squad, was made into The Hunting Party starring Richard Gere and Terrence Howard.
Scott is currently co-writing a screenplay with director Scott Elliott, under contract for Kennedy/Marshall Productions, based on his article, “Bringing It All Home,” (New York Times Magazine, May 29, 2006) about a Pennsylvania National Guard unit returning home from a tour in Iraq. He has also been contracted to write three screenplays based on his books or articles.
***
Via Jumpin Mag Online http://www.jumpinmagonline.com/page7.aspx
“Q: Is seems that Russia and Ukraine might be the next war zone.
A: Yeah, well…I think that the actual shooting war is going to be in Georgia and again possibly in Chechnya. I think the more alarming thing is that Putin is rebuilding the Soviet Union. Now he has tremendous natural gas reserves, that he can put the squeeze on Europe with. I was just there in September, and at that time people were feeling economically better off. Politically they keep murdering journalists. Political opposition parties just get banned.
Q: It seems that people are trusting in Putin the same way they did Stalin.
A: I don’t think to that degree. What Putin does is he buys off people. He has his little cadre of oligarchs that he supports. He moves against anyone that threaten him in anyway or stands in opposition to him. He is kind of a king maker, now he has his front man to pretend that he is the ruler. It is really interesting that when I there in September, about a month after Georgia, and the mood in Moscow was amazing. Everyone was really full of themselves. Putin’s popularity rating was like 87 percent. They really felt like, OK we just kicked the shit out of Georgia. Now we can dictate the Europeans. No one can touch us. Then the recession hit, and they just got took by it. That was just starting to happen when I was there. They kept closing the stock market on certain days, because the numbers were collapsing. At that time most Russians thought ‘oh this is only hurting the Oligarchs.’ Now it has spread all through society.”
***
Aleks, I think the answer to question no. 1 is the tenth anniversary of the bombings and Putin coming to power.
As for question no. 2, according to the passages you’ve cited, it seems that Anderson wants to add Russia to his belt.
I just hope that he speaks or at least reads a little Russian because he’s clearly bought the Russian liberal line, and they, always adept at English, can make a novice believe all sorts of crazy things and reaffirm the widespread myth among Americans that in Russia the Leader has some kind of supernatural control over all events and people.
Of all the Russian liberals, I respect only Novodvorskaya. Yes, it’s true that she is among the craziest of them. But she is strangely patriotic in the way, that she lives in Russia and attempts to participate in the political life here (she’s invited to TV talk shows, published articles in the press, etc.).
Even among the Russian patriots, Novodvorskaya is often referred to as “Baba Lera”, i.e. “Granny Lera”, where the irony is mixed with respect.
She is crazy. But she is a crazy Russian.
When do political opposition parties get banned?
By the way Sean, do you know where you’ll be stating in Moscow?
Chris:
“When do political opposition parties get banned?”
In minds of opinionated journalists, I guess.
This Anderson guy comes across as a complete tool.
I can’t bring myself to read the article. Does he mention anywhere that Khattab actually declared that he would begin a bombing campaign in Russian cities, or that Basaev originally blamed the bombings on Dagestani jihadis responding to the attack on Little Chechnya, by some coincidence the very same group that was eventually convicted for the bombings?
Chris & Sean, can you point me in the direction of any sources that take on the conspiracy theory that Putin was behind the apt bombings? I realize that this is like asking for proof against the idea that Bush engineered 9/11 (i.e., what respectable outlet would waste their time on that), but it would be very helpful for me to pinpoint the responsible retort.
Do a search on Anatole Lieven or Robert Bruce Ware. They’ve both talked about it.
Kevin, I don’t know of anything that specifically looked to disprove Putin’s involvement. I think that others, like Paul Klebnikov, just offer different explanations.
Klebnikov didn’t believe Putin was behind it, suggested that if there was a conspiracy among Russians it would have been Berezovsky or “maverick members of Putin’s camp.” But in the end, Klebnikov wrote: “The most likely explanation is that the attacks were in fact carried out by Chechen militants or by Islamic extremists acting on behalf of their embattled coreligionists.” (GFITK, 302-306)
Maybe Chris knows of some places you can look.
