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The Medvedev Doctrine
September 3, 2008 |
On Friday, Tbilisi broke diplomatic ties with Moscow in protest to statements that Russia plans to absorb South Ossetia and Abkhazia in “several years.” Moscow responded by closing its embassy in Tbilisi.
The EU also stepped up warnings against Russia by announcing it would suspend talks for a long term partnership agreement as long as there are Russian troops inside Georgia. The Russians, using something called “salami tactics,” looks to divide Europe from itself and from the US. And who are the targets of Russia’s culinary karate chop? Germany and France.
American Vice President Dick Cheney has left the building for Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Ukraine. Too bad. I as looking forward to his speech at the RNC. In Azerbaijan, Cheney looks to secure energy agreements to prevent Baku oil from going to Russia. “The U.S. is afraid that Azerbaijan will begin sending its energy resources through Russia instead of Georgia, and this question will be one of the main points of the visit,” says Vafa Guluzade, a Baku-based political analyst and former presidential adviser.
Cheney’s trip to Georgia and Ukraine are to let both nations know that the US has got their back. Or, in the words of Mark Parris, a former U.S. ambassador to Turkey, “Cheney’s mission is to stiffen [their] spine.” The Wall Street Journal sees Cheney’s trip to the region as a possible signal of a tougher American policy toward Russia. One wonders how traction said policy would get in an Administration that has four months left in power. Perhaps the $1 billion economic aid package to Georgia is a sign of commitment. Cha-ching! It just goes to show that it pays to be a proxy.
The Christian Science Monitor is looking for cracks in “Putin’s kingdom.” The CSM article is really quite a silly. First, forget the fact that Putin isn’t President anymore, yet he keeps being treated as he is. Who is really in charge can be debated to the end of time. But a few Russian policy experts disagreeing with Putin somehow means that there are “cracks in his kingdom”? Please. “The strong man has started to show his weaknesses,” writes Paul Quinn-Judge. I thought serious analysts would understand the difference between reality and the cult of personality.
If you really want some laughs see Ed Lucas babbling about the Britain’s politicos kowtowing to the “oil-fueled fascist kleptocracy ruled by secret police goons and their cronies.” Ed, keep pushing those book sales up, up, and up.
The real President of Russia, Dmitri Medvedev, however, is just getting started. Perhaps people should be paying more attention to him rather than Prime Minister Putin. As the interview above shows, Dima has a vision. In this vision Russia defines its own destiny, and presumably the destinies of its “near abroad.” This so-called the “Medvedev Doctrine” is predicated on five points:
International law
“Russia recognises the primacy of the basic principles of international law, which define relations between civilised nations. It is in the framework of these principles, of this concept of international law, that we will develop our relations with other states.”
Multi-polar world
“The world should be multi-polar. Unipolarity is unacceptable, domination is impermissible. We cannot accept a world order in which all decisions are taken by one country, even such a serious and authoritative country as the United States of America. This kind of world is unstable and fraught with conflict.”
No isolation
“Russia does not want confrontation with any country; Russia has no intention of isolating itself. We will develop, as far as possible, friendly relations both with Europe and with the United State of America, as well as with other countries of the world.”
Protect citizens
“Our unquestionable priority is to protect the life and dignity of our citizens, wherever they are. We will also proceed from this in pursuing our foreign policy. We will also protect the interest of our business community abroad. And it should be clear to everyone that if someone makes aggressive forays, he will get a response.”
Spheres of influence
“Russia, just like other countries in the world, has regions where it has its privileged interests. In these regions, there are countries with which we have traditionally had friendly cordial relations, historically special relations. We will work very attentively in these regions and develop these friendly relations with these states, with our close neighbors.”
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There are a few new develops concerning the aftermath of the war. Georgia has admitted using cluster bombs in a letter to Human Rights Watch. The letter emphasized that the bombs “were never used against civilians, civilian targets and civilian populated or nearby areas.” But they whole thing with cluster bombs is not when they were used. The problem is with the unexploded bomblets left after their use.
HRW’s allegations that Russia used cluster bombs has yet to be independently confirmed. For an excellent breakdown of HRW’s allegations see Moon of Alabama. Here’s the main thesis:
The ammunition in question is of Israeli origin and was used by the Georgian military. The Georgian Ministry of Defense has now admitted as much. HRW now also acknowledges this in a new press statement. But it continues to claim Russian use of such weapons. It does so by pointing to its own older reports which clearly misidentified Georgian cluster ammunition as Russian made. HRW has still to show any proof for its continuing accusations against the Russian Federation.
