“The President is the symbol of power, and the Prime Minister is only a manager.”

Isn’t this what all sorts of critics of the handover have been saying, that it lacks legitimacy? She’s saying people know it’s all a stitch-up, but it’s Putin’s stitch-up, so they’re going along with it. The problems start once he’s no longer tsar.

I think that analysis is correct and it highlights the challenge facing Medvedev. He’s going to have to win Russians over after the election and they’re going to be in a demanding mood.

“They trust Putin, and not the authorities because in the mass consciousness the president is detached from the system of power according to the age old tradition of separating the Tsar from the Boyars”

I think this is a real cliche, and does not account for the age old tradition of hating the head of state, like the previous two.

Also, I think the “Tsar/Boyars” cliche is a trick the intelligentsia use to explain away the popularity of leaders they don’t like. I’m sure Sean could think of comparable intellectual gymnastics anti-establishment American intellectuals engage in. In both cases you have a small group of people who think of themselves as standing up for the masses, who then have to rationalize the fact that the masses are hostile to their agendas.

I think this is a real cliche, and does not account for the age old tradition of hating the head of state, like the previous two.

One can argue about why Russians didn’t like Gorbachev and Yeltsin, though the descent into oblivion comes to mind. But what are you suggesting, Chris? That popular trust in Putin is purely personal and has nothing to do with his position? That the trust in Putin also applies to the boyars, including Medvedev? Neither of these seems very likely.

I think popular trust in Putin has to do with the increased standard of living and Russia’s resurgent geopolitics. I think people see the country moving in the right direction — hence Putin/Medvedev’s high approval ratings. However, they do not see it moving as fast as they would like — hence the government’s low approval ratings.

I think if one looked at Russian/Soviet leaders back to 1917, the only one that matched the “good Tsar/bad boyars” cliche was Stalin.

The thought just occured to me that the cliche reproduces the myth about the omnipotent Tsar, because it makes him the locus of the system who is responsible for everything.

Agree with Chris – this so called analysis is nothing more than a pack of cliches.
In simple words – this “deputy chair of the Political Psychology Department at MGU” in my personal opinion would be entitled with “баба- дура” title.

In fact people will vote for Putin not for Medvedev. If the rules of the game doesn’t allow Putin to keep his current chair – to be so. If he thinks that the best way to continue his job is to castle – to be so.

This stupid “two terms” trap has nothing to with “democracy”, right? Once created as a tool to stop really popular politician it was copied by new Russian “democrats” for exactly same purpose. If you look at the US Senate and Congress – also democratic bodies – there is no limitations in terms as long as people vote for you.

Maybe appointment of Medvedev is something “undemocratic” and unique? Well I might miss something but I don’t remember when people voted for Gordon Brown. And in another country – known as the country of oldest parlament in Europe – the chair of PM is passed without any votes for second time in a row (not saying that their Tsar spent is his chair almost as many years as comrade Brezhnev).

So if deputy of political psychiatry doesn’t know the basics – I’m not surprised of so called Russian “ooposition”. Maybe they need to eat Viagra (instead of listening to “experts”)- to improve potential?

PS. Will not vote for M. but rather for Ж.
Just for fun

I think people see the country moving in the right direction — hence Putin/Medvedev’s high approval ratings.

Agreed, except I would omit Medvedev’s name for now. That’s the bit I think we’re disagreeing over. I doubt Putin’s blessing is enough to bequeath public confidence in his successor. Medvedev will be on a back foot at least initially, in a post-election campaign to win his own popular backing. Which is also why I’m deeply skeptical about his nice-Nellie liberal-sounding talk of the moment. That won’t win him a lot of points as president.

“I think if one looked at Russian/Soviet leaders back to 1917, the only one that matched the “good Tsar/bad boyars” cliche was Stalin.”

If we looked a little further – one more person comes to mind. Петр I.

People might not think in such scientific manner but they a capable to realize the difference between Putin, Kasyanov and Kasparov without an advice from political psychiatrist or PR-industry. These guys are good to convince themselves only about their “importance”…

This doesn’t mean that Putin is an angel. But we are living in real world – and we’ll have to select the best offer available on political market. Like anywhere else.

“Agreed, except I would omit Medvedev’s name for now. That’s the bit I think we’re disagreeing over. I doubt Putin’s blessing is enough to bequeath public confidence in his successor.”

I think Medvedev is a compromise candidate. The majority of the population want a third Putin term but can’t have it because of the stupid constitution. They trust Putin to pick the right guy.

You are of course correct that this trust is only going to be transferred to Medvedev for a finite period of time.

Any thoughts why the “leadership pool” is so small? Any theories on the lack of genuine alternatives?

Or is that a mischaracterization? Ie, are there leadership prospects aplenty, but they just don’t fit in with the good “hair-and-teeth” typecasting of the west?

I see that the ZheZhe comments from the NY Times’ new “community” (http://community.livejournal.com/nytimesinmoscow/) have started surfacing in English on the NYT site: http://community.nytimes.com/article/comments/2008/02/24/world/europe/24putin.html?s=3

“Any thoughts why the “leadership pool” is so small? Any theories on the lack of genuine alternatives?”

Because with the partial exception of the KPRF, Russia has no political parties in the Western sense. It has tusovky.

OK. My mother is 70 years old “regular” Soviet top manager (CFO of regional sate company). Will she vote for Zyuganoff? NO WAY.
Will she vote for Medvedev? She doesn’t know. She doesn’t know what he is standing for. And Putin’s support doesn’t mean much for her as for many pensioners in Russia (with a pension around $150 it’s hard to support anyone).
But what is frustrating her the most – the lack of choice. Juts M, Ж or Зю.

And this is not Putin’s fault. I mean the lack of people with better ideas.

PS. I always asking myself “What if Putin slips in the shower and …bang?” This is not good for such country as Russia to be so dependent on just one person in the shower.

I think the interview was interesting not because of the naive monarchism stuff. But because of the false binary between the authorities and society. I personally have never heard anyone tell me when the one begins and the other ends.

I sure have. All the time in fact. People seem very keenly aware of who has power and perks and who doesn’t. The “authorities” as a group — a class? — seem to be deeply resented.

Commentators’ support for Putin is very practical and for reasons that Chris says above.

I agree. But for the same practical reasons, real support for Medvedev starts at, well, not at zero, but at a low level. If, say, there’s an economc downturn, the political impact could be pretty bad.