I do want to sound a kook alert for this article: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/larisa-alexandrovna/bombing-russia-and-media_b_278527.html
Here is the typical line: “The Gawker translation is of extreme importance. The fact that there is almost an entire media black-out of these allegations is astonishing. Why is this so important?”
If there is a media black-out then why is every Russian media outlet reporting on the GQ story?? Even so much that the Putin’s press secretary gave a response?
The kookiness of the comments to the article are also gems.
Crazy!
Lieven talks about it here: http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/4546.html
Giant quote:
Only with the bombings in Moscow and elsewhere in September 1999 that killed more than 300 people did the growing crisis make headlines in the West. Western reporting of these bombings was invariably accompanied by statements that proof of Chechen or Islamist responsibility for the bombings had not been established (no one claimed responsibility). It was also argued that the behavior of the security forces had been highly suspicious; notably, that they moved quickly to bulldoze the buildings affected by the Moscow blasts, thereby also perhaps destroying evidence, and that they carried out an alleged “antiterrorism” operation in the town of Ryazan, which involved planting explosives in a building-something of which they had apparently not warn-ed the local police. The blasts of course also seemed to be very convenient for Putin and his supporters. They created a great wave of public support for a new war in Chechnya and allowed Putin to present himself as a forceful and courageous leader in the run-up to the presidential elections of 2000.
This was all in itself correct; if not the Russian security forces, then it is certainly plausible that a tycoon supporter of Putin might have contracted such an operation. Yet, as far as the general Western discussion of the issue is concerned, the history of bombings in the North Caucasus was barely mentioned, nor was the character, antecedents, or links of Khattab and his men. Whatever the suspicions about pro-Putin forces, it should be obvious that the suggestion that a force largely composed of Arab Muslim extremists would have lacked the motive, the expertise, or the ruthlessness to carry out a terrorist bombing campaign against Russians is absolutely ridiculous.
In an interview with a Czech newspaper, Lidove Noviny, immediately after the September blasts, Basayev made the following remarks (he did not at that stage attribute the bombings to the Kremlin): “I denounce terrorism, including state terrorism used by the Russian empire. The latest blast in Moscow is not our work, but the work of the Dagestanis. Russia has been openly terrorizing Dagestan. . . . For the whole week, united in a single fist, the army and the Interior Ministry units have been pounding three small villages. . . . [A]ll this will go on, of course, because those whose loved ones, whose women and children are being killed for nothing, will also try to use force to eliminate their adversaries. . . . What is the difference between someone letting a bomb go off in the center of Moscow and injuring 10 to 20 children and the Russians dropping bombs from their aircraft over Karamachi and killing 10 to 20 children? Where is the difference?”
I have some sympathy with this point of view, which is almost identical to that expressed by an Algerian terrorist leader in Gillo Pontecorvo’s anticolonialist epic film, The Battle of Algiers. But that is the point. One could just as well put these words into the mouth of an Algerian, or a Palestinian, or a Kurd in Turkey-and if they were, would the United States media have the slightest sympathy for them?
To suggest that Khattab and his men had no motive to carry out the Moscow bombings is similar to suggesting that Osama bin Laden had no motive to attack the United States embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, killing hundreds of innocent Africans in the process. Bin Laden and Khattab share not only the same background but also exactly the same beliefs and attitudes. The tendency of too many Western commentators to believe automatically in Russian responsibility for the bombings is tragicomically reminiscent of the attitude of the old leftists for whom the anti-Israeli forces in the Middle East could do no wrong. Western Russophobes believe that Russia can do no right, and their views have colored Western media approaches.
