There is so much to say about Anders Aslund’s “Purge or Coup?” commentary in the Moscow Times. The big question on his mind is why Putin isn’t going to retire as promised. Aslund’s reasons are twofold: 1) There have been “serious accusations of corruption and grand larceny” raised against Putin requiring him to secure immunity via the office of the Prime Minister. 2) Putin is, in good old dialectical fashion, the identical subject-object of the system he’s created. If he leaves, Aslund asserts, “his system is prone to collapse.” Now, I completely dismiss the first and agree somewhat with the second. But my agreement with Aslund is for different reasons than he provides.
Putin doesn’t need immunity because there haven’t been any serious allegations of grand larceny. At least not enough for anyone in Russia to take seriously. Allegations of Putin’s wealth have come from abroad, mainly from an interview Stanislav Belkovsky gave in the German daily Die Welt. Belkovsky has no documents linking Putin to his supposed $40 billion. He only provides estimates of the wealth of shares Putin allegedly holds in Surgutneftegaz, Gazprom, and Gunvor. Now I have no doubt that Putin has stashed away a little sumptin’ sumptin’ on the side for retirement. I mean, if he can’t who the hell can!? The real question is what does the revelation of Putin’s alleged wealth mean and for who?
Aslund is convinced that Putin’s wealth was leaked by Sechin as the trump card in his clan war against Viktor Cherkesov. This was suggested by Luke Harding in the Guardian two weeks ago. But there has been little evidence linking the “leak” to Sechin. This hasn’t stopped the speculation, though. The main theory is that Sechin’s people leaked information about Putin’s wealth as retaliation for the hits they’ve taken over the last two months in what is now being called the “Siloviki War.” The logic goes that Putin’s picking Medvedev is a death blow to Sechin (who was apparently the main backer of the “third term party” who desired Putin’s return. If true, then wouldn’t Sechin be happy that Putin is sticking around?) But what does Sechin have to gain politically from outing Putin stash?
I would say very little. If Sechin is threatening Putin, then he’s only threatening himself. Any investigation into how Putin amassed his wealth would inevitably put the focus on how Sechin and his people got theirs. This seems to already be happening. Belkovsky’s assertions are beginning to engender other claims of massive Kremlin elite graft. In an interview with conservative Daily Telegraph, former Kremlin insider-turned-enemy Andrei Illarionov alleged that the Kremlin elites have all but drained Russia’s Stabilization Fund. This is a claim, forum.msk reminds us, that Russian economist Mikhail Delyagin made two months ago. “One gets the impression that someone in the leadership regards the Stabilization Fund as his personal wallet,” Delyagin said at the time.
If Sechin’s group did indeed leak information about Putin’s money, it was more to remind him that there are no Kremlin princes among thieves. No one is against or in “revolt” of Putin as Aslund claims. The back and forth between Cherkasov and Sechin is merely two clans jostling for position over their future. Putin has attempted to “contain” the “Siloviki War” with two counter moves. First, he anointed his own protege Dimitry Medvedev as the next Don. Medvedev’s loyalty is to Putin alone and therefore makes him a suitable future manager of the clans in. One should emphasize “future” because as things stand now, Medvedev is hardly strong enough to keep a balance between the clans. This points to the second move Putin has made. By accepting a position of Prime Minister, he lets everyone know that he’s going to stick around and make sure things don’t go to shit. The Medvedev-Putin “dream team” will manage the clans until Medvedev can do it on his own. Welcome to peaceful presidential succession, Russian style.
If you buy my take, then Aslund’s assertions that Putin has “carried out a coup against his KGB friends,” that the Chekists “undoubtedly loathe Medvedev, who has outwitted them,” and that they “hate their former friend Vladimir Vladimirovich” is absolute poppycock. None of the siloviki will be “discarded into the dustbin of history.” To cry that civil war is on the horizon is premature, if not down right silly. If the 1990s were as traumatic to the Putinistas as some claim, then they know well that they will gain nothing by a replay of the 1997 “Banker’s War” or, god forbid, another coup a la 1991. The days where “purge and a coup are obvious actions for a conspiratorial brain trained in the Kremlin” are gone. In its place we are seeing the post-Soviet Russian elite becoming what Marx called a class in itself and for itself. Clans will bicker. They will jostle for position. Sometimes daddy will side with one over the other. But to break the class deal will mean disaster for them all. In fact, the only thing that would spark said disaster is if Putin took Aslund’s advice to “fire all these Chekists before the planned coronation in May.” That, my friends, would initiate a bloodbath for sure.
