How did Han Solo put it to Chewbacca after he was freed from carbonite in Return of the Jedi? Oh yeah, he said, “I–I’m out of it for a little while, everybody gets delusions of grandeur.” There I was in Israel with a self-imposed ban on blogging and war ignites between Russia and Georgia. In an instant, the information I was gathering on Russian immigrants and Israeli street kids suddenly appeared less relevant.
While Han Solo’s “delusions of grandeur” was meant to be ironic in Jedi, its current application to Georgia lacks ironic overtones. Just what was President Mikhail Saakashvili thinking when he sent Georgian troops into South Ossetia? Did he really think that Russia was going to sit by and twiddle its thumbs? Did he think that his paltry contribution of America’s War on Terror and its support for Georgia’s NATO membership was enough political capital for US save him? Was the move simply a cynical effort to propel Georgia’s international victimhood in the face of big bad Russia? Or was it a desperate attempt quell his own domestic travails by uniting the country against the external Other? Enquiring minds want to know.
Whatever the answers may be, one thing’s for sure: Saakashvilli fucked up. And fucked up bad. Trying to reestablish Georgian hegemony in South Ossetia with military force has only place his country in mortal danger. Now Georgia is at Russia’s mercy, and given how the Russians already think that Georgia is a child that needs a good spanking, the whipping might end up being worse than necessary just to prove a point. Kind of reminds me when my grandfather would get so infuriated, he would tell one of us, “Boy, go get me a switch from the tree.” It’s almost in a weird Oedipal way, by attacking South Ossetia, Saakashvilli was volunteering to pick the perfect switch for Daddy Russia to beat him with.
This is not to say that Russia hasn’t played the abusive Father in all this. You can cite, as many have, all of the Russia attempts to inflame the situation: supporting South Ossetian and Abkhazian rebels, issuing passports, and declaring itself Ossetia’s protector. Russia is the real power here and its using it to constantly poke Georgia.
But ultimately the blame game is rather boring. There just isn’t much analytical power in repeatedly saying, “It’s Russia’s fault!” “No, its Georgia’s fault!” If one wants to attribute blame then it might better to capture the situation as a dialectical Mobius strip and move on. This is what I think Charles King is trying to point to in his comment in the Christian Science Monitor. He writes:
Russia illegally attacked Georgia and imperiled a small and feeble neighbor. But by dispatching his own ill-prepared military to resolve a secessionist dispute by force, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili has managed to lead his country down the path of a disastrous and ultimately self-defeating war.
Unfortunately, language must be presented linear. The more pro-Russian/Georgian reader will find fault and satisfaction in this statement. When read simply, Russia, by virtue of it being mentioned first, comes out the bigger aggressor, tempered by Saakashvilli’s brash and ill advised solution. I would suggest that the reader freely exchange the order of the sentences to escape determinism.
However, the main thing one should notice is that this effort to equally blame Russia and Georgia is predicated on a kind of colonial erasure. Namely, absent from this formulation are the South Ossetians themselves. Their agency is rendered invisible or worse reduced to the body upon which the larger powers dance. Perhaps we should redo the narrative to include them?
The reality is that South Ossetia is not alone in its aspirations for ethnic self-determination. The situation in South Ossetia, as with other places where political borders don’t align with ethnic ones, is kind of ethno-waste of modernity. When the Bolsheviks drew up its Republics, Autonomous Regions, and autonomous oblasts in 1936, the North Caucuses was an artificially crafted mosaic where political borders ran counter to (emergent) ethnic ones. The Ossetians where split politically into North and South, while their ethnicity remained unified. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the South Ossetians became one of the many internal Others for the Georgians to proclaim their new found nationalism. That is, Great Georgian Nationalism was predicated on its vicious denial to the Other. Brutality comenced. As Human Rights Watch reported in 1996,
Between 1989 and 1992, fighting flared in the South Ossetian A.O. and in Georgia between ethnic Ossetian paramilitary troops and Georgian Interior Ministry (MVD) units and paramilitaries. South Ossetia had demanded to secede, and Georgia cracked down on the renegade area by sending in troops. Approximately 100,000 ethnic Ossetians fled Georgia and South Ossetia, and another 23,000 Georgians headed in the other direction. One hundred villages were reportedly destroyed in South Ossetia. Also the North Ossetia-Georgian border went largely uncontrolled, providing an almost unhindered access point for weapons, fighters, and ammunition in both directions.