Because with the partial exception of the KPRF, Russia has no political parties in the Western sense.
and
This is not good for such country as Russia to be so dependent on just one person in the shower.

Exactly. And if there emerged a fledgling political party with any prospects for attracting genuine support and generating new leadership, how long before the FSB and others would be on its case?

I think one can explain Putin’s popularity by thinking of him as the ground.

I don’t know if any of you guys ever thought you were going to drown, but I have. I was in southern France at a lake and decided to swim across, thinking, “hey those people on the other side of the lake don’t look so far away.” Well I got to the middle of the lake and the people on the other side of the lake still looked exactly the same size, and my arms were in agony. I thought I was going to die in the lake. When due to a combination of treading water, resting on my back and fighting panic, I made it to the other side, the ground was the sweetest thing I ever saw in my life. So wonderfully solid and life-giving and conveniently located under my feet. I looooved that ground. I gave thanks to the ground. The ground was my best friend.

The 1990s are the lake, and Putin is the ground.

“Certainly. I wasn’t clear in my original statement. I should have said that no academic in their discussions of authority and society have demonstrated a clear line that divides them”

There is no line. “Authority” and “society” are abstractions. Reality is real people doing real stuff. Also, authority, that is, people in charge who are doing stuff, is a subset of society, people in general doing stuff. How can they be opposed?

I am a stuffist.

Let’s start the Stuffist Party.

I promise much stuff for everybody!

Anyone steps outside those parameters, you become incomprehensible to your target audience and unacceptable within the established political system.

Some of the folks involved in Civic Force regard themselves as a Russian version of UK Conservatives (or Christian Democrats, perhaps, elsewhere in Europe). The ones I’ve spoken to in the past are pretty open about having been organized around that notion by the Kremlin. In other words, it’s not the ideological parameters which are constrained. The guys in power don’t give a damn about that.

We want stuff! We want stuff! Vote Maximus!

And vote maximally.

Sean wrote:

“The idea that the Russian population is passive is a total myth. This is a population that experienced three revolutions (not to mention revolutions of modernization and war) in a century.”

In the early or mid 1980s the New York Review of Book published a polemical exchange between Milan Kundera and Joseph Brodsky . From what I remember, Kundera said something to the effect that communism is an alien disease that invaded Central Europe from Russia and that anyone who knows Russian culture should not be surprised either by Soviet brutality or by the passive acquiescence of the Russians to such brutality. Brodsky strongly objected and wrote that communist ideology was also integral part of Western thought and that while Russia went through a bloody civil war and peasant uprisings that were brutally put down before the communist consolidated power in Russia, there was very little resistance to it in Czechoslovakia.

Having said that, my impression is that during the Russian Civil War the vast majority of Russia’s population was fairly non-committal. Many of them were conscripted by either side, but most did not have a strong preference. What most really wanted was peace and an end to chaos. In other words, the truly committed cadres (to either side) were a minority of the population. (I’m aware that I’m simplifying things by only referring to two sides.)

“Having said that, my impression is that during the Russian Civil War the vast majority of Russia’s population was fairly non-committal.”

A lot of them couldn’t even read a political pamphlet. I think in the Civil War most people were worried about one thing — appeasing whatever armed forces were in the area at any given moment.

I think we should remember however that it is possible to make broad statements about groups of people who DID take sides. For instance, Jews were overwhelmingly Red, for the very good reason that the Red Army was the only faction executing pogromshchiki, plus the fact that the Bolsheviks and Social Democrats had defended Jews (with guns) in previous pogroms. Cossacks started out pretty neutral but then went into White and secessionist camps when they started being repressed by the Bolshies. Various nationalist groups that wanted independence or self-determination supported the Reds because they took Lenin’s words about national self-determination seriously. The Reds had support among secular members of Muslim nations because they were atheist and wanted to get rid of religious makobesia, and religious Muslims opposed them for the same reasons. Etc.

I wrote:

“The Reds had support among secular members of Muslim nations because they were atheist and wanted to get rid of religious makobesia, and religious Muslims opposed them for the same reasons. Etc.”

Anecdotally, my Uzbek waitress says the Soviets were very popular among Uzbek women, because of the whole liberating-women thing. Apparently Stalin had a “marry more than one woman, and you go to Gulag. Wear a veil, and you go to Gulag” policy. He also appointed women Party leaders to implement the policy, just to add salt to the wounds.

Speaking of the Civil War, a while ago I translated a short White pamphlet, which I reproduce below partly in the interests of propping myself, and partly because these kind of documents would never come to anybody’s attention otherwise. Here it is:

WHAT IS ATAMAN DUTOV FIGHTING FOR?

Elected by the 13 Cossack voiskos and the population of three gubernias, the honored elder of all the voiskos and citizen of many cities of Russia Ataman Alexander Dutov has given himself to the service of the people without regard to faith or nationality. For Dutov, distinctions between classes, estates, nations and faiths do not exist. Ataman Dutov believes his Russia to be great and is struggling to consolidate it. All the nations inhabiting Russia must be together and work amicably for its welfare, glory and greatness. If Russia is whole, all will be peaceful within it and it will have everything; if there is no Russia, everything will collapse. Neither Muslims, nor Bashkirs, nor Ukrainians, nor any separate state will exist. A stronger people or state will smash every group into parts and the whole will perish.

Ataman Dutov believes that the large nationalities of Russia, such as, for example, the Muslim ones, must have their own laws and administrations. Other smaller peoples must be assured of the preservation of their customs, traditions, language and faith, and minorities must be guaranteed a place in state administration by law. Ataman Dutov believes that, in those regions where they are an almost exclusive majority, Muslims must have self-government, their own language and alphabet, and only use Russian in relations with the Russian Government. The freedom of belief of Muslims is inviolable, just as their mosques and prayer houses are. Where there is state assistance, schools for Muslims have the same rights to this as Russian ones and for support from the state treasury. Muslims preserve their customs, traditions, and courts entirely and inviolably according to their books, heritage, and habits. Only state crimes will be considered by a general state court. Matters concerning both Muslims and Christians are decided by a general state court with equal numbers of Muslim and Christian judges.