Georgia has released casualty figures for the war. There were 169 soldiers and 69 civilians killed. And what of the figures deaths at the hands of marauding Ossetian militiamen? After all, cleansing is messy business.
Finally, I direct your attention to Tony Wood’s “What Condoleezza Said” in the London Review of Books. The article is for subscribers only but I know that JRL carried it today. I found this passage about the rapid increase of Georgia’s military budget deserving of more discussion.
The arrival of Saakashvili changed the picture considerably. His push for Nato membership, and the funds and equipment supplied by Washington, gave military substance to his determination to regain control of the two territories. Georgia’s military spending went from $84m in 2004 to $339m in 2006; in July 2008, the Georgian parliament approved a budget which raised it to $1bn. Since 2004, Saakashvili has alternated between conciliatory offers of autonomy within Georgia and implicit threats to resolve the situation by force. The Ossetians were offered autonomy in 2005, but rejected it, and in 2006 voted for independence in a referendum Tbilisi did not recognise. Instead, in spring 2007 Saakashvili set up a parallel pro-Georgian government in South Ossetia – copying the Kremlin’s policy in Chechnya in 1995 and 1999. Retaking either territory by force, however, was still militarily unfeasible.
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RIA Novosti- Global Voices: Russia
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RE: ‘Medvedev Doctrine’
-Doesn’t this essentially summarize Russia’s foreign policy posture since Primakov was FM? It appears that the only elements that have changed are Russia’s willingness and ability to act on it.
I found this passage about the rapid increase of Georgia’s military budget deserving of more discussion.
I seem to recall that Russia’s military budget is 40 times that of Georgia’s and was increased 20% from 2007 to 2008.
Georgia’s apparently rapidly increasing budget is a statistical misnomer in my opinion - they essentially had zero military budget before 2004. That had to change. And any change was going to look like a huge percentage growth in military spending. It is really kind of a joke to point at their budget and wring hands. I recall they have 9 fighter aircraft, only 6 of which are actually flight-worthy. Most of their heavy armaments are still export-quality Soviet equipment.
So yes, if they want to join NATO, money is going to be spent. Lots of it. Not as much as Venezuela or Iran is buying from Russia, but still lots. And if you’ve been reading JRL, you know that even Shevardnadze says in recent interviews that Georgia is right and doing what is in their best interest in moving to join NATO.
So if even the guy who was supposedly beaten in the “Rose Revolution” supports Georgian NATO membership, where is the opposition to that in Georgia?
I would be remiss to not point out that Condoleeza “Redneck” Rice has announced a $1 billion foreign aid package for Georgia today.
So, step up to the big boy table, Saakashvili. You’re finally getting some “real” money out of the US government.
Claim of a multipolar world - that’s cool!
Since Khrushchev none of our leaders do not knock boots on the table.
Rating Medvedev rising, the stock market falls
“I seem to recall that Russia’s military budget is 40 times that of Georgia’s and was increased 20% from 2007 to 2008.”
But the relevant comparison here is with the budgets of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, not Russia.
Just small not. Venezuella and Iran have money. Georgia - does not.
So someone will have to pay. And that “someone” will decide what Georgia “wants”.
“Кто за девочку платит, тот её и танцует” (с)
PS. Air traffic control system of Georgia is part of NATO’s system already…
Isn’t Russia’s military budget about as transparent as China’s (i.e. not very)? It has gone through several hikes and I suspect that there is some quantity of obfuscation in it. We can piece bits together, selling off $$$ military locations, funding for kontraktni, upgrades & salaries, but the total?