Since then South Ossetia has overwhelming approved seceding from Gerogia in two referendums, yet their right to self-determination remains ignored.
Contrary to Cold War Triumphalists, neo-Hegelian End of Historyites, Kantian Perpetual Peaceniks, and the Death of Nation State globalists, walls continue to be erected to create or harden ethnic-religious identities. If the symbol of the 20th Century was the Berlin Wall, the 21st appears to be marked by its fragmentation and redepolyment across a variety of ethno-political spaces. The concrete walls at the US-Mexico border, Israel-Palestine, and the streets of Baghdad (For the conjunction between walls and Shia and Sunni ethnic cleansing see Derek Gregory’s excellent “Biopolitics of Baghdad“), have their biopolitical and virtual expression in the new states of Southeastern Europe and the aspiring ones in the Caucuses, South Asia, and China. The formerly bipolar world of the 20th century has begotten a shotgun splatter of ethno-nationalist states of the 21st.
This is why, however much people want to point to South Ossetia as a Russian proxy, they still have to somehow account for the fact that South Ossetians gleefully take those passports, use Russian currency, and are running not into Georgia but into Russia to escape the violence. I think we have to remember that however one wants to attribute blame for the conflict, there are some real reasons why the South Ossetians want to ditch Georgia altogether. Yet in all the reporting that has come out in the last few days, the South Ossentian voice as an agent of his or her own present and future has been more or less muted. In its place has stood a number of metonyms: Russia, Putin, Georgia, rebels, proxies, oil pipelines, NATO, the United States . . .
Human Rights Watch has shed some light on the situation. According to documents provided by the Russian Operative Headquarters for Providing Humanitarian Assistance to the Residents of South Ossetia, from 8 August to the afternoon of 10 August, the Russian Federal Migration Service recorded 24,032 people crossing the border to Russia. Given that the population of South Ossetia is a mere 70,000, that is quite a large percentage of the population. Perhaps more telling is that 11,190 of them have gone back, many of which “to join to volunteer militias of South Ossetia.” Granted, as HRW admits these figures are hardly accurate given the fluidity of the situation. They should merely be taken as a snapshot of what Ossentians are doing in all this.
As for the violence, here is what HRW has culled from refugee interviews:
Human Rights Watch visited a camp for the displaced in the village of Alagir and interviewed more than a dozen individuals, including those from Tskhinvali and neighboring villages. Those from the city reported spending more than three days in the basements of their houses, unable to come out because of the incessant shelling. Two individuals from Tskhinvali – a mother and her pregnant daughter – said their apartment building was severely damaged by shells and they only dared to come out of the basement on the fourth day, early in the morning of August 10, when Russian troops took full control of the city and started transporting local residents to a safe zone. They said the convoy consisted of six buses (about 27 people each), escorted by the military to the safety zone.
Residents of Satskhenet village told Human Rights Watch that after the village came under heavy artillery fire on the night of August 7, all women, children and elderly (more than 100 people) started fleeing their homes; most of them spent the next two days hiding in the woods and then trying to make their way toward the Russian border. They were assisted by the Russian military in the village of Ger and transported to North Ossetia.
Many families were separated while fleeing the fighting in South Ossetia, and to date they have not been able to obtain any information as to the fate and whereabouts of their relatives whom they left behind.
This seems to confirm RAI Novosti‘s telling of events a few days before the Russian military entered the conflict.
South Ossetia has evacuated more than 1,000 children across the border into Russia since violence broke out on Friday. The separatist authorities say six people were killed and 15 injured in mortar and sniper attacks from Georgian forces. Georgia had denied using snipers, and says it only retaliated against South Ossetian grenade attacks.