The territories of the Tatars, Kyrgyz, Tarnachks, Bashkirs and other Muslims are the property of the given people. Muslims can have their own voiskos, officers, commands in Muslim dialects, and bear the sign of the Moon, but discipline and organization must be federal, just as the definition of various divisions must be determined only by the law of the Russian Government. The form of clothing of Muslim divisions, food, and barracks articles must be in agreement with their customs and the Koran. The holidays of Muslim voisko divisions are Muslim holidays. In State life, Muslims will play the same role as Russians, in agreement with the composition of the population, with preservation of the law of minorities.

???? (CM — he lists some Muslim stuff here I don’t know) are retained by Muslims, just as are many customs, processes, holidays, celebrations and the mode of family life. The rights of Muslims in trade, settlement and other branches of life cannot be limited by anything. The right to obtain higher education paid for by the Russian Government and the right to serve in Russian facilities, if so desired, cannot be taken from Muslims or infringed upon.

Ataman Dutov does not predetermine in what forms the Muslim question will be resolved, considering it on the one hand to be a matter ultimately for resolution only by a Constituent Assembly, and, on the other hand, only by Muslims themselves in their All-Russian Congress.

Ataman Dutov believes that in the new, reborn Russia the death penalty and the besmearchment of the name of a man must not exist. All requisitions, expropriations and other forms of violence must be forever abolished through alteration of the law. Free trade in a free country must be one of the bases of the restoration of industry and trade. The property of citizens must be protected by law.

Neither a monarchy, nor a republic imposed upon a people by individual persons, will be durable until that time when all the people of Russia gives its commanding word on what form of government it wants to have.

Freedom, equality and brotherhood* — in the best senses of these words — that is what Ataman Dutov is fighting for.

*Note French Revolution reference!

Don’t disagree with what you Chris, except for one small correction. I know that Wrangel, of the White Army, also executed a number pogromschiki, and General Kutepov, also from the White Army, did not tolerate pogroms and did not hesitate to execute White Army soldiers involved in such activities. It is true, though, that too many White Army commanders either encouraged them (especially among the Cossacks), turned a blind eye to them, or felt unable to stop them.

“I know that Wrangel, of the White Army, also executed a number pogromschiki, and General Kutepov, also from the White Army, did not tolerate pogroms and did not hesitate to execute White Army soldiers involved in such activities.”

Interesting. It’s also true that Red Army divisions also comitted pogroms, so much so that the Bolshevik leadership called a special meeting to deal with it (note the famous, possibly apocryphal, peasant false distinction between Bolsheviks, who are good and Russian, and Communists, who are bad and Jewish).

“It is true, though, that too many White Army commanders either encouraged them (especially among the Cossacks), turned a blind eye to them, or felt unable to stop them.”

I think a lot of it may have been the belief that if you don’t your men do want they want, your men will stop fighting.

Fascinating stuff about Dutov, Chris. Did he ever get a chance to demonstrate one way or the other whether he was prepared to put these promises into effect? Is there a date on the pamphlet?

Fh, I THINK the date is 1919. I’ll look it up. I translated that from the book Tri Atamana, which is about atamans Dutov, Semenov (of later infamous Soyuz Russkikh Fashistov fame), and a Kalmyk ataman whose hyphenated name I can never remember (he later helped form the Union to Help the Buddhists of Russia and was executed by the Bolsheviks). I doubt there was enough time for anybody to put anything into effect.

PS. I think the Dutov pamphlet should be seen in the context of Caucasian/South Russian/Cossack politics of the time, with the Cossacks (Dutov was I think a Don) trying to form a front with the Muslim peoples of the Caucasus against the Reds.

The reason I spend time with SRB is that I learn things. Very good.

I too admire the lake analogy and it agrees with the comments from Russians I have pestered with my questions here in France. Pleased to see the lake was in France.

A small comment. The attitude of the great majority of the Russian people is very easy to recognise seen from France as it coincides with France particulary in 1958. I believe that Putin models himself de Gaulle – indeed he has confirmed as much. de G also rescued his country from chaos bankruptcy and ignomy. He was wrongly regularly accused of wanting to set up a dictatorship. He centralised power and weakened parliament. He also conducted an independant foreign policy. It is interesting that despite the problems of the student riots of 1968 it was not until 1983 that the French were prepared to trust an alternative government to the Gaullists.

There’s a short blurb about him in wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alexander_Dutov

Seems he was assassinated in exile by a guy named Мahmud Khadzhamirov.

The reason I spend time with SRB is that I learn things.

Totally agree. Sean and the regulars are a continuing source of info and insight for me.

One observation about the de Gaulle analogy. France had the benefit of a long and deep-rooted history of electoral politics. The path back from its strongman period was clearly marked.

“One observation about the de Gaulle analogy. France had the benefit of a long and deep-rooted history of electoral politics. The path back from its strongman period was clearly marked.”

Abslutely but the French and Russians are both rather good at revolutions. All I am saying is that the mindset is the same.

Oui, ce lac inoubliable et maudit, et la terre sainte aussi, se trouvaient dans le sud de la France, pas loin de Nice. J’ai passe un mois la avec des membres de ma famille il y a presque 15 ans.

My French is getting so bad…

“There’s a short blurb about him in wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alexander_Dutov ”

Look here:

http://www.hrono.ru/biograf/dutov.html

Understood. Interestingly, for all its instability, the Fourth Republic oversaw reconstruction and major economic growth. Decolonization was the key driver, not economics. Ie, things like national pride, status in the world, etc. These are among the buttons Putin is pressing too.

Chris – Wow. And he has his own site: http://www.atamandutov.narod.ru/project.htm

Thanks.

Robert – By the way, I’d meant to respond to your thoughts a while back on Kosovo but, like you, got diverted at the time. Things have obviously moved on. Hitchens and others have declared it the end of “the Yugoslavia idea.” Is it?

I also like the lake and ground analogy. I’m mentioning this because I want to have some Chrisius Maximus brownie points before the next time Chris and I don’t agree.

