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“Putin’s historic achievement”
April 5, 2008 |
Michael Idov’s ” The Hibertation” in the New Republic is a must read.
The New Republic
The Hibernation by Michael Idov
Meet Dmitri Medvedev, a docile president for a docile Russia.
Post Date Wednesday, April 23, 2008Minutes after the polls closed on March 2 in the westernmost Russian city of Kaliningrad–certifying a blowout victory by presidential candidate Dmitri Anatolyevich Medvedev, handpicked heir to Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin– the men of the hour made an appearance at a massive concert underway in Red Square. As broadcast by NTV, a television channel owned by Gazprom (where Medvedev chairs the board of directors), the scene looked like something out of Mission: Impossible. A low-placed camera tracked alongside Putin and Medvedev, dressed Kremlin Casual in a boxy leather jacket (Dima) and a parka (Volodya), as they strode, to a rock beat, across the convex cobblestone expanse of the square. The shot’s director, perhaps taking another cue from Tom Cruise movies, had removed background extras or anything else the eye could use to calibrate the heroes’ heights: Medvedev is 5′4″ to Putin’s 5′7″. The action duo climbed onto the stage, and Medvedev–a professed headbanger who had had a box reserved at the Led Zeppelin reunion show in London on the day Putin named him his successor–got to live out a rock ‘n’ roll moment. He grabbed the mic and yelled “Privet, Rossiya! Privet, Moskva!” (the Russian equivalent of “Hello, Cleveland”). The square went wild. His fervor subsiding, the president-elect segued into an anodyne victory speech about the need to “fortify stability” and “improve quality of life.” The crowd began chanting “Con-grats! Con-grats!”–an unusually impersonal choice of a mantra. Medvedev passed the microphone to his benefactor, and the chant immediately changed. “Pu-tin! Pu-tin! PU-TIN!!!” Medvedev politely smiled.
This episode is likely to repeat, in one form or another, throughout the first months and even years of Medvedev’s rule. If it seems as if Russia has elected a man nobody knows anything about, it’s because Russia, with a complacency easily mistakable for contentedness, didn’t really elect Dmitri Medvedev at all. It reelected Vladimir Putin, in the way Tibetan monks pick the same Dalai Lama each time, regardless of the human form he’s taken. The rubber- stamping of the Kremlin candidate illuminates a useful truth about Russian society: Putin’s stifling regime and the country’s oil-fueled prosperity are viewed not as unrelated phenomena but as cause and effect. Medvedev, even as he formally represents the end of that regime, is also its ultimate triumph.
Popularity: 6% [?]
Comments
146 Comments so far
“Putin’s stifling regime ”
Has this person ever been in Russia?
He’s a young NYC-based writer from an émigré family originally from Latvia. He was born in Riga.
From the artcle:
“The morning after Medvedev’s victory, on Pushkin Square, I joined a group of about 60 young Nashi men and women with government-issue flags huddled, under freezing rain, in front of an outdoor stage.”
Chris — Is it my imagination or do you ask that question about every journo with whose stuff you disagree?
I like this:
“Instead, there’s a new language of cynicism. In the past few years, Russian has acquired an extraordinary number of energetic slang terms for various subspecies of fraud: raspil (embezzlement), otkat (kickback), otzhim (hostile takeover). Every street rally, every public opinion is assumed to be zakazano and proplacheno–”ordered” and “paid up.” The most fashionable pose is that of a conspiracy theorist: Belief in a shadowy world government, be it KGB, CIA, or Jews, is mainstream and commonplace. This thinking, of course, has the side benefit of excusing the thinker of any responsibility.”
A well-written article by someone who clearly doesn’t understand economics and politics. The assertion that Russia’s growth since 2000 has been entirely due to oil prices is simply wrong - the economic reports from the World Bank and even the Economist Intelligence Unit have been saying this for a long time now. Second, Idov amazingly asserts that today’s Russia is characterized by ‘zastoi’! Why are these journalists amazed that Russians aren’t rearing to tear down a system or leadership that has provided so many successes? For some reason, in Russia, if you aren’t anti-system, then you aren’t a part of the ‘opposition.’ This is an obvious holdover from the Cold War mentality. Why doesn’t he write an article about how American democracy is in a state of ‘zastoi’ because nobody votes for Ron Paul or Ralph Nader? The previous comment pointing out Idov’s Baltic emigre background is instructive. Years of kitchen table discussions about evil Russians tends to make an impression.
“Chris — Is it my imagination or do you ask that question about every journo with whose stuff you disagree?”
Your imagination is running wild!
Funny, I don’t feel stifled.
““Instead, there’s a new language of cynicism. In the past few years, Russian has acquired an extraordinary number of energetic slang terms for various subspecies of fraud: raspil (embezzlement), otkat (kickback), otzhim (hostile takeover). Every street rally, every public opinion is assumed to be zakazano and proplacheno–”ordered” and “paid up.” The most fashionable pose is that of a conspiracy theorist: Belief in a shadowy world government, be it KGB, CIA, or Jews, is mainstream and commonplace. This thinking, of course, has the side benefit of excusing the thinker of any responsibility.”
Belief in a shadowy world government is mainstream and commonplace?
“Second, Idov amazingly asserts that today’s Russia is characterized by ‘zastoi’!”
Yeah, I know. Where’s the stagnation? I think the writer just wanted to use the word.
Sometimes I miss good old Soviet days because people who “Belief in a shadowy world government is mainstream and commonplace” were getting free medical help.
Now they have to work hard and write something stifling… poor boy
“It has its own banking system (Gazprombank, which doesn’t deal in rubles”
http://www.gazprombank.ru/eng/private/index.wbp
For retail customers
“Gazprombank offers the following services to retail customers:
cash and settlement service in Russian roubles and US dollars;
money transfers in Russian and foreign currencies;
deposits in Russian roubles, US dollars and EURO … ”
I think this sums up the whole article
I noticed that he mentioned Tibet. It’s now a world mainstream fashion - no article without Tibet?
PS. Sorry Sean, I couldn’t got further than three first paragraphs.
I respect freedom of speech as loong as it’s not freedom of facts.
Michael - “Putin’s status as the head of United Russia”
UR web site - http://www.edinros.ru/news.html?rid=2812
“It has its own banking system (Gazprombank, which doesn’t deal in rubles”
check http://www.gazprombank.ru/eng/private/index.wbp
For retail customers
“Gazprombank offers the following services to retail customers:
cash and settlement service in Russian roubles and US dollars;
money transfers in Russian and foreign currencies;
deposits in Russian roubles, US dollars and EURO … ”
I think this sums up the whole article
I read the whole article and, frankly, don’t know what you guys are whining about. Perhaps he’s mistaken in a couple of places (I certainly cannot judge whether he made any mistakes), but were those mistakes fatal. Even great articles sometimes contain factual erroes. The point is whether those error totally undermined his case.