On Sunday, a total of 543 evacuees arrived in Russia’s North Ossetia, and over 500 are expected to arrive by Monday evening.
South Ossetia’s Interior Ministry said on Monday that Georgia had deployed a howitzer battalion and two mortar batteries along the border over the weekend, while police posts on the southern outskirts of the separatist republic’s capital, Tshinvali, had come under sniper fire.
South Ossentian rebel leader Eduard Kokoity told Interfax that up to 1,400 killed by Georgian troops. The Independent quoted Ludmila Ostayeva, 50, a resident of Tskinvali who fled to the Russian border, “I saw bodies lying on the streets, around ruined buildings, in cars. It’s impossible to count them now. There is hardly a single building left undamaged.”
Given these images, it’s rather funny to read Saakashvilli’s op-ed in today’s Wall Street Journal as he conjures the historical images of Russian aggression. “This invasion, which echoes Afghanistan in 1979 and the Prague Spring of 1968, threatens to undermine the stability of the international security system,” he writes. He goes on to explain to American audiences how “This war is not of Georgia’s making, nor is it Georgia’s choice.” Nor is it simply about the South Ossetia or Abkhazia. Indeed, he claims, this war was designed by the Kremlin to crush freedom. The war is more about those lofty ideas about “the kind of Europe our children will live in” and “the future of freedom in Europe.” All of these can easily be turned against himself.
What is most wondrous however is Saakashvilli’s geographic wizardry. It’s also ironic since geography as an expression of knowledge and power is part of the problem. Georgia, he asserts, is part of Europe and part of “our common trans-Atlantic values of liberty and democracy.” This war is about Georgia’s self-determination; a self-determination which apparently is rooted in denying the Ossetians theirs.
There is yet another problem with the IRA analogy. South Ossetia was not being bombarded by a terrorist group located in a foreign territory; it was being bombarded by a foreign territory.
I also apologize for my tone. I get carried away when I polemicize — it’s a holdover from my editorial-writing days.
I realize this is my billionth post today and I may have already eclipsed Averko on the Hall of Shame, but would really, really pisses me off regarding Saakashvilli is the constant lying.
First, we have “the Russians bombed the pipeline!” Then British Petroleum comes in and says “no they didn’t. We would have noticed.”
Then, we have “80% of our casualties are military,” which morphed within a day into “90% of our casualties are civilians.” This is actually conceivable, but IMO very doubtful unless the Einsatzgruppen showed up.
Then, we have the claim, repeated over and over, that “Russia has occupied Gori,” which turns to be, again, bullshit.
I was just listening to the Beeb where they were interviewing a few people from the balts and Poland. One made an interesting comment about ‘russian passport holders’ how this is a strong reason for Russian action.
This leads to the logical question that considering the non-status of quite a number of russians in the Baltic states, wouldn’t those authorities now be more inclined to give them citizenship rather than making them jump through more hoops???
@Cyrill
1: True, it is unlikely that Russia will attack anything larger than a peanut (either of the roasted or salted kind), but it now introduces an element of doubt. This is now a serious calculation that needs to be taken into account and prepared for which also will have a number of knock on consequences of different proportions.
As is most of the case, perception can count for as much as reality and even more. The rough rule is 5% action, 95% effect. As to how this will work out with regards to Russia is anyone’s guess.
2: As for doing something economically to Russia, your point is contradictory. OTOH you point that something can be done, but on the other you point out that Russia needs to sell its energy. Firstly, if Russia produces very little, then it is selling very little to the Euro-atlants and there is little to sanction in the way of goods. Secondly, who does Russia sell its energy to? Europe. It does not have an alternate source. I note that Russia is now building a branch line to Daquing in China… So your point about mutual dependency supports my point that nothing substantial can be done economically to Russia without hurting those who impose the punishment….
3: Re. the G8, it is a legacy institution and Russia joined it a long time ago as G7+1(?). It was about prestiege and the benefits that Russia thought would flow from being in such a club. No serious economist thinks the G8 has much relevance any more for a number of reasons, starting with why isn’t China a member?