In the Wikipedia photo Dutov looks like Pancho Villa, sans sombrero and bushy mustache. back in 1990 in Novosibirsk I met a native Siberian whose last name was Dutov. Without me asking him, he told me he’s related to Ataman Dutov but that in the past this was something his family did not talk about with others. Because of this I assumed Dutov was a Siberian Cossack. According to Wikipedia Dutov, though, was an Orenburgh/Ural Cossack. In the old days these Cossacks were known as the Yaik Cossacks and they formed the nucleus of Pugachev’s rebels, even though Pugachev himself was originally from the Don.

fh Kosovo

Herewith an article from our modest rag even before our lucky readers see it – with a French slant of course. There is a lot more that could be said. Notably that Kosovo was a dress rehearsal in deceiving public opinion for Iraq. There was no genocide or anything like it. There were no weapons of mass destruction. What has happened now will I think do grave harm to the image of Western foreign policy. In 1999 the deal was that Russia persuaded Milosevic to give up resistance and Kosovo in exchange for a confirmation of Serb sovereignty there. Serbia has since become pretty much a model democracy even accepting Montenegran indedpendance cutting it off from the sea – sound familiar? – for what? A broken promise. Incidentally good luck to the Albanian Kosovans but that is not the point.

TITLE***Kosovo troubles the world

France has joined America and Britain in imposing Kosovan independence on Serbia. It is a high risk strategy and a dramatic change of policy.

The long anticipated proclamation of independence by the Prime Minister of Kosovo, Hashim Thaçi, has sent shock waves round the world. Serbia is a fully functioning democracy but the burning of the United States embassy by a Serbian mob was a warning that whatever the inducements from the EU no Serbian government will be able to accept the amputation of one fifth of its territory in defiance of international law. The Serbian President Zoran Djindjic, who delivered Slobodan Milosevic to the International Criminal court at the Hague died by an assassin’s bullet. Pro EU President Tadic recently won re-election by the thinnest of margins despite strong EU support.

Western diplomats say that they expected difficulties. If that is true, they are getting their monies worth. The Russian government has said through its ambassador to NATO, Dmitry Rogozin, that “If the EU works out a single position or if NATO steps beyond its mandate in Kosovo, these organizations will be in conflict with the United Nations, and then, I think, we will also begin operating under the assumption that in order to be respected we have to use force,”. However he said that Russia did not intend to get involved in an armed conflict over Kosovo. Since the end of NATO’s war against Serbia in 1999, Kosovo has been under UN control. NATO’s presence there is permitted through the terms of Security Council Resolution 1244 but that resolution confirms Serbian sovereignty and talks of “autonomy” not independence.

The issue has left the EU divided. Despite much arm twisting, five countries still refuse to recognise the new mini-state. France, along with the United States, was quick to give its blessing. This is hardly surprising as Bernard Kouchner, now French foreign minister, was the UN high representative from 1999 to 2001 and did little to dampen the enthusiasm of the Kosovo Albanians to break definitively with Belgrade. The dissidents are led by Spain, concerned about the implications for the would-be breakaway Basque region. They are unimpressed by repeated statements the Kosovan independence is not a precedent.

Their position is supported by concern expressed worldwide in China, Indonesia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Canada and many other countries including Israel. Those that have potential Kosovo copy cats within their boundaries think it is a very dangerous development. An interesting measure of the highly sensitive and political nature of the whole question is that Taiwan and Afghanistan thousands of miles from the Balkan mini state were in the first flight of countries granting recognition. According to Kabul newspaper editor Hafiz Mansoor “Some of the lawmakers here do not even know where Kosovo is on the map,”. On the other hand the leading international human rights Swiss politician Dick Marty, who does, has urged his government not to rush into recognition.

The most talked about situations are the breakaway areas of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia and Transdnistria in Moldavia. However, in Europe, far more significant is Ukraine, with a population of 40 million, where the country is deeply split between pro Russians and pro Westerners. Not surprisingly the Ukrainian government, normally very keen on NATO, is nervous about developments in the Balkans. Anti NATO former defence minister and opposition Party of Regions’ MP Oleksandr Kuzmuk commented, “this (the declaration of independence by Kosovo) threatens the security of the whole world community – no more, no less. And to me the statement by the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry that it is not a precedent for Transdnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia is simply ridiculous. In our case it is Crimea. If a declaration of independence similar to Kosovo’s is offered to Crimea, for instance, then it will fit there 100%,”. The MP added, “this plan of destabilization worldwide is orchestrated by the United States and implemented by NATO”.

Supported by Russia, Serbia has said that it will never accept the independence of Kosovo. The Russians are concerned about the marginalising of the United Nations and the precedent. In addition to Chechnya, they have a multiplicity of different ethnic groups within their borders. Despite their initial violent reactions, the Serbs have learnt to be more subtle in their resistance than in the past. In internationally supervised Bosnia Herzegovina they have announced that they are to hold a referendum on secession and accession to Serbia. The result is not in doubt. How will the West refuse them what they have so easily handed to the Albanian Kosovans? Equally the idea that Kosovo, including the Serb areas, will now live happily and independently ever after, is optimistic in the extreme. As with the Balfour declaration in Palestine in 1917, where the same territory was promised to two rival groups, the guarantee of Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo by the Western powers, combined with agreeing to Kosovan independence is likely to haunt Europe for a long time to come.

France’s enthusiastic joining with Britain and the US to ignore a UN resolution and accept Kosovan independence is a striking change in French policy from the heady days of opposing the war in Iraq in the United Nations Security Council. Former Interior minister and presidential candidate Jean-Pierre Chevènement summed up the new French stance in a recent article in Le Figaro « After the fine speeches about the respect for the rule of law in 2003, for France to follow the example of the United States and Britain is a sad development. We have not joined the ranks of the cynics or the realists but the weak and feeble… »

Kolya, did you ever read Pushkin’s History of Pugachev? It goes into some neat ethnological detail on the Yaiks.

Thanks Robert. Where will that be published?

Re “In 1999 the deal was that Russia persuaded Milosevic to give up resistance and Kosovo in exchange for a confirmation of Serb sovereignty there.”

Serb sovereignty? Among the issues which led to the conflict was Kosovo’s curtailed autonomy under Milosevic, to gain him more votes in the collective presidency. Surely Serb “sovereignty” — as distinct from restoration to pre-1990 semi-autonomy — would have been a terrible betrayal. It simply wasn’t going to happen.

Chris, yes, years ago I read Pushkin’s history of the Pugachev rebellion. I don’t remember much of it, but it was a very very interesting read.

So as not be accused of turning a blind eye to disgusting political/prosecutorial shenanigans in the US, here is a link about such a thing:

http://tpmmuckraker.talkingpointsmemo.com/2008/02/todays_must_read_283.php

The nine minute video clip from “60 Minutes” is worth watching.