Jesse you wrote: “The assertion that Russia’s growth since 2000 has been entirely due to oil prices is simply wrong.” Maybe I missed it, where did Idov makes such a claim. He does write about Russia’s “oil-fueled prosperity”, but that is far cry from saying that all of Russia’s growth is “entirely due to oil”.
Moreover, I thought that his explanation for his use of the word “zastoi” was quite adequate. Readers can disagree with him on that, but he was not capricious in using that word. And Jesse, although the word “zastoi” is not used in the US, I read my share of American commentators lamenting the sense of stagnation in American politics and the apathetic indifference that this engenders.
As Jesse pointed out - “Years of kitchen table discussions about evil Russians tends to make an impression.”
+1
I also didn’t get the answer - is Tibet is a must in any article now?
I agree with Kolya. Excellent piece. Captures well the irrelevancy of the so-called opposition, the cynicism of the intelligentsiya, and the — what? — possibilities under Medvedev.
And he got Nashi dead to rights in a few words. I suspect he’s read Sean’s chronicles.
A few factual details wrong, but everyone gets some things wrong.
Ivanov - I’d be grateful if you would force yourself to read beyond three paragraphs so that we at least have something worthwhile to disagree over.
The reference to Tibet was actually very apt, as a metaphor for how power manifests itself.
OK, if Tibet is a must - as Stalin and Lenin quoting in every Soviet written document - let me say something also.
F&^K Tibet, F&^K D-lama.
So, fn, you think that Tibet was apt in the article?
But I got the impression that the author tried to impress readers with his English skill and pretend to be extremely smart (by using long sentences with rare words), but he completely lost the point in the process…
“It reelected Vladimir Putin, in the way Tibetan monks pick the same Dalai Lama each time, regardless of the human form he’s taken. The rubber- stamping of the Kremlin candidate illuminates a useful truth about Russian society: Putin’s stifling regime and the country’s oil-fueled prosperity are viewed not as unrelated phenomena but as cause and effect. Medvedev, even as he formally represents the end of that regime, is also its ultimate triumph.”
Just try to read above pile of words - and translate to plain English. I bet if everyone will “translate” above pile and then we’ll compare translations - it would be fun
PS. if a car is “oil-fueled” - do you think we might also suspect that it is moved by Space forces or pedal power? Not likely.
So if our rizhskiy friend wrote “oil-fueled prosperity” - most likely the chances are that he meant exactly what Jesse said.
off-top
For bot writers!
secret words are:
sea
fine
trout
better
near
space
At least I’m getting only them. Aha! I know what it means!
Fine trout better near sea space.
Sean, did you have to set anti-bot dictionary manually by yourself?
Sean, thanks for posting this, I might not have seen it otherwise and I thought it was a damn good article.
To the folks nitpicking (I especially like the Americans-turned-ура-патриоты) - it’s funny to see people happily residing outside of Russia so quick to reject an article about the atmosphere in the country written by a guy who has been there since before the election, clearly did a fair amount of legwork and old-fashioned reporting (hanging out with Nashi, chatting with people like Gel’man, who can hardly be considered an “opposition” figure) and does not seem to subscribe to a simplistic view of Russian politics. Obviously the guy has a point of view (he hardly hides it), but I’d hope that those of you who make a habit of mocking Western media coverage of Russia would at least give Idov a bit of credit for this:
The Western press likes to kid itself that Putin’s regime is crushing a potent revolt. “They always wanted us to give the opposition viewpoint,” chuckles a former reporter for The New York Times’ Moscow bureau. “Where’s the opposition? More opposition! We were like, ‘It’s really not about the opposition here.’”[…]
To call the Other Russia, a coalition of anti-Kremlin forces, disorganized or rudderless is to hugely understate matters. It is a leftover stew of political views–combining literally everyone who isn’t a Putinist or a communist in one of history’s least organic alliances. Given any measure of power, it would fracture in seconds.
I also thought the word zastoi was out of place - until I read the next sentence:
Economically booming, politically resurgent, today’s Russia is also culturally stagnant in the widest sense.
As for “oil-fueled” - Jesse, can you do a post or something debunking this myth or at least provide some links to the reports you mention? I confess I’m not an economist - the last econ class I took was in high school. I keep hearing about all of the reports validating the idea of the Russian economic miracle (in other places I’ve seen “IMF reports” - also unlinked - cited), and I was there to see some of their policy innovations during VVP’s first term - the introduction of the new tax and labor codes, for example - and saw some of the results - more foreign cars (including more and more produced in Russia), a Western-standard retail sector accessible to the middle class, consumer credit and mortgages (the latter developed, BTW, thanks in no small part to a US-gov’t-seeded investment fund), etc. - so I agree that they took affirmative steps to improve the economy. But do you really think Moscow would be quite so blingy if oil had stayed at $25-30/bbl (roughly where it was before 9/11)?
I’ll grant that the growth figures of plenty of oil-less post-Soviet economies since 1998 prove that growth in the region can be achieved without oil (query, though, why some of those other countries have outpaced Russia - I guess perhaps they just had lower baselines).
And I have seen lots of discussion elsewhere of the various methodologies for calculating GDP figures and accusations that the figures can be gamed to make Russia’s growth and size look less impressive than it is. But I still think it’s no accident that the year of Russia’s financial crisis directly coincided with a downward spike in oil prices (see chart), and it’s no accident that Russia’s resurgence has coincided with soaring oil prices. Really, even if you give credit to VVP & Co. for not screwing things up, how can the positive impact of high oil/gas prices on the Russian economy be denied?
The previous comment pointing out Idov’s Baltic emigre background is instructive. Years of kitchen table discussions about evil Russians tends to make an impression.
For a minute, I thought I was reading some Nashi member’s LJ. Please, isn’t it enough that prejudiced comments like this clog blogs all over RuNet?
“And Jesse, although the word “zastoi” is not used in the US, I read my share of American commentators lamenting the sense of stagnation”
Sure, but “zastoi” in Russian usually means ECONOMIC stagnation, which Russia, with one of the fastest-growing economies in the world, is not experiencing.
Who cares what American commentators think anyway? The US is a declining power. One should be more attentive to what they are saying in China and India.
“As for “oil-fueled” - Jesse, can you do a post or something debunking this myth or at least provide some links to the reports you mention?”
Look for the IMF report for last year. It’s online.
“For a minute, I thought I was reading some Nashi member’s LJ. Please, isn’t it enough that prejudiced comments like this clog blogs all over RuNet?”
Weak rhetorical trick.
Chris, do you assume that everything is a cynical “rhetorical trick”? Is it wrong to somehow point out a statement that is prejudiced on its face and to point out that such statements are more prevalent at other types of online venues?