Medvedev’s anointment is in the best interests of all of the clans, even if they might not fully realize it. To chose one of Cherkasov’s or Sechin’s clients would be like giving a kid the keys to a candy store. So no, this is hardly a “prelude to the fall of the KGB kleptocrats.” It’s about continuing their bountiful existence.
Image: Kompromat.ru
Interesting information Kolya. Thanks.The figures I have for St. Petersburg university show a different picture. According to Susan Morrissey (in her Heralds of Revolution), 64.99% of students in 1899 came from the gentry and civil servants. This dropped to 56.95% in 1910. In this same period, “lower urban orders” and peasants went from 15% to 20%. One question in regard to this:
One more and I have to go. Russian historian Sergei Volkov writes 23 percent of university students in 1897 were members of the gentry. By 1915 it was less than 10 percent. The vast majority of university students were not members of the gentry and their proportion was dropping rather quickly.
Could this be because of the war?
Kolya and Sean – Fascinating. One can imagine fast rising expectations then running smack into WWI. Back then all the various brands and shades of socialism were essentially aspirational.
Excellent stuff fellas, great comment Kolya.
Thanks, Tim.
Sean, my guess is that WWI intensified what was already a strong trend. I don’t know what to say about the discrepancies in the numbers of Morrissey and Volkov. Perhaps the reason is that her numbers deal with St. Petersburg and Volkov’s with all of Russia. This is only a guess on my part. Considering that that’s where the court was, it is reasonable to assume that the students in St. Petersburg where of a socially higher strata when compared to students in, say, Kharkov (which was known as a university town).
Okay, I think I just figured out one reason behind the variation of numbers. It seems that Volkov counted as gentry only those whose parents belonged to the hereditary gentry. The so-called “lichnie dvoranie” did not have hereditary status (although if during their careers they reached a certain position in the Table of Ranks they gained hereditary status–which, I believe, is how Ulianov, Lenin’s father, became part of the hereditary gentry.) Going back to the students, according to a table in Volkov’s book in 1906 the parents of 48 percent of unviersity students belonged to the gentry, but only a quarter of them (12 percent) where actually members of the hereditary gentry. It seems that there is some (but not dramatic) difference between the numbers that Volkov gives in the text and the ones in the table.
As to the military, keep in mind that if around 1900 only about half of the officers belonged to the gentry, virtually all officers who served in the Guard Regiments (primarily posted around St. Petersburg) where of the gentry.
Okay, enough! My home just quieted down, my daughter’s friends just left, so now I’m going back to the living room…
One can imagine fast rising expectations then running smack into WWI.
One can go considerably further, all the way to 1917. After the February Revolution, Russia briefly become the most liberal country in the world. The Temporary gov’t was dedicated to international socialism doctrines and the ‘War to Victorious End’. Elections were scheduled in one year, with SD party widely expected to obtain the majority. Germany was going down and if Russia would manage to stay in the Entente for just one more year it would emerge from WWI as an important partner in the victorious coalition, with new progressive gov’t and monarchy a thing of the past. All the enormous sacrifices would pay off.
Germany has sued for peace in November 1918. Unfortunately, in November 1917 Bolsheviks commited their coup and quickly surrendered to Germany, taking Russia out of the Entente and the civilized world for 70 years…
Sean, if you’re interested in the future of presidential libraries in Russia, you should check out articles here, here and here (thank you, Russian Google News!) about a bill recently introduced by Sprav. Rossiia to establish them for all ex-Russian presidents in the future (interestingly, the terms of the draft bill seem to exclude Yeltsin, but perhaps he’s already taken care of).
“While during the Napoleonic War the vast majority of Russian officers were members of the gentry, by the end of the 19th Century only about half of them were.”