Yet the bitterly anti-Western ideology of Khattab, Basayev, and their followers is not a matter of debate, and does not have to be sought out by intrepid journalists venturing to interview these men in the mountains of Chechnya. Their views can be found, on the Internet, in English, on the web site of the international mujahedeen in Afghanistan, at qoqaz.net. This is Basayev himself on the nature of the war (interviewed in early January 2000): “The crucifix is being raised anew and war is being declared against Islam and Muslims; this is proof that this war is like the Crusades, where all of Europe’s intelligence capabilities are geared towards providing Russia with information and other support. . . . The Russians and their supporters in the West are fighting us collectively, as Allah has described them: ‘And fight the unbelievers collectively as they fight you collectively.’”
And here’s Ware talking about it (way way down on the page here: http://cdi.org/russia/Johnson/8021-14.cfm
#14 – JRL 8021
From: “Robert Bruce Ware”
Subject: Ten Questions for John Dunlop (JRL 8017)
Date: Sat, 17 Jan 2004
John Dunlop has performed a considerable service by compiling a large quantity of information about the Nord Ost hostage crisis in an article titled “The October 2002 Hostage-Taking Incident” (JRL 8017). Dunlop presents this material in order to argue that the hostage incident was the result of a conspiracy between the Russian FSB and Shamil Basayev that was designed to discredit Aslan Maskhadov and thereby disrupt, what Dunlop regards as, tendencies toward a negotiated settlement of the conflict in Chechnya. Dunlop also asserts that, in 1999, similar alliances between Basayev and the FSB were responsible for the invasions of Dagestan and the apartment block blasts in Buinaksk, Moscow, and Volgodansk. He offers little evidence or argument for the latter claims, though some evidence has been presented elsewhere.
It is possible that Dunlop is correct, and no possibility can be disregarded. However, even the incomplete scenario that Dunlop paints is Ptolmaic in its complexity. For all of its merits, it remains an unwieldy and precarious stack of sub-hypotheses loosely connected by innuendo. In the absence of conclusive evidence, Dunlop does not explain why his account should be preferred to alternative explanations that offer greater simplicity and coherence. It would seem that Dunlop’s account would be further complicated if he were to attempt to address the following questions, which his account appears to beg:
1. If Basayev concocted the Moscow hostage incident in order to discredit Maskhadov then why, immediately after the incident, did Basayev claim full responsibility? Why did Basayev attempt to distance Maskhadov from the incident, and why did he acknowledge and accept the demotion with which Maskhadov punished him?
2. If Maskhadov had no responsibility for the Moscow hostage incident then why didn’t he condemn it while it was in progress? A similar question might be asked about the 1999 invasion of Dagestan?
3. Dunlop’s argument that Basayev conspired to discredit Maskhadov presupposes that Maskhadov was unable to control Basayev. But if Dunlop assumes that Maskhadov was unable to control Basayev then why does Dunlop think that negotiations between federal officials and Maskhadov (which, Dunlop believes, the hostage incident was intended to prevent) could have brought an end to the conflict in Chechnya? If Maskhadov were unable to control Basayev, as Dunlop assumes, then negotiations with Maskhadov would more likely have proven to be a meaningless exercise.
4. Dunlop argues that the Chechen terrorists who were responsible for the hostage incident intentionally “sabotaged” their own explosives that they brought to Moscow (in order to prevent them from detonating) because they did not wish to kill large numbers of Russian civilians. If that were true then why did they bring the explosives to Moscow in the first place? Certainly, Basayev does not hesitate to kill large numbers of Russian civilians, for he has claimed responsibility for several blasts that have done exactly that. Nor, on Dunlop’s account, does the FSB hesitate to kill large numbers of Russian civilians, since he holds the FSB responsible for the apartment block blasts in September 1999. Hence, if the explosives were brought to Moscow as a result of a conspiracy between Basayev and the FSB then it would seem difficult to explain why those explosives were intentionally “sabotaged” by the terrorists. Conversely, if the Chechen’s intentionally sabotaged their explosive devices in order to prevent them from actually detonating, then why did one of them explode at a Moscow McDonalds?