I mean no offense to Jesse, and he’s probably right to make an assumption about a point of view that may be prevalent among a certain group of people, but to draw a conclusion on the basis of that assumption puts his comment in the realm of racial profiling. Actually, I was thinking that his comment is perhaps akin to someone dialing up a bunch of Rev. Wright’s sermons on YouTube and making a comment like this:
“Pointing out Obama’s church membership is instructive. Years of hearing sermons about evil Whitey tends to make an impression.”
Actually, it’s worse, since none of us has any idea what was discussed at the kitchen table in the Idov family - or what impact any discussions might have had on his work (after all, don’t people sometimes rebel against their parents’ views?) - and to make assumptions about that on the basis of someone’s ethnicity is the textbook definition of prejudice.
Actually, perhaps a better comparison would be a comment dismissing anything critical of the US written by someone who was born in the Soviet Union before, say, 1975. After all, “Years of official indoctrination about evil Americans tends to make an impression.”
Although as we all know, in most cases, it didn’t make an impression. Anyway, I really mean no offense to Jesse (he is the only SRB commenter I’ve actually met in real life!), that comment just rubbed me the wrong way.
Lyndon, thanks for good comparison
“Actually, perhaps a better comparison would be a comment dismissing anything critical of the US written by someone who was born in the Soviet Union before, say, 1975. After all, “Years of official indoctrination about evil Americans tends to make an impression.”
The only problem - you made a wrong conclusion. Look at Cyrill - and try to find anything critical about US
Oh! One mistake, Lyndon, - we are talking about kitchen propaganda, not official one
Lyndon: “an article about the atmosphere in the country written by a guy who has been there since before the election,”
I even voted - so I guess I can smell that “atmosphere” as well
Lyndon: “clearly did a fair amount of legwork and old-fashioned reporting”
I’m not a reporter. Never taken any classes. So might be wrong to think that old-fashioned legwork should look different. Something like
“Vasya from Nashi told me bla-bla-bla. Taxi driver told me f**k-f**k-f**k, NYT reporter said bla-bla-bla. Then I went to the store and saw ….Then I passed babushka etc.” This would allow readers to feel atmosphere over there, right?
Lyndon:”how can the positive impact of high oil/gas prices on the Russian economy be denied?”
Who is denying IMPACT? Please point us out so we could nitpick the bastard to the ban
But it was Idov who claimed that Russian prosperity is “oil-fueled” only. As you know (without economy classes) shit could happened even with the country full of oil and nothing but the oil (Nigeria comes to mind)…
PS. Idov expressed his opinion about atmosphere. And this is his right that I respect. But I personally think he has some problems with the nose
Lyndon,
-Econ. Growth - read the EIU viewswire from last June (http://www.economist.com/agenda/PrinterFriendly.cfm?story_id=9354403)
byline = “It’s not about just oil and gas.” This is especially ironic considering the ‘reporting’ done by the section of the Economist that doesn’t rely on facts. Also, Da Russophile has done an insane amount of excellent blogging debunking the ‘oil-fueled’ myth. Check out this post (http://darussophile.blogspot.com/2008/03/editorial-fighting-russophobes.html)
The ‘oil-fueled’ line is bunk not only because it plays fast and loose with the facts, but also because it’s a mainstay of the Russophobe’s argument - that any positive development in Russia is attributable to oil. They ignore the improvements in the regulatory environment that have caused domestic and foreign investment to grown at breakneck speeds. Also, if Russia was spending its ‘windfall’ from oil profits - versus stashing it in a stabilization fund - inflation would spiral out of control and likely undermine that hard-earned stability from the past 8 years.
-Baltic Peoples: I wasn’t trying to be racist. I’ve met many first generation Russian-Americans who have never been to Russia and instead were raised with horror stories of the USSR. And even though Idov did spend time in Russia, it seems that he sought out the story that he ultimately told. His acknowledgment that Other Russia is not a popular organization reflects his overall hipster theme - that these guys are hip to the facade that is modern Russia, while anyone who is optimistic about the future is a total moron.
Look for the IMF report for last year. It’s online.
Well, Chris, not to be difficult, but the IMF has a lot of reports about Russia on its website, and none immediately jumps out as being “the one” from last year. There are several reports from last year (a couple of Article IV Consultation Reports, one Selected Issues report, and a couple of Working Papers) - I’m going to do a bunch of pasting from these various reports, and I apologize in advance if this turns out to be a long post.
Most likely, you’re referring to a report from April of last year which asked the question “Diagnosing Dutch Disease: Does Russia Have the Symptoms?”
The report notes the following:
Oil and gas exports have contributed significantly to recent output growth in Russia. Crude oil, oil products, and gas together account for almost 60 percent of Russia’s total export revenues,4 and for an estimated 20–25 percent of Russia’s gross domestic product (GDP). In recent years, record high oil prices have generated significant windfall revenues, have put the real exchange rate on an appreciation path, and have stimulated the economy to the point of overheating. (p. 3)
But it ultimately concludes that:
We conclude that, while Russia does appear to have all of the symptoms, the diagnosis of Dutch Disease remains to be confirmed. Although we find evidence of real appreciation, a declining manufacturing sector, an expanding service sector, and rapid real wage growth, more research is needed to determine that these symptoms are not caused by other factors. Nevertheless, the risk of Dutch Disease exists and warrants close monitoring. (p. 23)
For example, they note that wage growth may have been caused by “de-shadowization” of wages after 2000 and that the growth in the service sector relative to manufacturing may be natural for a “transition” economy and as households become richer. This is a very interesting report, and I recommend it - here’s the link again (but be careful with the pdf’s in FireFox, as they sometimes crash it).
Moving on to other reports from last year, here is the paragraph from last May’s Article IV Consultation report which seems most relevant to the discussion (my emphasis added):
18. The energy sector is now weighing on the long-term outlook. The oil sector is not expected to recover over the medium-term from the precipitous decline that took place in 2004-2005. Thus, having previously contributed significantly to economic growth, it is now becoming a drag on growth in the sense that it is projected to expand at only half the pace of the economy at large. This also means a sharp decline in the relative importance of a sector that has been the main source of revenue to the budget and of foreign exchange inflows in the past, which in turn significantly increases the risk of the external current account and the real exchange rate overshooting their long-term equilibrium if the fiscal relaxation of the non-oil deficit continues in the coming years, as discussed above. In this regard, the poor performance of the oil sector as the state has assumed greater control in recent years and the equally disappointing performance of the state controlled gas sector over a much longer period stand in stark contrast to the strong growth of the privately controlled energy sector until recently, suggesting that the state may not be the best steward of this important sector. While the long-term goal should clearly be to diversify the economy away from dependence on the natural resource sector, this sector provides Russia with a strong comparative advantage and its resources could help spur growth and economic transformation if harnessed through the right policies.
Seems like that’s just saying that the performance might not be as good in the future as it’s been in the past, because - guess what? - governments are not always the best managers of natural resource wealth. I guess that is the conclusion one would expect from the IMF, but it is surprising, Chris, based on your feelings about the 1990s in Russia, that you are willing to rely on their analysis in these matters at all.