I am not saying this is wrong but I wonder if it is right. In Britain as the Napoleonic wars reached their climax there was a growing number of ‘middle class’ officers in the army. By the end anybody who brought in 100 recruits was given one. The Russian army was much bigger. Were there really that many aristocratic young men to fill the junior officer ranks of the army in these long and bloody wars? As wars progress, generally speaking, age gives way to youth and status to competence.
“By the way, what’s the real story behind Russia Journal? Were you around at the end?”
I was there from late 2000 to late 2003. I won’t discuss former employers in public fora though.
I have heard it claimed (without any evidence being adduced) that the pre-WW I economic growth in Russia was mostly the product of rapid demographic growth, with lots of people being thrown into the work force. Is there any truth to this?
Robert, you raise a good point. I certainly never researched the issue and can only parrot what I read. Keep in mind that the dvorianstvo estate in Russia was not as rigid as the nobility in other countries. In any event, “gentry” or “nobility” are not exact translations of what the dvorianstvo was, and many of those who belonged to it were actually not that well off at all. I may be wrong, but I think the dvoriane consisted of about two percent of the population. Perhaps that proportion was enough to populate most of the officer corps.
I just checked a book on Amazon by Alexander Mikaberidze about the Russian officer corps during the Napoleonic Wars. A chart on the book says that 86.5 percent of Russian officers in 1812 belonged to the dvorianstvo. As I already wrote, this proportion dropped considerably as the XIX century progressed–especially after the death of Nikolai I.
Another issue that needs to be remembered about pre-rev social mobility is that there is a direct correlation between the rise in labor unions and the rise in wages. Metalworkers like nash Khrushchev were the most organized. The standard of living for skilled workers didn’t go up because of industrialization, but because workers fought for better wages and rights in the workplace.
By all accounts, 1900-1917 was a very turbulent period in Russia. Far more turbulent that the minimal amount of social mobility occurring could solve.
In terms of Russian economic growth, I think it has a lot do with the fact that Russian factories were the most modern in the world, especially in the metal and manufacturing and large sums of capital were being dumped into them. Also given the fact that Russia’s working class were new, high profits were more easily extracted as was higher rates of productivity. Russian workers worked more for less than their more organized European counterparts. That is until 1905 when unions gained the right to organize and the Russian labor movement rapidly rose.
Demographic growth could be another. There were several push-pull factors that facilitated urbanization. Stolypin’s reforms allowed for more migration into the cities, pulled by work in factories. There was already a tradition of labor migration, but breaking up the communes allowed for more workers to remain in the cities. Plus Russian factories were enormous. I think the Putiliov factory had about 12000 workers in 1902. I remember reading that by 1917 there were 45,000 workers in the Putliov factory. Historians argue the high concentration of workers facilitated labor organizing.
In terms of Russian economic growth, I think it has a lot do with the fact that Russian factories were the most modern in the world, especially in the metal and manufacturing and large sums of capital were being dumped into them.
Didn’t the Russians simply buy in a lot of the machinery for their factories (which would explain why they were the most modern in the world)? I was very interested to read that the town that is now Donetsk, where Khruschev started out his career, was originally called Yuzovka after the Welshman John Hughes who founded it in 1869. Hughes had been contracted by the tsarist government to build various industries in the region, which makes perfect sense given that a Welshman would have had considerable exposure to mining and steelworking industries.
“I think it has a lot do with the fact that Russian factories were the most modern in the world, especially in the metal and manufacturing and large sums of capital were being dumped into them.”
What do you think of the whole Trotskyist “uneven development” notion?
“Hughesovka” — exactly right. (Thanks Tim. Good tip, leading to a fascinating foray via Google. I love these stories.) His was the company behind the British navy’s fleet of “ironclads”. Yuzovka was a classic company town, complete with an Anglican church.
http://www.gtj.org.uk/en/item10/30128
Interesting that (according to that link) most of the Welsh workers went home after the revolution, but apparently some remained. Wonder if their descendants are traceable.
“I was particularly impressed by the views of Prof Jones of the University of New York”
About fifty comments ago i made this rather strange comment. I actually meant Prof Cohen Stephen F. Not quite the same.