5. According to Dunlop’s information, some of these explosive devices were prepared by Arman Menkeev. Menkeev, who has a Chechen mother and a Kazakh father, went on to become “a Russian officer, a major, and a former deputy commander of a [GRU] special-forces detachment.” After the hostage incident Menkeev was arrested, imprisoned, interrogated, and released. If Menkeev prepared the explosives on assignment from the FSB then why was he arrested? If he prepared the explosives and was subsequently arrested, then why was he released? It would seem that the conspirators would not wish to draw attention to themselves by arresting one of their own. If they did so, perhaps due to a failure in communication, then why would they release him? If one of the government conspirators were arrested then it would seem more likely either that he would die mysteriously during his captivity, or that he would be convicted in a closed trial, sentenced to a remote detention center, and then quietly disappear. If Menkeev were part of a government conspiracy, then it seems unlikely that he would be arrested and then released after his arrest had attracted media attention. However, that is exactly what occurred, and Dunlop offers no explanation.
6. Since his invasion of Dagestan, the fortunes of Shamil Basayev have suffered a dramatic reversal. He has lost power, prestige, the admiration of the Chechen people, and one of his feet. Yet this is nothing compared with the on-going social catastrophe suffered by his fellow Chechens as a consequence of his actions. If, as Dunlop suggests, the invasion of Dagestan were the result of a conspiracy between Basayev and the FSB, then why would Basayev wish to repeat what was clearly the greatest mistake of his life by conspiring with them again? Moreover, Basayev would surely know that if he conspired with the FSB, and if his fellow Chechens were to learn of his betrayal, then they would likely take mortal revenge upon Basayev as well as many members of his family. Given the liklihood that a conspiracy would eventually come to light, can anyone be sure that Basayev would wish to place himself and his relatives in that position?
7. Why would federal officials have encouraged Basayev and Khattab to invade Dagestan at a time when many federal officials seemed to believe, as Basayev seemed to believe, that most Dagestanis would side with Basayev against Russia? Had the Dagestanis welcomed Basayev then it is unlikely that Moscow could have prevailed against the unified forces of Chechnya and Dagestan. If that had been the case, then Russia would have lost 70 percent of its Caspian seashore and access to considerable resources, including a pipeline. Moreover, Russia would then have confronted a viable and militant Islamist state on its southern periphery. In the summer of 1999, it was clear that many Russian officials, including Vladimir Putin, did not expect the Dagestanis overwhelmingly to resist the invaders from Chechnya. It therefore seems unlikely that they would have encouraged Basayev to invade Dagestan.
8. If the FSB is responsible for the apartment block explosions in September 1999, then why did Basayev make the following statement on September 9, 1999 (in an article by Petra Prokhazkova published in the Prague periodical, Lidove Noviny): “The latest blast in Moscow is not our work, but the work of the Dagestanis. Russia has been openly terrorizing Dagestan… For the whole week, united in a single fist, the army and the Interior Ministry units have been pounding three small [Dagestani] villages [Karamakhi, Chabanmakhi, Kadar- RBW]…And blasts and bombs — all this will go on, of course, because those whose loved ones, whose women and children are being killed for nothing will also try to use force to eliminate their adversaries. This is a natural process and it is yet more evidence of Newton’s third law, that each action generates a reaction… What is the difference between someone letting a bomb go off in the center of Moscow and injuring 10-20 children and the Russians dropping bombs from their aircraft over Karamakhi and killing 10-20 children? Where is the difference?”
Among those whose women and children were in Karamakhi during the federal assault was Ibn ul Khattab, Basayev’s Arab partner in the invasion of Dagestan. Khattab was married to a Karamakhi woman. On 15 September 1999, an Associated Press reporter (Greg Myre) quoted Khattab as saying: “From now on, we will not only fight against Russian fighter jets (and) tanks. From now on, they will get our bombs everywhere. Let Russia await our explosions blasting through their cities. I swear we will do it.”
The last of the apartment block blasts occurred on 16 September 1999, the same day that Basayev’s insurgents were driven from Dagestan. Dunlop does not consider that the blasts might have been retribution for the federal attack upon the Wahhabi enclave centered in the villages of Karamakhi, Chabanmakhi, and Kadar, which was in progress at the time.