It seems that they have taken a leaf out of the chinese book, denial of information. The US military has openly declared that it is unhappy with Chinese military cooperation as it would be good for ‘both sides to build trust’. BS of course - having good relations, i.e. direct access to generals and base visits provides very useful military intel such as preparedness of force, quality etc. The less the US military knows about the opposing military, the more more ‘unknowns’ and thus the more possibilities, all absorbing intel manpower resources. As Santa Klaus said(?) “half of all warfare is deception”. Russia stiffing NATO relations would suit Russia much better than NATO, especially if they could get NATO to break the ties…
In this light, I also question the analysis of Russia’s military capability in Georgia. Why didn’t they use their latest gear etc. etc.? Not ruling out incompetence or other, why would Russia risk any equipment that could actually be effective against NATO in Georgia? If captured or used (such as radar), it would only help NATO create counter-measures and render all those R&D $$$ more or less useless. If they could crush georgian forces numerically with older gear (though at the cost of a few lives), then why risk it?
And what of the use of ‘irregular’ forces? The best way to counter anti-tank groups is not to send tanks. These groups will choose the best ambush locations which means that they would not be so hard to find by irregular forces…
As for effectiveness of systems, it plays both ways of course. We often hear from unnamed western military experts that the S-300 system would be ‘deadly’ to NATO forces and much bleating of such systems ending up in Iran or Syria, yet the fabled ‘Tor’ system failed to deal with Israel’s airstrike on the alleged syrian nuclear site. We know (it has been written about) that the US acquired S-300 systems from the Ukraine in the 1990s and also from its producer in Russia, Almaz (who’s head was assassinated not long after) and use equipment to mimic S-300s in its war games it holds with military allies in Nevada(whatever).
The only thing that is certain is that there is a lot of deception going on by both sides.
BTW, Israel has supplied Azerbaidjan with similar UAV systems, has Migs from the Ukraine and Byleorussia and probably similar stuff to what Georgia has/had.
As long as Medvyedev doesn\’t take his eye off the ball and forget about dealing with corruption at home as he claims/ed is his prime policy as P…
This sounds more like a policy than a doctrine. The usual differentiator between policies and doctrines is longevity, e.g. the Monroe or Truman doctrine. Who remembers the doctrines of Hoover, Eisenhower, Nixon, Carter, Reagan or Clinton?
Our unquestionable priority is to protect the life and dignity of our citizens, wherever they are.
This from the president of a country which insists that all citizens must carry an internal passport and register themselves with the authorities whenever they move anywhere? Yeah, some dignity he’s protecting.
We will also protect the interest of our business community abroad.
Presumably this means he doesn’t want Russian businesses abroad being treated the same way foreign businesses are treated in Russia.
[Some of you probably already read Matlock. Here are some excerpts that I posted elsewhere. Ivanov, you will probably like at last some of it.]
Jack Matlock was the US Ambassador in Moscow during Reagan and Bush senior (1987-1991). Excerpts from a just published essay he wrote on Russia and Georgia (link at the bottom).
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Of course, the Russian intervention was brutal and an overreaction. … However, most commentary has failed to note that U.S. and NATO actions over the past decade have set the stage for the Russian reaction. NATO bombed Serbia over human rights abuses in its sovereign territory without UN approval. It has occupied Kosovo ever since. Then, recently, the U.S. and many other countries recognized Kosovo independence, even though it is not independent in the full sense. It is, in fact a ward of NATO, which must still occupy it to keep order. At each stage of this process Russia protested, and before the recognition of Kosovo’s independence warned that they considered South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Pridniestr comparable situations.
We now say that Russia must respect the “territorial integrity” of Georgia. The Russians can answer that they appealed in vain for the U.S. and NATO to do just that in the case of Serbia, to no avail. The U.S. said that they had to recognize Kosovo’s independence because the Kosovars would never live under Serbian rule again given what had happened. Isn’t that precisely what the Ossetians and Abkhazians are saying in respect to Georgian rule? Do they have any justification for feeling that way? Has everyone forgotten that one of the first things Gamsakhurdia did when he was elected to lead Georgia was to revoke the autonomy of South Ossetia and when the Ossetians resisted, laid siege to Tskhinvali in the middle of the winter? Gorbachev was too distracted, too weak politically at the moment, and too wary of using force (lest it lead to civil war) to intervene in Georgia, but the Ossetians fought back, and soon Georgia dissolved in a civil war of Georgians against Georgians. Only with Shevardnadze’s return–and the help of Russian peacekeepers–was any semblance of order restored.
Let’s face it. Georgia was handed its independence. Georgians did not have to fight the Soviet Union or Russia for it. And the first thing they did was to try to subdue minorities in their midst and fight among themselves.