Thanks for passing that on, Kolya. I like the pull-quote Hortan uses: From Grant Woods, a top McCain supporter: “I personally believe that what happened here is that they targeted Don Siegelman because they could not beat him fair and square. This was a Republican state and he was the one Democrat they could never get rid of.” http://harpers.org/archive/2008/02/hbc-90002487

Awfully difficult to throw up much criticism of judicial abuse in Russia when this kind of nonsense is happening.

But (still on the Siegelman case)….

This whole area of cash for appointments is pretty slimy. The case against Siegelman was a stitch-up. As Horton says, the main evidence was false.

But Scrushy did give money to a Siegelman cause and got a political appointment in return. Horton’s counter to that is:

So how many Bush-Cheney donors in amounts of one hundred thousand and more were appointed to government offices or to positions in the Bush-Cheney transition team? The answer is one hundred and forty-six (146). And in how many of those cases did the Justice Department initiate investigations of corruption? The answer is zero (0).

Fair enough. But this kind of patronage is still very much the dark underside of politics.

“Serb sovereignty? Among the issues which led to the conflict was Kosovo’s curtailed autonomy under Milosevic, to gain him more votes in the collective presidency. Surely Serb “sovereignty” — as distinct from restoration to pre-1990 semi-autonomy — would have been a terrible betrayal. It simply wasn’t going to happen.”

All that may be so although there are arguments on both sides but the real point is that the Western powers signed up to Serbian “sovereignty”. What are we saying? That you just sign anything and then break your word when it suits you? The West has since WW2 traded on being the good guys. The key error for Europe was to agree to the attack on Serbia. The US clearly has a different agenda to Europe and it is time that the European politicians had the courage to say so. We have created another Palestine situation but without the excuse of the terrible pressures that existed in 1917. Incidentally part of the motivation for the Balfour declaration was to impress the Jews in the Russian government to stay in the war but that is another story.

The article appears on the Europe page in the March edition of the English language newspaper French News published in France. It will work its way on to the web site eventually http://www.french-news.com. We have about 120,000 readers of all nationalities but the majority are British. There may even be some Russians.

…[T]he Western powers signed up to Serbian “sovereignty”.

They signed up to “substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region.” The FRY disappeared in 2003 and, after Montenegro’s 2006 independence, that left Serbia. Serbia + Kosovo. To repeat: it was never going to happen.

It’s highly appropriate to worry over questions of self-determination. They are always fraught, because there are always “stranded” minorities, like the 100,000 Kosovar Serbs.

But to imagine Western European governments were going to force Kosovo back into Serbia’s embrace is a fantasy and would hardly have helped them remain “good guys”.

Where was “the West” regarded as “the good guys” in the Cold War? In the West itself, and to some extent in the Warsaw Pact countries. That is not the world, which also includes Latin America, Indochina, and a bunch of other places that I think would to a large extent disagree.

Where was “the West” regarded as “the good guys” in the Cold War?

Well, yeah. Point taken. But, in this instance, I think the W Europeans really have tried to be good guys, despite terrible constraints, ethical dilemmas and impenetrable ambiguities. And I should add here that, since the conflict, I think Serbia without Milosevic has behaved as an absolutely normal country. It deserves credit for that.

But when 90% of the residents of a clearly delineated piece of real estate want out, they’ll usually get what they want. That’s just reality. In my opinion, what the locals want always trumps territorial claims by others. All the Serbian mythology about Kosovo Polje and how Kosovo is the “heart of Serbia” is just nationalist cant.

England lost Calais in 1553. I don’t think the Brits are going to be claiming it back any time soon. Although the estate agents there are doing their best to sell it to them.

FH, re the former Alabama governor conviction, I’m also very uneasy with political patronage. I’m afraid that it’s inevitable. That is not to say that we should not minimize it.

I’m not sure whether you saw the video clip about the trail of Alabama’s former governor. In it either the Republican that was so disgusted with the prosecution of a Democrat stating something like “I’m American first, Republican second”) or one of the attorneys said that if Siegelman was justifiably jailed then thousands of state politicians and US congressmen and senators should be jailed. (I’m sure plenty of readers of this blog would say, “yes, of course!”}

However he said that Russia did not intend to get involved in an armed conflict over Kosovo.

Probably a good idea. Last time they sent soldiers to confront NATO troops in Pristina, they neglected to supply them with food or water, and the Russians found themselves having to sheepishly ask for food from opposing Italian and British troops. A friend of mine was one of the Russian paratroopers there at the time.

The US clearly has a different agenda to Europe and it is time that the European politicians had the courage to say so.

The European politicians did precisely this for much of the Balkans war. Their position was to pretend nothing was going on, and even if it was, it was nothing to worry about. If European politicians want independence from US actions, they might have to occasionally take some actions of their own, instead of continuing decades of inaction which results in episodes like Srebrenica.

Kolya – It was Grant Woods who said he was an American first. He’s a hero, in my view.

Yes, I watched the video. I’ve also been following the case via Scott Horton for some time now. I’ve been disgusted by it. I don’t understand why Siegelman is still in jail.

I was surprised and absolutely delighted that you raised this issue here. For most people, it will have seemed a non sequitor, totally off-topic. I regard it as utterly on-topic.

In my view, the foremost problem in Russia is its judiciary and the clear lack of a “dictatorship of the law.” This is Putin’s greatest failing.

But how can we in the west say so when we have cases like Siegelman’s to answer for. Where is our moral authority when our vaunted legal system sends political adversaries to jail? In my mind, Siegelman is America’s Khodorkovsky.

All that having been said, we don’t just preach rule of law to Russia. We also preach democracy. And here I have more trouble. A democracy which rests on patronage – INCLUDING that which Siegelman appears to have been (legally) engaged in – is morally skewed. It’s corrupt. It inevitably means that plutocrats can rig the system to their benefit. And they do.

So what can we tell Russia? Anything?

By the way, I don’t know whether you’re aware of this but Scott Horton, as a civil rights lawyer, has been heavily involved in FSU issues for many years. So there’s another justification for mentioning this case in a Russia blog.

FH, first my apologies for my atrociously written last comment. My wife and daughter were already sitting at the dinner table while I was clumsily trying to write a comment, so my writing was even worse than the usual.

Guys, you have to check this link. It applies to most of us:

http://xkcd.com/386/

As to your comment, FH. I agree with everything you wrote. And thanks for the Scott Horton tip. I read some of his stuff in Harper’s but without really knowing who he is.