The October “Selected Issues” report discusses oil mainly as a cause of inflationary pressure (to the extent that I can understand the economic jargon therein - see p. 11). Here I think we can all agree that oil wealth may be a mixed blessing, but again I’m not sure how this bolsters the argument that the growth of the 2000’s thus far was not due in large part to high oil prices (that seems to be the case Chris and Jesse are trying to make).
the fall Article IV report, here’s the first sentence:
High oil prices, a strong catch-up potential, and sound fiscal policy underlie
Russia’s long spell of robust growth.
So, oil is one of three major factors, and without it there would have been no room for VVP & Co. to pursue their sound fiscal policy of salting away the windfall. The report also notes the strong growth in other sectors and greater “balance” in GDP growth in 2006, and have the following assessment, which would seem to bolster an argument that oil has been a crucial factor in the past but is no longer the only factor in Russian growth:
37. Russia’s macroeconomic performance continues to impress. Much is owed to high oil prices and large capital inflows, but also to good economic management. Most important in view of the dependence on oil prices, the stabilization fund is providing a notable measure of stability, helping self-sustaining growth in the form of rising investments and a positive nexus of high growth in productivity, real wages, and consumption to take hold. The acceleration in investments, even with receding oil prices and uncertainty relating to political transition, points to the robustness of investor sentiments at this time.
They also note, though, that the “balanced-budget oil price” will be rising from $30/bbl in ‘06 to $55-60/bbl in ‘09 (para. 42), which suggests that Russia is to a certain extent coming to rely on higher oil prices (even, one might say, “doubling down” on the role of the energy sector).
And this:
48. Improving the investment climate is the main long-term challenge. Despite the increases in recent years, the level of investments remains relatively low. Moreover, Russia scores poorly in international comparisons of the investment climate. The limited progress with regard to important reforms—not least, civil service, public administration, and legal reforms—has been of limited consequence so far because high oil prices and the still strong catch-up potential have entailed robust growth.
“Box 1″ on page 20 of the report discusses strong financial sector and consumer credit growth - this is not oil sector growth, but would it really be as strong as it is if not for the underlying oil wealth? “Box 2″ on page 21 lauds the government for introducing reforms which will limit the amount of oil money that goes into the budget, but it’s talking about a smart policy move for the future, not about the growth of 2000-2007.
In conclusion (now that I’ve burned a couple of hours wading through these reports), I can certainly agree that the Russian government has managed the oil windfall well and that today other areas of strength in the economy have developed. I still think it’s incorrect to insist that oil has not been a critical factor in Russia’s growth under Putin, and I’d still argue that it has been the critical factor.
Note that calling it “oil-fueled” means just that - oil fueled the growth, not that oil was exclusively responsible for it. Obviously no one is suggesting that management had nothing to do with it. After all, pouring more gasoline into a Zaporozhets won’t make it faster than a BMW. But Russia’s sound policies and previously underutilized human capital (the “BMW,” in case you need me to connect the dots of my oblique analogy) could not have started the engine and put the pedal to the metal without the fuel.
Jesse, thanks for the links - I will check them out soon, for now my head is still spinning from all those IMF reports and other stuff I was looking at (I’m going to risk the wrath of Sean and do one more long post which I hope people will find edifying)
-Baltic Peoples: I wasn’t trying to be racist.
I know, sorry if I went off a bit on that.
I’ve met many first generation Russian-Americans who have never been to Russia and instead were raised with horror stories of the USSR.
Oh, so have I. My favorite was a Russian-American I met once with an MBA from a good school who had a rather unglamorous and not high-paying job crunching numbers for a law firm but had never considered going to Moscow to seek his fortune. After talking about it with him for a while and suggesting he look into it, I realized he just didn’t think anything good could come of his going there to work.
And even though Idov did spend time in Russia, it seems that he sought out the story that he ultimately told. His acknowledgment that Other Russia is not a popular organization reflects his overall hipster theme - that these guys are hip to the facade that is modern Russia, while anyone who is optimistic about the future is a total moron.
Well, perhaps he was infected by the cynicism he was chronicling…
A couple of letters from the March/April issue of Foreign Policy (I’m pasting here because the full text is only accessible through paid databases):
Lilia Shevtsova (”Think Again: Vladimir Putin,” January/February 2008) is a remarkable political scientist. But when a specialist, even one as qualified as she, begins discussing the problems of another sphere of competence, the risk of error is high. I am not simply referring to some peculiar expressions such as, “The proportion of goods and services in Russia’s exports is a mere 1.7 percent” (exports are, as a matter of fact, the transport of goods out of a country, and nothing else). These are trifles. More important is Shevtsova’s assertion that Russia’s economic growth is entirely due to high oil prices. This is an error I can’t ignore.
Dynamic economic growth in Russia began in 1990 during a period of low oil prices. Between 2000 and 2003, growth continued, while oil prices in real terms were close to the relatively low rates of 1986 to 1999. This was the environment surrounding the Soviet Union’s economic collapse. Only from 2004 onward did prices in real terms begin to approach the abnormally high levels of the late 1970s and early 1980s. It is true that Russia’s budget and balance of payments, just as those of, say, Norway, are strongly dependent on the strength of the oil market. But one should also remember that the Russian authorities took several responsible steps at the time, including using the “superincomes” from high oil prices to repay government debt.
An honest analysis of economic growth in Russia proves that oil is by no means the main engine of economic growth. In 2007, oil-production growth was approximately 2 percent, while output growth in machine building was 20 percent. Against a backdrop of extremely low growth rates in the extraction of mineral resources, production in the manufacturing industries rose by more than 9 percent.
Having a fairly strong understanding of the structural problems that the Russian economy faces, I have much to disagree with regarding the economic policies pursued by the current government. But even if one does not like a policy, it is nevertheless better to stay within the realm of facts when assessing it.
-YEGOR T. GAIDAR
Director
Institute for the Economy in Transition
Moscow, Russia
Lilia Shevtsova replies:
Yegor Gaidar [does] not argue with my key assertions regarding the trajectory of the Russian system; indeed, we have a common platform. As for the details, [his] comments only contribute to the Russian narrative.
Gaidar disagrees with the assertion that Russia’s “economic gains have a false bottom-high oil prices.” In his view, the oil price is not the main engine of economic growth. Fine-I trust Gaidar’s expertise. But then what is the “main engine” of this growth? Would this engine work without high oil prices, and would it be sustainable?
In fact, we can turn to Gaidar himself for some answers. In his brilliant new book, Colbpse of an Empire: Lessons for Modern Russia (Brookings Institution Press, 2007), Gaidar concludes that “Russia’s economy, like the USSR’s before it, is becoming dependent on keeping oil prices at historically anomalous levels.” That sounds remarkably like a false bottom to me. Does economic growth in Russia actually translate into development, or is it indeed an obstacle to modernization? […]
OK, I know that at this point I’m acting like you-know-who (I dare not speak his name, but the anagrams one can create with it are amazing) and quadruple-posting, but I want to share one more bit of source data on the topic of oil & Russia’s economic growth.