Oh, and–by the way–when President George H.W. Bush spoke in Kiev on August 1, 1991, and warned the non-Russian republics to avoid “suicidal nationalism,” he was referring to Gamsakhurdia’s attempt to subdue South Ossetia by force. (We briefed the press on this point, but not much got through in the coverage.) …
It should have been evident, from at least 1993, that the only way Georgia would regain sovereignty over South Ossetia and Abkhazia would be by letting tempers cool, developing their economy, and convincing–over time–the Ossetians and Abkhazians that they would be safer under Georgian sovereignty than as Russian-supported ministates. I believe Eduard Shevardnaze understood this, and whatever his other failings may have been, such as an inability to bring corruption under control, he did his best to avoid violent flare-ups. Saakashvili rejected this course and recklessly fell into the trap the Russians set. He is not stupid, and I can only conclude that he had been encouraged to believe that the U.S. would support an attempt to retake, first South Ossetia, then Abkhazia by force. This was the rationale for sending 2,000 Georgians to Iraq–to obligate the U.S., and eventually NATO, to support Georgia’s territorial ambitions.
If such encouragement was given by elements of the Bush administration, it was utterly irresponsible. In other conflicts over territorial sovereignty, the U.S. has normally avoided taking sides but insisting that conflicting claims be settled peacefully, by negotiation, no matter how long it takes. (Note China and Taiwan or Kashmir, or Kurdish claims to parts of Turkey, etc., etc.) To have encouraged even implicitly a Georgian attempt (once again!) to impose its rule on Tskhinvali by force was utterly irresponsible.
[... Matlock a bit on Ukraine...]
… as of now, the majority of Ukrainians do not want to be in NATO and an effort to bring Ukraine into NATO would almost certainly split the country and virtually force Russia to demand a referendum in the Crimea on Ukrainian sovereignty. Want to guess who is likely to win that referendum? …
… experience tells me that Georgia’s future lies in developing the areas it really controls, making clear that it will not use force to try to regain South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and taking care–the way the Finns have done ever since the Winter War–not to poke Russia in the eye. Nothing can weaken any country more in the long run than trying to rule people who don’t want to be ruled. Why not use foreign aid to rebuild, to integrate the refugees into Georgian society, to improve the economy and reduce corruption? If Liechtenstein can stay neutral, Monaco self-governing, and other mini-states scattered around Europe, why can’t, at least for a time, South Ossetia and Abkhazia? (Russia is unlikely, barring further “provocations,” to take them in formally.)
Saakashvili has made a serious mistake in letting Georgia become the spark of a great power confrontation. Nobody is going to benefit from this, for both Russia and the United States have much more important issues to deal with, particularly as regards nuclear weapons, terrorism and energy supplies. I believe that Russia’s reaction has damaged Russian interests and that the evident attempt to use a form of Russophobia in the U.S. election campaign is very damaging to U.S. interests. But the country that will suffer most if the confrontation becomes more militarized will be Georgia. It needs a leader who understands this.
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http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com/2008/09/ambassador-jack.html
Matlock was paid by this old fox Putin for sure. And Kolya - I’m sure - is a member of “бригада”.
PS. I guess we now got better term for atomic bombing of Japanese towns - “overreaction”…
“Who remembers the doctrines of Hoover, Eisenhower, Nixon, Carter, Reagan or Clinton?”
I do.
“And what of the use of ‘irregular’ forces?”
This is a misunderstanding of what these people are. Russia cannot keep them out.
CC, you are of course right (even the mighty NATO could not ‘control’ the KLA when it returned) , but I wasn’t referring to pissed off locals who are only interested in revenge. More in the sense of guerrilla warfare and using sabotage units (preferably locals but under proper disciplined military command(!)) sent in advance to clear the way rather than the usual soviet style military doctrine.
So Saakashvilli was imitating Russian policy in Chechnya and Russians countered with imitating NATO approach to Kosovo?
I guess we now got better term for atomic bombing of Japanese towns - “overreaction”…
Poor analogy, given that it was at the end of years of war and after a “sneak attack” that dragged the US into the war.
Better to say it was “revenge”.
Which is also a useful word as regards matters involving Kosovo, Serbia, Georgia, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, etc.
Keep up a good job! Easy on the Russian government!
DIMA!!!!!
Сколько лет, сколько зим!