“In my view, the foremost problem in Russia is its judiciary and the clear lack of a “dictatorship of the law.” This is Putin’s greatest failing.”

It’s a point I have raised before, but if the law were to be applied uniformly, that would likely mean criminal charges against everybody who became wealthy through the 1990s privatizations. Not only when that do immense damage to the economy, it would lead to a new wave of “anti-Putin (soon to be Medvedev) democratic fighters” in Britain.

“They signed up to “substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region.” The FRY disappeared in 2003 and, after Montenegro’s 2006 independence, that left Serbia. Serbia + Kosovo. To repeat: it was never going to happen.”

First point Serbia is the internationally recognised successor state to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. For example Serbia still funds the public debt for Kosovo. In international law F.R. Yugoslavia means Serbia. Even the United States admits that, which is why they initially tried to get UNSCR 1244 changed. 1244 says “Reaffirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia”. It is a long document and it actually says it several times. It also talks of “Promoting the establishment, pending a final settlement, of substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo, taking full account … of the Rambouillet accords”. The Rambouillet Accords also refer to “the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia” under Article One Principles.

For NATO and the United States now to ignore all that is a serious breach of faith and no government is likely to take an agreement signed by them very seriously in future. The reason for confirming sovereignty then was to end a war that had become an embarrassment. The reason for getting rid of “sovereignty” now is amongst other things so that Camp Bondsteel can stay in Kosovo. Of course now the Serbs in the north of Kosovo also want self determination – why not? But the US, NATO and the EU says no because Kososvo is already a marginal proposition for statehood and they need the north economically. This is a quite separate issue to the rights and wrongs of the Serb Albanian dispute or whether the UN and NATO ever seriously tried to implement resolution 1244. Internationally it is far more important.

It’s a point I have raised before, but if the law were to be applied uniformly, that would likely mean criminal charges against everybody who became wealthy through the 1990s privatizations.

And today’s bureaucrat billionaires too.

But, no, I don’t think it has to be that way. You don’t just flick a switch and suddenly you’ve got an independent judiciary and prosecutors who are rules-bound “officers of the court.”

You start at the top, at the Supreme and Constitutional Courts, and make sure they are the most respected people available, people whose personal reputations are valued by them. You make them train for the job. You supply them with strict rules on ex-parte communications, including disclosure of same to all parties. You supply the parties with the means to impeach or force recusal. Critically, you provide defence attorneys with the means to fend off attack and prevent the horrifying spectacle seen in the Yukos case of lawyers jailed and their work product confiscated. Etc Etc.

All this takes time. The oligarchs’ kids will have pissed away their papas’ fortunes by the time the full effects are being felt at the Basmansky level.

In fairness, some of this has already been happening. Russian lawyers say that as long as there is no political interest in the case, it is possible to get a fair trial or hearing. The body of law itself is in fact quite good (thanks largely to unsung steps taken during the Yeltsin era, by the way).

But independence is the key bit. I would force the judges to log and disclose all contacts with government and Kremlin officials.

Robert – Yes, I know Serbia is the successor state. And I realize the agreement to end the war included undertakings which were going to be problematic even then, and still more so now. They conflict with Kosovans’ rights to self-determination, which have now been asserted by Kosovo’s leadership. Had Nato, the EU or other outsiders dictated that step, they would have been in breach both of the agreement and of Serbia’s territorial integrity. As far as I know, they didn’t.

But there are a number of principles involved in this, not just those outlined in the agreement.

Basmansky level = Basmany level. Obviously.

Fh, I think you’re talking about a process that would take a couple of generations.

“In fairness, some of this has already been happening. Russian lawyers say that as long as there is no political interest in the case, it is possible to get a fair trial or hearing.”

I think this is true if you are talking about conflicts between equals (two little guys, or two big guys). If it’s a little guy against a big guy, that’s something else… Not that that is unique to Russia.

I think Yukos was to a large extent a demonstration (not show ) trial intended as an object demonstration to big criminal capital in general.

Chris – At least one generation, yes. But there can be visible steps along the way, including self-discipline at the Kremlin. Whether demonstration or show trial, the Yukos prosecution demonstrated the opposite of all this. Instead of “obey the law” it said “we will get you if we want to.”

fh “Had Nato, the EU or other outsiders dictated that step, they would have been in breach both of the agreement and of Serbia’s territorial integrity. As far as I know, they didn’t.”

Nato and the EU are not outsiders and they are certainly not behaving like them. If what you really want to say is that independance for Kosova in itself is great. I agree with
you. The long term consequences worldwide and for the moral standing of the West are not great, as we shall see.

“Instead of “obey the law” it said “we will get you if we want to.””

But once again nobody is obeying the law. It’s a sign not to disobey the law too eggregiously.

But once again nobody is obeying the law. It’s a sign not to disobey the law too eggregiously.

Exactly. Isn’t that the danger of arbitrary enforcement targeting opponents? It’s a get-out-of-jail card for “friends”.

“Exactly. Isn’t that the danger of arbitrary enforcement targeting opponents? It’s a get-out-of-jail card for “friends”.”

Well, how do you get out of the trap? I know you have a long-term plan, but that doesn’t address the immediate (in 2003) problem of dealing with the oligarchs NOW.

Not on topic. Chris mentioned Pushkin’s book on the Pugachev rebellion. It’s a work I recommend to anyone. Besides being an interesting history, it shows the expanding range of Pushkin’s interests and talents. It’s passe to say it, since it’s so obvious, but what a loss was his early death! Ironically, I only have this book in English. A translation by Earl Sampson, a retired professor at the University of Colorado and a good man.

It is an extremely good book! On consideration though I think some of his descriptions of the early history of the Yaiks are almost certainly mythologized (like the story about how they started taking wives).

Well, how do you get out of the trap?

Oh, I misunderstood your point there. Good question. I just wrote a long-winded response. And then pressed “delete” because it was naive as hell.

The short answer is I’m not sure you can get out of the trap without saying, what’s past is past, but starting next Tuesday….

Not a very robust answer I’m afraid. Thinking…

I’m conflicted about Kosovo primarily because Kosovo is indeed important to the Serbian understanding of themselves as a people and a nation. People can make fun of it as a sort of irrational atavism, but that does not mean that such things do not run deep. On the other hand, the demographics cannot be disputed: Serbs are a tiny minority there and the vast majority of Kosovars do not want to be part of Serbia. Even before WWII Kosovo was a place that Serbs loved and venerated but preferred not to live there. Why? Because they had a choice and it was easier to prosper in other parts of Serbia (greener pastures).