Nor does Dunlop mention the credible convictions that resulted in the case of the first of the four apartment block blasts. That explosion occurred on 4 September 1999, in the Dagestani town of Buinaksk, near Karamakhi, Chabanmakhi, and Kadar. In the winter of 2001, a Dagestani court convicted five so-called Wahhabis from those same three villages for the Buinaksk apartment explosion. One of them, who had worked as a cook for Basayev and Khattab, admitted that he had brought the explosives from Chechnya beneath a truckload of watermelons. Later he retracted his confession.
9. Why would Khattab and Basayev have conspired with the FSB to stage an invasion of Dagestan, when it was clear that a likely outcome of that invasion would be the destruction of Karamakhi, the village of Khattab’s wife and the place where Khattab was spending much of his time? Wouldn’t Khattab have recognized that he was thereby creating an opportunity for federal authorities to attack his family, friends, and neighbors?
10. Why does Dunlop think that Moscow leaders would have been influenced by the peripheral efforts of various individuals and NGOs to inspire a negotiated peace in 2002? Why does he think that Russian leaders would be likely accept advice from Zbigniew Brezinski? Why does he think that Western leaders were increasing the pressure on Moscow to negotiate a settlement in 2002? Hasn’t it been widely agreed that Western leaders decreased their pressure on Moscow after 11 September 2001?
Dunlop’s analysis answers none of these questions. Moreover, he neither addresses nor refutes the evidence for Maskhadov’s complicity in the Moscow hostage incident that was compiled by Ralph Davis and myself and published in The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 16, 3, September 2003.
The simplest explanation for the invasion of Dagestan is that Basayev’s judgement was clouded by his own grandiosity. Perhaps he miscalculated the mood of the Dagestanis because he was unduly influenced by the Dagestani Wahhabis with whom he associated. In those years, Dagestani Wahhabis chronically overestimated their influence in Dagestani society, and would have had a clear interest in exaggerating their support during discussions with Basayev. On the other hand, the principal weakness of this explanation is that Basayev’s second entrance and exit from Dagestan (in September 1999) appeared to be too easy.
The simplest explanation for the 1999 apartment block explosions is that they were retribution by Wahhabis (drawn perhaps from throughout the North Caucasus) for the federal assault upon the Wahhabi enclave of Karamakhi, Chabanmakhi, and Kadar. The first apartment block blast occurred in Buinaksk, the town nearest to those villages, on 4 September 1999, just a couple of days after the federal assault began. The last apartment block blast occurred in Volgodansk on 16 September 1999, the same day that Basayev was finally driven from Dagestan. On the other hand, the principal weakness in this explanation is the incident at Ryazan, which it does not explain. Legitimate concerns are also raised by the closed, and consequently unsatisfactory, nature of the trial that recently convicted two men for the Moscow blasts.
The simplest explanation for the hostage incident of October 2002 is that Basayev conspired with Maskhadov to bring the Chechen conflict to Moscow. To his credit, Dunlop essentially has catalogued the weaknesses in this explanation. While that is a significant contribution, it is not a credible alternative explanation. However, Dunlop’s analysis does succeed in raising a number of important questions, and these deserve as much attention as the ten that I have noted above.
PS. I love Ware. He’s a Hegel scholar (specializing in Hegel and the philosophy of mathematics) and it really, really shows as he effortlessly runs logical circles around his opponents.
I know that guys at Wikipedia (notably, user Offliner) did a large job to reshape the article “Moscow apartment bombings”. Now it’s quite readable, and can be used as a good source.
Hey thanks. I’ll take a look at the Wiki entry.
Confession, or irony?
War Novelist: Scott Anderson
…
Great post, Sean. & Great comments too.
In the age of the internet, scanners, pdf format and hordes of Russian students in American universities the whole controversy was nothing but a PR stunt designed to boost the sales of the magazine.
Some journalists may have a hard time in Russia but internet is still uncensored as far as I’m concerned. Story like this can’t be kept a secret.
If that’s true, I would sincerelly suggest the Russian government to aid the further PR campaign of the magazine with a portion of polonium tea.