Excerpts from an interview with Kudrin last week:
[Kudrin] said the oil and gas sector’s share of the economy would fall from 21% to 14%-15% in the next four years. “We won’t be able to sustain the sort of oil and gas sector revenue that is being used for federal spending,” he said, explaining the need to cut public spending. […]
Russia earned an extra $475 billion in 2000-2007 due to high oil prices, Kudrin said.
In 2000 the forecast oil price was $20 per barrel, which was the average price in the preceding 10 years. Since then the price above $20 per barrel has brought Russia a windfall of $475 billion, of which $340 billion - 72% - went to the budget.
In that way, Russia was able to prevent the ruble from strengthening too much. It also helped to keep down inflation, Kudrin said.
Thirty percent of the windfall went to budget spending, 34% to retire foreign debt, and the remaining 36% went to the stabilization fund.
To give you an idea of the scale of a $475bn windfall, that amount is greater than the country’s total GDP for 1999 and 2000 put together, and larger than annual GDP for all individual years until 2003. On the other hand, it’s less than 10% of the total GDP for the years 2000-2007 (see this chart for the figures).
Sean et al., I apologize for the flood.
Shevtsova (who I think is awesome and whose new book I am currently reading) asks: “But then what is the “main engine” of this growth?”
Answer: An extremely educated workforce (especially in the hard sciences and technology fields), rising consumer demand, and, most importantly, rising domestic/foreign investment. This is not only portfolio investment, but the actual acquisition or creation of factories - e.g., VW, Coca-Cola.
To be clear, I’m not denying the role oil has played in helping Russia recover - I think almost half of its exports are carbon-based (even though this hasn’t been an export-based recovery). But, there are two points:
1. Every country benefits from whatever happens to be in the ground.
2. Resources do not = wealth. As I said before, if Russia had in fact used the wealth from oil production for spending to keep the population fat and happy, then inflation would skyrocket. In fact, spending has stayed amazingly low, despite the huge surplus. Also, I don’t see how people can argue that Russia is a kleptocracy where its wealth is dependent on oil, but the leadership steals all the oil wealth. If this were the case, Russia would be a basket case like Nigeria, where even with tons of oil and foreign investment, the people live in abject poverty.
I like Shevtsova as well. I read a few chapters of her Lost in Transition (which I assume is the book Jesse means), but had to put it down to read other things. Anyway, I liked what I read. I good sober analysis of Russia and Putin (especially since what she says gives weight to my own view of Putin as the very contradiction to the house he built).
Shevtsova’s article which Lyndon cites above is also emblematic of her analysis. For example, in response to the claim that “Putin’s KGB friends rule Russia” she writes,
As if. The reality is far more complicated. For starters, it was former president Boris Yeltsin, a leader the West hailed as liberal and democratic, who first brought people from the security services into Russian politics. He anointed Vladimir Putin, who spent 16 years in the KGB, as his successor. Yeltsin brought this group in from the cold to guarantee the continued influence of his loyalists and to secure their economic interests.
Putin, on the other hand, has hardly handed power to his former KGB colleagues, as many assume. Rather, he created a “spider web” of various clans and interest groups that include the security services, liberal technocrats, moderates, and political pragmatists. Putin creatively used the infighting between these groups to prevent any one clan from being able to monopolize power. In so doing, he followed an old rule of Russian leaders: In the Kremlin, to rely on just one political force is suicide.
Yes, Putin’s former kgb colleagues have influence. They spearheaded an aggressive redistribution of assets inside Russia, including the renationalization of Yukos, once the world’s largest private oil company, and jailed its former chairman,Mikhail Khodorkovsky. And they control several powerful state corporations, including Rosneft, the state oil company; Rosoboronexport, Russia’s defense technology exporter; and Russia’s state railroad corporation. But it was not Putin’s kgb buddies who initiated the tightening of the screws on Russian civil society. That was Yeltsin and his team, including such leading liberals as Yegor Gaidar (a contributing editor to Foreign Policy) and Anatoly Chubais, darlings of the West, who became the architects of Russia’s democratic backsliding by ignoring the need to build independent institutions. It was Yeltsin, not Putin, who crafted the constitution that enshrined the unaccountable, personified power that Putin enjoys today. Putin has certainly taken advantage of this system. But neither he nor his kgb friends created it.
In his Russia’s Capitalist Revolution, Anders Aslund also disputes the oil as the reason for Russian economic growth. Granted, his reasons support his neoliberal economic views (and to benefit his legacy as an advocate of “shock therapy”), but nevertheless, they are worth considering since neoliberalization is good, after the initial shock, at producing at least initially high levels growth and wealth in the short term (it just can sustain them in the long term).
Aslund gives three reasons for Russia’s economic boom:
1. Russia established “a normal market economy based on predominant private enterprise,” low taxes, and fiscal belt tightening. All part of neoliberal austerity.
2. The financial crash of 1998 produced budgetary discipline and surpluses.
3. An ideological consensus on economic growth among Putin and the intellectual class.
Aslund is quick to point out that Putin only benefits from this. All of Russia’s current economic success originated with the reforms of the 1990s, which incidentally he was a major advocate and adviser for.
I think Jesse has a point in regard to oil-kleptocracy. It seems to me part of Russia booming middle class is not so much oil, but the stability those revenues bring. Subjective factors are as important as objective ones in a growing economy. Oil has given the image of prosperity which carries more weight than many seem to be willing to admit. As a result, investment in Russia on the part of multinational corporations in on the rise and wages are going up as a result. For example, do a search of “cars produced in Russia” and see how many companies are setting up plants: Toyota, Ford, Mitsubishi, Renault, Chrysler, Volkswagen, Nissan, Peugeot, Citroen, Suzuki, Hyunda. Foreign investment by multinational automakers exceeded $1.8 billion in 2007. And for good reason. Russia has a skilled workforce, weak labor laws, low wages (by Western standards), and for the most part weak unions. Not to mention, a booming car market. All ripe for the picking.
Oil is certainly part of the story, but it’s not the only story.
Jesse, because you mention the kleptocracy argument (which I know is out there, and put there by Russians like Belkovsky more than by any Western “Russophobes”) as though it was raised here, I want to be sure no one misunderstood my phrase about “VVP & Co. [pursuing] their sound fiscal policy of salting away the windfall” - that was a non-sarcastic statement referring to the StabFond. I don’t think the kleptocracy argument was raised in Idov’s article, either (since that was the topic of the post, before that “oil-fueled” tangent).