Robert will probably hate it, but I think this Timothy Garton Ash quote is spot on:

“For all the atrocities of the Milosevic years, the settlement is not wholly just. But in the end, it is the least worst outcome for Serbia too. It’s horrible to lose a gangrenous arm, but that is sometimes the precondition for recovery. In their hearts, many Serbs know this. And it was in Belgrade, not Pristina, that I heard this joke: the Serbs will do anything for Kosovo except live there.”

Interesting discussion, Chris and FH.

Chris:

“Well, how do you get out of the trap?”

FH:

“Oh, I misunderstood your point there. Good question. …. The short answer is I’m not sure you can get out of the trap without saying, what’s past is past, but starting next Tuesday….”

That’s probably the only way to do it. For that to happen, though, some prerequisites have to be met. First, a credible legal infrastructure has to be in place (which already is the case, I believe). Then, as you said, FH, the people appointed at the top should have the the professional integrity and moral backbone to resist both political pressure and bribery attempts (either subtle or direct). A messy muddling through period is inevitable until the prerequisites are met. And then, of course, you cannot advertise too far in advance the crucial “what’s past is past, but starting next Tuesday….”

Despite the recent and ongoing abuses, is there any evidence that this is something Putin & Medvedev are working on? I mean, any evidence that goes beyond mere words? This is not a rhetorical question, I really don’t know.

KOYLA In a sense I agree with Ash and you. I have split feelings about it all. BUT we would be very foolish to imagine that what has happened had anything to do with justice. It is also highly questionable that the “atrocities” that are bandied about are much more than a PR creation. There were atrocities on both sides but nowhere near a level to justify a 78 day bombing campaign. In total 3,000 bodies were discovered in Kosovo after the NATO occupation from both sides. Despite this the figure of 10,000 Albanian Kosovan deaths is still bandied about even today by media sources who should know better.

Milosevic’s greatest error is that he spent his money on inadequate weapons rather than first class PR people faced as he was by the whole Western com machine. He might have then pointed out that at exactly the same time a real genocide was taking place on the other side of the world in East Timor where tens of thousands were being slaughtered by a western ally Indonesia armed with western weapons and not a squeak out of the media or the deeply concerned humanitarian “international community”. It is this sort of futile hypocrisy that damages us so much in the eyes of countries that we lecture to about human rights, freedom of the press and democracy. They have their intelligence services and their diplomats. They do not have to rely on half baked and biased reporting. Sadly they know us for what we do not what we say.

In a sense I agree with Ash and you. I have split feelings about it all.

Hey – me too! I’m certainly not hugely optimistic about this latest mini-state’s prospects. But I really don’t see any alternative.

He might have then pointed out that at exactly the same time a real genocide was taking place on the other side of the world in East Timor where tens of thousands were being slaughtered by a western ally Indonesia armed with western weapons and not a squeak out of the media or the deeply concerned humanitarian “international community”.

This is totally incorrect. The media, human rights groups, and the international community raised hell over Indonesia’s actions in East Timor. It got so bad that Australia sent soldiers.

Despite the recent and ongoing abuses, is there any evidence that this is something Putin & Medvedev are working on?

Not that I’m aware of Kolya but maybe Medvedev’s general words about the rule of law recently meant something to him.

The problem I’m having is that Chris is asking about a hypothetical 2003 – a year before another presidential election. Not today, and not under a newly-elected President Medvedev.

I was on close personal terms with what I would term a mini-oligarch at that time. He was having a dispute with Kremlin-related forces. He was talking tough. He really was thinking about throwing financial support behind an anti-Putin campaign. Within months of Platon Lebedev’s and then Khodorkovsky’s arrest, this guy folded his cards on his dispute and learned to behave.

So, as a demonstration case, Yukos worked on several levels. It disposed of an enemy. It chilled out some rich mavericks who might have thrown major money at an opposition campaign. It greatly enriched allies and cronies. And it threw a bone to the resentful public.

What’s not to like there, if you’re in charge? Can you achieve all that by instituting a proper long-term program of judicial and prosecutorial reform? No way.

As Chris suggests, it really was a demonstration, but not of the application of the law, but the exercise of raw state power. These are two contradictory things. You do not inspire what Sean calls “ideological reverence for law” through fear of its arbitrary application and abuse.

How to get out of the trap? The Yukos case is part of the trap, because it stands as a highly visible contradiction to what ought to be done. The more I think about it, I don’t think my initial answer – “what’s past is past, but starting next Tuesday….” – would work without some kind of closure on the Yukos case.

The best book about civil war, cossaks and bolsheviks – “Тихий Дон” by Sholokhov. It is as good and precise as Pushkin’s Pugachev. It shows why people born and living in next houses become worst enemies, Reds and Whites…

PS. Chris. You wrote “My French is getting so bad…”… Well, I have to tell you – it’s terrible. I didn’t understand a word! : ))

The impulse to centralize weakens alternative centers of power, which in turn maintains centralization as the only effective means of preventing chaos.

That’s right. It also means there are too few leaders-in-training out there, something discussed a few days ago. Not enough forums through which up-and-comers can learn how to organize, frame a program, persuade people, get elected to the board or whatever, on a small scale.

I don’t know about the reformers. They seem as fixated on grand schemes as the folks in power are.

Come to think of it, pardoning and releasing Khodorkovsky (along with some property settlement) would be a pretty smart political move by Putin just before leaves the executive.

Oops. Amsterdam might quote you on that.

Tim Newman “This is totally incorrect. The media, human rights groups, and the international community raised hell over Indonesia’s actions in East Timor. It got so bad that Australia sent soldiers.”

