Сколько лет, сколько зим!

Poor analogy, given that it was at the end of years of war and after a “sneak attack” that dragged the US into the war.

Better to say it was “revenge”.

Which is also a useful word as regards matters involving Kosovo, Serbia, Georgia, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, etc.

This is a misunderstanding of what these people are. Russia cannot keep them out.

I do.

PS. I guess we now got better term for atomic bombing of Japanese towns – “overreaction”…

Jack Matlock was the US Ambassador in Moscow during Reagan and Bush senior (1987-1991). Excerpts from a just published essay he wrote on Russia and Georgia (link at the bottom).

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Of course, the Russian intervention was brutal and an overreaction. … However, most commentary has failed to note that U.S. and NATO actions over the past decade have set the stage for the Russian reaction. NATO bombed Serbia over human rights abuses in its sovereign territory without UN approval. It has occupied Kosovo ever since. Then, recently, the U.S. and many other countries recognized Kosovo independence, even though it is not independent in the full sense. It is, in fact a ward of NATO, which must still occupy it to keep order. At each stage of this process Russia protested, and before the recognition of Kosovo’s independence warned that they considered South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Pridniestr comparable situations.

We now say that Russia must respect the “territorial integrity” of Georgia. The Russians can answer that they appealed in vain for the U.S. and NATO to do just that in the case of Serbia, to no avail. The U.S. said that they had to recognize Kosovo’s independence because the Kosovars would never live under Serbian rule again given what had happened. Isn’t that precisely what the Ossetians and Abkhazians are saying in respect to Georgian rule? Do they have any justification for feeling that way? Has everyone forgotten that one of the first things Gamsakhurdia did when he was elected to lead Georgia was to revoke the autonomy of South Ossetia and when the Ossetians resisted, laid siege to Tskhinvali in the middle of the winter? Gorbachev was too distracted, too weak politically at the moment, and too wary of using force (lest it lead to civil war) to intervene in Georgia, but the Ossetians fought back, and soon Georgia dissolved in a civil war of Georgians against Georgians. Only with Shevardnadze’s return–and the help of Russian peacekeepers–was any semblance of order restored.

Let’s face it. Georgia was handed its independence. Georgians did not have to fight the Soviet Union or Russia for it. And the first thing they did was to try to subdue minorities in their midst and fight among themselves.

Oh, and–by the way–when President George H.W. Bush spoke in Kiev on August 1, 1991, and warned the non-Russian republics to avoid “suicidal nationalism,” he was referring to Gamsakhurdia’s attempt to subdue South Ossetia by force. (We briefed the press on this point, but not much got through in the coverage.) …
It should have been evident, from at least 1993, that the only way Georgia would regain sovereignty over South Ossetia and Abkhazia would be by letting tempers cool, developing their economy, and convincing–over time–the Ossetians and Abkhazians that they would be safer under Georgian sovereignty than as Russian-supported ministates. I believe Eduard Shevardnaze understood this, and whatever his other failings may have been, such as an inability to bring corruption under control, he did his best to avoid violent flare-ups. Saakashvili rejected this course and recklessly fell into the trap the Russians set. He is not stupid, and I can only conclude that he had been encouraged to believe that the U.S. would support an attempt to retake, first South Ossetia, then Abkhazia by force. This was the rationale for sending 2,000 Georgians to Iraq–to obligate the U.S., and eventually NATO, to support Georgia’s territorial ambitions.

If such encouragement was given by elements of the Bush administration, it was utterly irresponsible. In other conflicts over territorial sovereignty, the U.S. has normally avoided taking sides but insisting that conflicting claims be settled peacefully, by negotiation, no matter how long it takes. (Note China and Taiwan or Kashmir, or Kurdish claims to parts of Turkey, etc., etc.) To have encouraged even implicitly a Georgian attempt (once again!) to impose its rule on Tskhinvali by force was utterly irresponsible.

[... Matlock a bit on Ukraine...]

… as of now, the majority of Ukrainians do not want to be in NATO and an effort to bring Ukraine into NATO would almost certainly split the country and virtually force Russia to demand a referendum in the Crimea on Ukrainian sovereignty. Want to guess who is likely to win that referendum? …

… experience tells me that Georgia’s future lies in developing the areas it really controls, making clear that it will not use force to try to regain South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and taking care–the way the Finns have done ever since the Winter War–not to poke Russia in the eye. Nothing can weaken any country more in the long run than trying to rule people who don’t want to be ruled. Why not use foreign aid to rebuild, to integrate the refugees into Georgian society, to improve the economy and reduce corruption? If Liechtenstein can stay neutral, Monaco self-governing, and other mini-states scattered around Europe, why can’t, at least for a time, South Ossetia and Abkhazia? (Russia is unlikely, barring further “provocations,” to take them in formally.)

Saakashvili has made a serious mistake in letting Georgia become the spark of a great power confrontation. Nobody is going to benefit from this, for both Russia and the United States have much more important issues to deal with, particularly as regards nuclear weapons, terrorism and energy supplies. I believe that Russia’s reaction has damaged Russian interests and that the evident attempt to use a form of Russophobia in the U.S. election campaign is very damaging to U.S. interests. But the country that will suffer most if the confrontation becomes more militarized will be Georgia. It needs a leader who understands this.
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http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com/2008/09/ambassador-jack.html

Our unquestionable priority is to protect the life and dignity of our citizens, wherever they are.

This from the president of a country which insists that all citizens must carry an internal passport and register themselves with the authorities whenever they move anywhere? Yeah, some dignity he’s protecting.

We will also protect the interest of our business community abroad.

Presumably this means he doesn’t want Russian businesses abroad being treated the same way foreign businesses are treated in Russia.