I would note, though, that the way control of the energy sector is set up would seem to make it easy for certain people to skim enough to become pretty rich without the overall effect being more than a rounding error. The idea of using the StabFond money to play the Russian stock market (floated by Putin last year - not sure if it went anywhere) is also quite problematic, given the the potential for this to just create false valuations for Russian blue chips - not to mention the potential for the folks involved to make a little extra on the side through insider trading, since one imagines it would be a small group of people with little oversight except from the dyarchs themselves. Part of the problem is that there is no one auditing the Korporocrats (if I may try to coin a new term), so even if you don’t think there is money being siphoned off on a large scale, you have to remember that these guys are human, and the temptation would have to be pretty huge.
It seems to me part of Russia booming middle class is not so much oil, but the stability those revenues bring. Subjective factors are as important as objective ones in a growing economy. Oil has given the image of prosperity which carries more weight than many seem to be willing to admit. As a result, investment in Russia on the part of multinational corporations in on the rise and wages are going up as a result.
This is very insightful and true, I think (although the effect of oil/gas, at 20-25% of GDP, is not just about image). It is a confidence-builder and lets certain foreign investors come in knowing that someone will have money to buy their stuff (recall that the first post-2000 trend in this regard was the foreign hypermarkets).
Here is an interesting hypothetical to consider: Putting much of the oil money in the StabFond has been a good thing for the country because that money doesn’t go into the economy and create inflation (right?). But what if - and I know this is probably impossible, but it’s just a thought exercise - the StabFond numbers were tweaked and the actual amount deposited was, say, $50bn short of the $157bn claimed. If no one knew, presumably everyone would assume the government was prudently caring for the nation’s wealth, the “image” would be secure, Russians would continue to take out loans, FDI would continue to pour in, and the virtuous circle would continue. But if the news were to leak, the “kleptocracy” rumors would be confirmed, and things might look decidedly less rosy, even with $100bn+ still in the account.
I am interested to hear any other interpretations of that hypothetical (including that it is bred). My own conclusion is that it illustrates that image (Sean’s “subjective factors”) is indeed quite important, but that “objective factors” - the reality of how much cash there is and who has it - are more important in the long run. Then again, as a wise man once said, in the long run we’re all dead.
one more interesting fact which is not often mentioned is that the Russian Central Bank deversified its currency reserves back in 2005/6, thus making some extra dozens of billions
https://financialcryptography.com/mt/archives/000748.html
“On Thursday, June 8, Russia became the latest in the list of countries that shifted a part of its Central Bank reserves from the dollar. Sergei Ignatyev, chairman of the Central Bank, said that only 50 percent of its reserves are now held in dollars, with 40 percent in euros and the rest in pounds sterling. Earlier it was believed that just 25-30 percent of Russia’s reserves were held in euros, with virtually all the rest held in dollars.”
back then the buck traded around 1,2$, now it is 1,57$, the Gulf and China still hold nearly all of there reserves in dollars
Gosh. I’m sure Idov would be astonished to see a single throw-away phrase — “oil-fuelled prosperity” — parsed to this extent. He’d be doubly amazed at the eminent thinkers cited variously to attack or support his imputed point of view.
Perhaps we should simply take it as given that, as the splendid Shevtsova states, “The reality is far more complicated.” It always is.
Many thanks to Lyndon for the impromptu research on the relationship between oil prices and the RF economy. And thanks also to Sean for unearthing a piece which has proven to be so provocative. Frankly, if I’d stumbled across it myself, I’d have regarded it as interesting, and usefully (from a western media perspective) unorthodox, especially about the state of dissent, but largely uncontroversial. Not for the first time, Sean’s “second sense” on what to post has proven superb.
There is a disturbing tendency to dismiss the observations of western, especially US, journalists. (eg, Who cares what American commentators think anyway? The US is a declining power.). This particular commentator’s views were initially dismissed on grounds that he might not even have been to Russia, and then because – as a Russian speaker – he actually had been.
In matters of analysis of the power elite in Russia, it reflects a smug self-confidence which no-one sitting outside the Kremlin could possibly justify. Whether American, Chinese, Indian – or Russian – we know little about what’s going on on the other side of those walls. I’m neither arrogant enough to think I have a better answer nor cynical enough to dismiss someone else’s based on his nationality (or, in Ivanov’s case, on a reading of three paragraphs).
Sean said (or at least quoted Aslund): All of Russia’s current economic success originated with the reforms of the 1990s, which incidentally he was a major advocate and adviser for.
This is not true. Since Putin entered office, Russia has passed a a new tax codes, labor code, land code, a reduction in red tape in certain areas affecting business, and the Arbitrazh courts’ competency and independence have greatly increased because salaries for judges were raised. And I really can’t stress enough the restraint with the stabilization fund - they’ve used it to pay down huge deficits but haven’t significantly increased spending. In theory, with the fund at $156 billion, the government could give a billion dollars to each Russian citizen.
‘a billion dollars for each citizen’ - oops, i mean a thousand..i just woke up
Jesse - I think you meant a million. I have just applied for Russian citizenship.
“Then again, as a wise man once said, in the long run we’re all dead.”
In Britain where this fellow mostly practiced his economic arts, as we looked around at the wreckage of the economy, we used to say “… and this is the long run and Keynes is dead”. A clever man but not I think a wise one.
The source of Russia’s current prosperity. I suspect a lot of the above debate is really about the infantile attempt of some commentators to suggest that any clown could have managed the current economic recovery in Russia because of the high oil and gas price.
It is interesting that with carbon resources contributing 20 -25% to GDP that is the same as the percentage of GDP provided by financial services and the City of London in the until recently prosperous UK. At least I think it is interesting.
No quite right a thousand. I have just torn up my application.
By now, with Lyndon, FH, and Sean’s better informed comments, my words are largely irrelevant and uninteresing, but here they go. First, my apologies for somehow forgetting about the existence of questions marks in the comment I wrote yesterday–the one where I wondered why so many of you were unfairly dismissing Idov’s fine article.
Chris, you wrote that “zastoi” usually means economic stagnation. True, but Idov makes it PERFECTLY clear that by using that word he’s not talking about the economy. One more thing. The reason I wrote about American commentators lamenting the state of politics in the US was a response to Jesse’s “Why doesn’t he write an article about how American democracy is in a state of ‘zastoi’ because nobody votes for Ron Paul or Ralph Nader?”
And once again let me repeat that Idov’s phrase, “oil-fueled prosperity” is a far cry from the assertion, as Jesse wrongly claimed, that “Russia’s growth since 2000 has been entirely due to oil”.
The only problem - you made a wrong conclusion. Look at Cyrill - and try to find anything critical about US
Simple. I have posted a number of radio shows at cyrillvatomsky.com. There is quite a bit of criticism on subjects usually outside of what is discussed here: immigration, religiosity, over moralizing, NIMBY.