4: Your points about the WTO are well taken, but as with all large trans-national institutions, there is a strong element of politics. How is it the Ukraine is in the WTO? Is it less corrupt or more corrupt than Russia? Not to mention that particularly with a country like Russia, other ‘unofficial’ issues can be tagged on to membership criteria.
Further evidence of where politics trumps golf club rules is the entry of Bulgaria and Romania into the European Union. Neither fulfilled the Justice and Home Affairs chapter of the acquis communautaire, the body of european law that must be adopted before entry, and now both states are being sanctioned for still being corrupt and funds are being withheld. It was a political decision to let them in, strongly pushed for by the UK and France.
The big question to do with corruption is whether Medvyedev’s announced platform to crush corruption will actually have any effect. He has already announced that there are several hundred investigations into state corruption at all levels…
I’m not sure about what you mean “new crop of BTC-like pipelines being built.” Even if such pipelines are built, they will hardly diminish Europe’s dependence on russian energy in the near, middle or long term..
5: The pushing refers to the steady expansion of NATO right up to Russia’s border and it turning from a defensive military organization in to an active offensive and expeditionary one. Not to mention missile defense and sponsoring ‘democratic’ coups. The words coming from the euro-atlants may be soft, but the actions are hard. Are the Russian’s paranoid? Who wouldn’t be considering their history and long borders.
6: I think there is something about Kosovo not being able to join Albania, but there is also a clause that it is not allowed to have an army. It is just sophistry. The borders between Kosovo and Albania are practically non-existant and NATO is training and setting up a ‘security force’.
As for Russia and S. Ossetia, my guess is that in part of any cease-fire agreement, they will demand some sort of demilitarized zone between the two. Putin and co. are going to try and do this as cheaply as possible and such an agreement is the way to go rather than paying for the permanent presence of very large numbers of russian troops there. If the Russians are clever enough, they’ll get the UN to pay for it and the other ‘peace-keepers’ (if they are allowed) will come from non aligned countries such as India. We’ve seen in Kosovo how the ‘right kind of peace-keepers’ impose the ‘right version’ of a UN implemented peace plan…
7: I’m not entirely sure what you mean to say about Afghanistan, but if I am correct, I find that unlikely if only for the fact that Russia has by far the largest ‘diplomatic’ presence there. At the end of hostilities, Russia flew in 10 Il-76′s worth of equipment to Kabul, but despite this one hears very, very little about presence of the Russians there.
It looks similar to the relationship between France and Algeria, i.e. despite the extreme historical nastiness, they are still closely linked economically and politically and both keep quiet about it. One day the euro-atlants will leave which will leave the Russians.
“How is it the Ukraine is in the WTO?”
Magic space ponies?
On the subject of bad historical parallels (1938, 1956, 1968, whatever), I’d like to throw my hat in to the ring. With regards to Georgia, who in the West that played the equivalent role of former ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie, who intoned to the then leader of Iraq, Saddam Hussein, that ‘whatever you do is fine with us’?
The Glaspie transcript (not confirmed by US State Department):
http://whatreallyhappened.com/WRHARTICLES/ARTICLE5/april.html?q=ARTICLE5/april.html
Any bets? No prizes.
‘We cut Georgia arms sales months ago’ – Israel
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1218104259498&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull
“Several months ago, we carried out an evaluation of the situation in Georgia and realized that Georgia and Russia were on a collision course. We have good relations with both, and don’t want to back either in this conflict,” the official said. “We therefore made a decision to drastically minimize sales of weapons to Georgia.
Frantic requests from Georgia to Israel for military hardware leading up to the current conflict with Russia set off alarm bells at the Ministry of Defense.
“We saw that there was a surge in requests for weapons, and we therefore decided to, in effect, minimize the entire issue. After our decision, we sold only defensive weapons in small quantities to Georgia,” he said. “If Georgia asks us to send in first aid to treat casualties, we will oblige. But we will not get into the heart of the war between Georgia and Russia,” he added.”