I wish it was. Yes the NGOs finally embarrassed the United States into allowing Australia to take action after approximately one third of the population had been murdered. Did anybody even think about bombing Jakarta? No because Indonesia was too big, had too much oil and bought too many weapons, was not leftwing and was a western ally. The point is that there was an imaginary genocide in Kosovo and a real one in East Timor. A Nexis media search has shown that between 1998 and 1999 LA Times, the NYT, the Washington Post, Newsweek, and Time between them used the word genocide in connection with Serbia 220 times and 3,000 people died – 10,000 if you want. Between 1990 and 1999 those same journals used the word 33 times to describe the actions of Indonesia in East Timor. Indonesia invaded in 1975 and 220,000 are estimated to have died. Australia finally took action in 1999. The British Ambassador to Jakarta advised the Foreign Office in 1975 “It is in Britain’s interests that Indonesia should absorb East Timor as soon and as unobtrusively as possible, and if it comes to the crunch and there is a row in the UN, we should keep our heads down and avoid taking sides against the Indonesian government.” UN Human Rights Commissioner Mary Robinson wrote in 1999 “For a time it seemed that the world would turn away altogether from the people of East Timor… Action when it came was painfully slow; thousands paid with their lives.” You can argue that real politik is all that matters or you can argue that humanitarian intervention is a moral obligation but you cannot argue both at the same time without people eventually noticing. As I say if Milosevic had been smarter he might have shamed the Western powers and avoided invasion but with the attitude of the Western media it would have been difficult. The final point is that Putin and the Chinese know all this and inevitably it affects their attitudes to what we say we think they ought to do, which is why I am writing it here.

“Come to think of it, pardoning and releasing Khodorkovsky (along with some property settlement) would be a pretty smart political move by Putin just before leaves the executive.”

I don’t agree. It would be taken as confirmation that the affair was political. Domestically, people would wonder why he has pardoned this oligarch asshole.

“As Chris suggests, it really was a demonstration, but not of the application of the law, but the exercise of raw state power.”

In a situation of state collapse and anarchy, demonstrations of raw state power are a good thing, not a bad thing.

“In a situation of state collapse and anarchy, demonstrations of raw state power are a good thing, not a bad thing.”

Quite agree. It took the French judges around ten years to get the bandits who treated Elf as their private piggy bank into court. Not an appopriate way of proceeding for Russia in the early 2000s. Switching into “normal” judicial mode when things calm down is the difficult trick. A change of top man makes it easier.

Switching into “normal” judicial mode when things calm down is the difficult trick.

Agreed. And an on-going further trial won’t make it easier. I agree with Chris that the state isn’t likely to acknowledge the true nature of the case. But, absent the new charges, they would have been released on the earlier ones by now.

In response to this:

“Come to think of it, pardoning and releasing Khodorkovsky (along with some property settlement) would be a pretty smart political move by Putin just before leaves the executive.”

Chris wrote:

“I don’t agree. It would be taken as confirmation that the affair was political. Domestically, people would wonder why he has pardoned this oligarch asshole.”

But are Russians that stupid not to know that the reason Khodorkovsky was singled out was indeed political?

I know you deeply dislike Khodorkovsky, but is he any worse than the other billionaires? Even if guilty, does he deserve to be treated as he’s treated?

“But are Russians that stupid not to know that the reason Khodorkovsky was singled out was indeed political?”

They don’t care. He’s an asshole.

“I know you deeply dislike Khodorkovsky, but is he any worse than the other billionaires? Even if guilty, does he deserve to be treated as he’s treated?”

I don’t think “deserve” matters. If this was based on what they deserve, morally speaking, they’d all be in jail. It’s a matter of practicality. He tried to buy the Duma and run his own foreign and energy policy, violating the social contract, so he got warned and then when he didn’t back down he got stepped on.

Chris is right again…

And that’s why this would-be-release might be considered as wrong signal.

If Putin needs to play “Fair Tsar” it would be wiser to lock a couple of more crooks
At lest three men – is a minimum for a good party.

Chrisius Maximus is always right. Even when I’m wrong, I’m just pretending.

So you were pretending in the middle of the lake, weren’t you?

They don’t care. He’s an asshole.

The first sentence is right, that most Russians probably do not care that the affair was personal and political payback. But that’s an extremely poor foundation on which to build respect for the law which (I note) Medevedev has been discussing again. Comments on the corruption problem:

The fact that a significant proportion of the
population do not give a damn about the
observance of the law is at the root of this
phenomenon,” he said today in answer to questions from journalists in Ufa. “Either we learn to lead law-abiding lives and comply with the law without thinking whether or not it needs to be observed, or people will think that they can do whatever they like.” (ITAR-TASS)

About Sean’s statement that it would be a smart move for Putin to pardon Khodorkovsky, Chris wrote:

“I don’t agree. It would be taken as confirmation that the affair was political. Domestically, people would wonder why he has pardoned this oligarch asshole.”

I wrote:

“But are Russians that stupid not to know that the reason Khodorkovsky was singled out was indeed political?”

Chris wrote:

“They don’t care. He’s an asshole.”

Well, if they don’t care whether his arrest, trial and conviction was politically motivated, why would they care if he’s pardoned? Just because according to you he’s an asshole? Because they envy him?

I wrote:

“I know you deeply dislike Khodorkovsky, but is he any worse than the other billionaires? Even if guilty, does he deserve to be treated as he’s treated?”

Chris wrote:

“I don’t think “deserve” matters. If this was based on what they deserve, morally speaking, they’d all be in jail. It’s a matter of practicality. He tried to buy the Duma and run his own foreign and energy policy, violating the social contract, so he got warned and then when he didn’t back down he got stepped on.”

Okay, let’s assume you are right. Why then is giving Khodorkovsky a pardon such a bad move? He lost the vast majority of his fortune, he already spent a considerable time in jail (exhibiting remarkable fortitude despite all those petty indignities foisted upon him), and a pardon does not imply innocence.

Frankly, I’m repelled by the schadenfreude exhibited by many in Russia when talking about Khodorvkovsky still languishing in prison.

Why then is giving Khodorkovsky a pardon such a bad move?

Kolya – As I’ve said, I don’t even think a pardon’s needed. The prosecution is clearly having difficulty putting together a case for the new trials — as in re the disgraceful treatment of Vasily Aleksanyan, whose testimony they’ve sought to extort. Drop those charges and both Khodorkovsky and Lebedev walk. They’ve done their time.

Thanks, FH. A detail I didn’t know.

“Well, if they don’t care whether his arrest, trial and conviction was politically motivated, why would they care if he’s pardoned? Just because according to you he’s an asshole? Because they envy him?”

Because they think he’s a gangster, part of a gangster class who looted the work of generations of Soviet people and are responsible for their suffering? Most people in Russia think Putin is FAR TOO LIBERAL with the oligarchs, who should ALL be in jail. Morally speaking they are right of course, but for practical reasons I shall have to allow my craving for justice to be satisied by Khodorkovksy.