As for the article itself, any long piece will have errors and any opinion piece will have facts “stretched” to various degrees. Which usually is used by those that disagree with opinion to nitpick and try to invalidate the whole based on details. A commonly used debate tactic. When he talks about Gazprom media assets he does not mention Эхо Москвы. It is a glaring omission (sloppiness or intentional) but does it invalidate his claim about NTV? To a degree it does, since he is not making specific claims akin of Kommersant’s “доступ к теле” and Medvedev’s coverage on NTV vs. Rambler. Sloppy.
Thanks, again, Lyndon for reaffirming what many had claimed before that the current petrodollar glut is partially responsible for Putin’s success. But does such a claim invalidate all successes Russia had achieved in the last decade? Hell no.
Regarding the zastoi comment, it is not necessarily only an economic issue. After all, zastoi (I might be completely wrong but I recall it being more of a slogan to distinguish a new leader rather then based on specific economic numbers) refers to the Brezhnev era when Russia experienced a similar petrodollar glut. Economically it was not as bad as the word implies. While Moscow and Leningrad elites might not have had it as good as before, the oil glut was spread a bit more evenly in провинция. And then there is this comment:
today’s Russia is also culturally stagnant in the widest sense. Its only identifiable passion is to be taken seriously abroad.
This really hurts but this seems to confirm my experiences with Russia and with Russians there and abroad. With all the anti-Western fervor and self professed cultural identity Moscow MacDonalds is the busiest in the world. Mannerisms of cheap купечество oozes from everywhere. Meeting Russian tourists in Europe is a painful experience - more so then even meeting American tourists there. Culturally what I saw in Russia in the last 3 years is predominately kitch. For crying out loud, a Deep Purple fan as a president?! Anyone remembers this юрай хип и дип пурпле очень нравятся урле.
The article’s depiction of Nashi is spot on from what I gather. Just like the late zastoi Komsomol was - mildly ideological at the base but cynical and career oriented above.
The final leg of Sovereign Democracy is in what used to be the private sector. A de facto nationalization of Russia’s most flush industries–oil and gas–provides the cushion that keeps the bureaucratic deadweight afloat. Both functionaries and dissidents, struggling to put this socioeconomic model into first-world terms, like to say that the new Russia is being run like a corporation. To an extent, it is a corporation, and that corporation is Gazprom–currently headed by Dmitri Medvedev.
While I agree in general terms, I think it is more then Gazprom, but it is a corporation - Putin Inc. Gazprom is only one component of it. Let’s not forget Igor Sechin and Rosneft (the current owner of Yukos’ assets) or Leonid Reiman - current telecom minister that apparently owns assets he regulates and shares some with Ludmila Putina’s Megafon. A feudal lord set up his hierarchy by giving what Timofei Granovsky refers to as “алоты” - allotments, pieces of land - the most important “means of production” at the time. Similarly, current feudal lord would give currently valuable means of production to his lieutenants - quasi-state corporations. However, this is not in any way Russian. This model is universal for late feudal/early capitalist societies from early US to fascist Italy to current Iran, Kuwait or Kazakhstan.
Agree on pathetic depiction of pathetic intelligentsya. Always self-indulgent, always elitist and always messing things up because of utter incompetence in anything except kitchen talk about global and cultural issues.
Kolya,
then why didn’t he say ‘consumer-driven prosperity’ or ‘construction-boom prosperity’? That catchphrase is meant to at once simplify Russia’s economic recovery and dismiss the much-needed reforms that helped this process.
Idov said: “Putin’s stifling regime and the country’s oil-fueled prosperity are viewed not as unrelated phenomena but as cause and effect.”
The gist of this argument is that Putin has somehow ‘bought off’ the population with oil riches, which makes them more ‘docile.’ If the prosperity was due to reforms made by Putin’s regime, then the population might have a legitimate reason for supporting his successor.
Lastly, perhaps the area where Russia’s ‘oil-fueled’ prosperity has had the most effect is in increasing the country’s independence on the international stage. Because of the surplus generated by rising oil prices, Russia has gone from a debtor to creditor nation. I think it paid off the Paris club in ‘05 or ‘06. Thus, Russia doesn’t have to worry about the views of western creditor nations. I guess it makes sense that western commentators would fixate on and resent a dynamic that has diminished the west’s leverage over Russia.
I would like to emphasize that I quoted Aslund, I certainly don’t advocate his views. Because if Aslund’s neoliberalization would have continued in the energy sector, there would be no stablization fund, Russian gas and oil would have been carved up by Chevron, BP, et al.
In regard to this, it is interesting to note that the Duma passed a bill limiting foreign ownership in 42 sectors of the Russian economy. This includes industry, natural resources, military, nuclear, and media. The bill makes it more difficult for foreign multinationals to own over 50% of a Russian enterprise.
I just wonder how much this will push back Russia’s entry into the WTO.
I’ve been rather surprised of the nitpicking of Idov’s article (though it has spawned some interesting discussion, especially thanks to Jesse and Lyndon’s interventions). Especially since most of the picks were made without reading the piece.
I think it is one of the best articles I’ve read on Russia in the long time. Since I think Perry Anderson’s article in LRB. It’s complex and without all the democracy crusade rhetoric. I especially liked Idov notion that Russia is run like a corporation because it recognizes the inherently capitalist nature of Putin’s administration.
That said, I do take issue with his claim that Russia is “culturally stagnant” (he uses zastoi to describe this). True, Russia does seem to be overly concerned about its image abroad (partly for good reason since its image is under constant attack and many of those attacks are based in Russophobic assumptions).
But Russia culturally stagnant? This I’m not so sure, and even if there is some truth to the claim, Russia is not alone but just one more victim of the general cultural malaise that has captured most industrial countries. But that is on a mass cultural level. I think if Idov would have dug a bit deeper he would have discovered a vibrant Russian intellectual culture.
One last disappointment is with Idov himself. I notice that he is the editor-in-chief of Russia! Magazine. The same magazine published La Russophobe. I would hope that with such a fine article he would have enough intellectual integrity to not give that creature a platform for its voice.
Culturally what I saw in Russia in the last 3 years is predominately kitch. For crying out loud, a Deep Purple fan as a president?!
Kitsch indeed, but I wouldn’t make much of the rocker President. But again that is on a mass cultural level of reality shows, bad pop, etc. But every country seems to be infected with this and has been for a long time.
In fact, I was in NYC last week and went to MOMA for the first time. I felt like I was at the mall. Even the archetypes of high culture were reduced to mere culturally and intellectual vapid spectacles. Whatever power the art had over the spectator was turned into mere kitsch. I left horribly disappointed after an hour.
I notice that he is the editor-in-chief of Russia! Magazine. The same magazine published La Russophobe.
Yuck! I’m afraid I don’t know anything at all about the magazine. But that’s certainly not a good sign.
Sean,
I am putting the finishing touches on a law review article on the new strategic sectors legislation. Long story short, it probably won’t hinder Russia’s WTO progress as it mirrors similar legislation in France, Germany, etc.