Funny that, no one else saw the war coming. The israelis may not have sold any weapons systems recently, but they still had advisors and probably provided spare parts for exisiting systems.
It looks to me that Israel wants to keep good relations with Russia, which considering all the bellicose statements about ‘dealing with Iran’, does not jive. It seems as if someone still needs Russia….
Speaking of Saak’s war, I would like to draw everybody’s attention to what this fucktard said a few hours before blowing the shit out of Tskhinvali with this thing http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p-lGwyySrwY:
——
Georgia is undertaking an immediate, unilateral cease fire.
We do not have the will to respond to violence with yet more violence.
We have been tolerating this for so many years. We have not responded to so many provocations throughout the years, to countless violations. No other state would have shown such restraint. Please, do not test the Georgian state’s patience. Because this is your country, which is willing to defend each of you.
Let’s stop this spiral of violence. I address everyone: Let’s do everything to stop the escalation—today, tomorrow, or the day after—and return to the negotiating table. Let’s use every possible format—direct, multilateral, and other formats—to overcome this absolutely critical situation, to come out of this unacceptable deadlock in which we all find ourselves.
My dear people!
I rely on your wisdom, on your historical experience, that lies in our shared past and in our genes.
This is the Caucasus, where violence harms everyone.
Let’s give peace and dialogue a chance.
I really believe in you!
http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php…=natural%20ally
a peanut
I apologize, my peanut comment was unnecessary.
2: As for doing something economically to Russia, your point is contradictory. OTOH you point that something can be done, but on the other you point out that Russia needs to sell its energy. Firstly, if Russia produces very little, then it is selling very little to the Euro-atlants and there is little to sanction in the way of goods.
I was referring to consumer and agricultural goods. As for energy, yes, it completely cuts both ways but other sources can potentially be found, while for Russia, there is very little that can substitute a drop in state revenue with over 60% of it coming from energy commodities. I am not suggesting it is easy, just possible.
3: Re. the G8, it is a legacy institution and Russia joined it a long time ago as G7+1(?).
Not really a legacy institution. A rich boys club is never a legacy institution.
How is it the Ukraine is in the WTO? Is it less corrupt or more corrupt than Russia?
I have no knowledge of trade related corruption in the Ukraine. As for membership, it is a matter of process – signing bilateral agreements with each member.
Further evidence of where politics trumps golf club rules is the entry of Bulgaria and Romania into the European Union. Neither fulfilled the Justice and Home Affairs chapter of the acquis communautaire, the body of european law that must be adopted before entry, and now both states are being sanctioned for still being corrupt and funds are being withheld. It was a political decision to let them in, strongly pushed for by the UK and France.
European Union membership process has been ridden with problems from the very beginning, when countries like Italy with chronic budget deficits suddenly trimmed their books to satisfy the 3% rule. And it later became apparent that even France and Germany never really qualified. Validity of memberships in institutions wasn’t my point, only that if needed, these memberships can be used as levers.
The big question to do with corruption is whether Medvyedev’s announced platform to crush corruption will actually have any effect.
I think that the only way to seriously reduce (underline the reduce) corruption is to make government less powerful in daily business related decision making. So far, most of Putin’s policies lead in the opposite direction. I doubt Medvedev’s policies will change any of it regardless of investigations.
I’m not sure about what you mean “new crop of BTC-like pipelines being built.” Even if such pipelines are built, they will hardly diminish Europe’s dependence on russian energy in the near, middle or long term..
Sure they will. Having three sources is better then one.
5: The pushing refers to the steady expansion of NATO right up to Russia’s border and it turning from a defensive military organization in to an active offensive and expeditionary one.
I personally see no reason for Russia not to be a member of NATO if it would wish to join. It has to qualify, but I do not think there are any fundamental reasons beyond Russia’s desire to stand alone.
Who wouldn’t be considering their history and long borders.
This logic would prevent Germany and France from being in the same alliance ever.
7: I’m not entirely sure what you mean to say about Afghanistan
Stingers.