-One last thing about the Idov article that really bugged the hell out of me: right after stating that most Russians have conspiratorial world-views, he goes on to float the idea that Medvedev was chosen because he’s a closet homosexual! It just shows that, for the most committed Russophobes, any unexpected turn of events (the choosing of a liberal successor as opposed to a silovik or Putin staying on) can be fit into the central thesis (that Russia is ruled by evil people with mischievous schemes for power). I can almost picture the smoke-filled dacha where the siloviki decide in between vodka shots to choose the ‘queer’ as the next president. Conspiratorial world-view indeed…
Kitsch indeed, but I wouldn’t make much of the rocker President.
Sorry if it came across as more then a jest jab.
True, Russia does seem to be overly concerned about its image abroad (partly for good reason since its image is under constant attack and many of those attacks are based in Russophobic assumptions).
We have been through some of this before and I would predictably disagree. I think that lots of the image problems Russia (and Russians) have are of their own making. Just like lots of image issues US has are of its own making. I certainly would not ascribe US image issues as based on some USophobia.
Behaviour of individuals abroad speaks volumes. The kupechestvo antics of Russians in Courchavelle, Milan or London are just as repugnant as some US people in Iraq expecting every Filipino girl there to drop on her knees… - just an example.
Back to the article, I read it again and I agree - it is the best piece I have ever read about Russia, balanced, without the democracy now drumbeat, realistic and in some cases painfully perceptive. I am going to do some talking about this on my radio show today - will post it at cyrillvatomsky.com later tonight. (a shameless plug, but also a way to save virtual trees)
Hey, you know, considering that Russia has one of the fastest economic growth rates in the world, and that this all has nothing to do with, nay, is IN SPITE OF!!, Putin, just imagine what it would be like if he weren’t there.
Russia’s economic growth rate would be like A BILLION PERCENT!!!! There would be flying cars! Personal robot butlers! Damn you, Putin!
I liked the article, and so did my whole family, which is rare.
Kudos to Mr. Idov for unearthing this old term ‘zastoi’. It was certainly keenly felt in late 70s-early 80s. Without ‘zastoi’ there would be no ‘perestroika’. It instantly brought back many lost memories of youth and I feel richer for it.
Of course it’s nonsense to compare Brezhnev’s ‘zastoi’ to modern Russia. It’s also nonsense to use the term ‘Neo-Soviet’ to describe modern Russia: this is just lazy. But that’s our media, always lazy but also always adversarial to any status quo.
What Russians can’t grasp is that in the US politics it’s always about ‘Change’. In the US politics, few weeks without controversy or scandal is ‘BIG Zastoi’.
Anyway, good article. Way better than the average media pabulum.
P.S. Deep Purple ROOLZ!
Jesse, it’s obvious that the phrase “oil-fueled prosperity” means something different to me than to you. As you wrote in your first comment, with that phrase Idov asserts that “Russia’s growth since 2000 has been entirely due to oil prices.” I don’t read it in such extreme way at all. If Idov meant to say what you are saying he meant, I’m sure he would have said so directly.
Although I liked the article this does not mean that I think he’s right on everything he wrote. For example, in my ignorance I totally missed what he meant by “gaydar”. I read through it without giving it much of a thought except to think (I kid you not) that it had something to do with Gaidar. Now that I know what he meant and knowing how homophobic the Russian establishment is, I agree with you that those words were a low blow on Idov’s part. And like FH, I’m disappointed by what Sean uncovered about Idov’s connection with the despicable La Russophobe.
There is no denying that Russophobia is wrong. My own perception, though, is that it is more acceptable to be a USphobe than a Russophobe. Many times I heard and read comments in foreign media that are insultingly and pettily anti-American and nobody bats an eye about it. Although there are exceptions, the US government and the American media is so used to this that for the most part they simply take it for granted and ignore it. Russians, though, have an extra-sensitive radar for such things.
“I’m disappointed by what Sean uncovered about Idov’s connection with the despicable La Russophobe.”
Was it Sean who interviewed Russophobka not so long ago? Doesn’t mean there is a connection. Neither in Idov’s case.
Was it Sean who interviewed Russophobka not so long ago?
An emphatic NO. Nor would I ever. The very thought of it makes me nauseous. I was interviewed by the Moscow Times, which also interviewed her. And Idov being the editor in chief of Russia! magazine and the fact that he published an article by her is a connection. Just like I have a connection to Mike Averko because I published his stuff here at one time.
I was disappointed to read that Idov published her. Nothing more. Just like I’m sure there are people who are disappointed that I put Averko’s work on SRB.
Now, while there is a connection, what it means is a different story. It could matter little or nothing in the big scheme of things.
Kolya - The “gaydar” thing swept right by me too, I’m afraid. I had to look the word up. Probably a generational thing, or I’m just hopelessly out of touch. But yeah, I’m not comfortable with that kind of smarmy tabloid-style drive-by smear either. Although…is it possible that for people who do NOT have to look the word up it is not generally regarded as a smear? Just a thought.
With regard to the oil-fueled prosperity issue: I think you could probably line the bottom half of a magazine page with 6-point footnotes listing all the other contributing factors for the Russian boom. But it’s TNR, not an academic journal. For a political sketch, oil-fueled prosperity works well enough.
By the way - I was away when you resurfaced. Welcome back. Hope what needed doing got done.
Sean: Especially since most of the picks were made without reading the piece.
Did you mean this: “Candide on April 6, 2008 1:19 pm
Was it Sean who interviewed Russophobka not so long ago?”
Yeah, ivanov, something just like that.
1. If Idov meant to say what you are saying he meant, I’m sure he would have said so directly.
This is the main problem of the article - too many efforts to say something умное instead of what he meant. In simple words.
2. “What Russians can’t grasp is that in the US politics it’s always about ‘Change’. In the US politics, few weeks without controversy or scandal is ‘BIG Zastoi’.”
Are you sure you are not mixing words “changes” and “show”?
And believe me, Russian have been “grassping” changes much more often then they wished.
There is a Chinese proverb (very negative) “I wish you live in the time of changes”….
3. “I just wonder how much this will push back Russia’s entry into the WTO.”
What is so special in WTO that Russia must rush in to? As a voter - I against it. There was/is no peace treaty between CCCP/Russia and Japan. Does it hurt REAL business and cultural relations? In no way. Actually Japanese businessmen were somewhat scared when iron curtain was pulled apart. Same with Finland (are they in WTO?)
4. But my 10 points go to Lyndon for his excellent example
“After all, pouring more gasoline into a Zaporozhets won’t make it faster than a BMW”
Exactly!
PS. I found Lyndon’s post much more worth reading than Idov’s first three paragraphs
But one correction! Lyndon, Zaparozhets is not Russian car - it’s Ukranian!
fn’s “For a political sketch, oil-fueled prosperity works well enough.”
I would say - political comics.