What do you think of the whole Trotskyist “uneven development” notion?
Interesting question. Trotsky noted that what we now call under-developed economies modernize by adopting the latest technologies, skipping all the intervening stages advanced economies went through, but making themselves ever-more vulnerable to decisions by the the advanced economies, as owners of the intellectual and other capital.
(CM: please feel free to correct me on this. It’s been a few decades since my last economics classes.)
So — the first question is: Did Trotsky develop this theory based on direct observations of what was going on in Donetsk and elsewhere in late-Tsarist Russia? Almost certainly. The underlying observation looks accurate. It can be seen in action all the time. Parts of the Russian telecommunications system are now among the most advanced in the world, without having had to go through several generations of development from analog to digital.
Question 2: Was he correct in his assessment that the original owners of the intellectual property would be apt to exert undue negative influence on the host economy? More specifically, did foreign owners of intellectual and other forms of capital (ie, guys like our Welshman above) play a malign role in the lead-up to the revolution?
Short answer: Don’t know. What do the historians say?
Behind the darker periods of history, one can always find a Welshman.
“(CM: please feel free to correct me on this. It’s been a few decades since my last economics classes.) ”
I have a copy of Results and Prospects/Permanent Revolution on my shelf. Much as a find reading Trotsky to be painful, I think I’ll skim through them again to verify.
Behind the darker periods of history, one can always find a Welshman.
You’ll normally find us behind a sheep or two as well.
Evil sheep.
Baaaaaaa-d sheep.
As I catch up on this thread, I return to thinking that often they lend themselves to a entirely new topic or blog posting. In other words, the topic wanders to something else, but still an interesting topic.
This thread is better cited than most.
If Mr. Newman objects to Naomi Klein’s Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism, I’m sure he would completely pop a cork over Jules Boykoff’s Beyond Bullets: The Suppression of Dissent in the United States that I was reading on my recent trip to Phoenix.
I have no idea who Jules Boykoff is, but I very much doubt I would pop a cork over anything he has written, completely or partially.
My objections to Naomi Klein are based on the conclusion I reached after reading her newspaper columns over the course of 3 years, which is that she is economically illiterate. For somebody who has chosen writing about economics as a career, this is a serious shortcoming.
putin is staying on because without him the system he put in place will devour itself inside out. there r too many competing power cliques that would love to control the purse strings, and putin rightly fears that without a stabilizing demi-god-like figure the whole governing edifice will collapse. i don’t think putin wants to stay on, as prime-minister or in any other capacity, but his hand was forced by the state model he created. that’s why u can criticize anybody in russia, but not the president. even calling supporters rallies putings and the supporters themselves putinists, can get one in a sport of trouble with law enforcement. it’s not because putin is personally vain. it’s just he understands that to juggle the competing interests of the elites, the umpire must be revered and stay beyond reproach. putin also understands that in russia authority is institutional, not personal, so medvedev will amass all the piety and veneration befitting his status as ruler of all great, little, and white russia etc etc etc, pretty soon after taking the oath of office. but this interregnum, between putin stepping down and medevedev feeling fully in control, is dangerous for the system putin built, so vvp will stick around for a while as guarantor of stability before medvedev can rule in his own right. sort of what sophia did, when her brother ivan was too demented, and half-brother peter too young, to rule. the problem with her, she overstayed her welcome, and was shipped off to a convent. i’m pretty sure putin won’t repeat that mistake and will bow out when the times comes.
That was a strange mix of incoherent grammar and orthography, on the one hand, and very good sense, on the other.
coherent grammar is in the eye of the beholder, as they say.
“but his hand was forced by the state model he created”
Astana.kz I agree with your analysis but it would be interesting to know whether you think that Putin has any choice in the model he created, given the dire circumstances he inherited. Statements by Western commentators that assume that he could have and ought to have turned Russia into a western european style democracy seem to me unrealistic.
robert, fully concur. he could not have built a full-blown western-style body politic in russia even if he wanted to, which i believe he did want to, at least in the beginning. however, consensus had been reached among the emerging new elite that russia could not be thrown head-on into the pool of democracy and expected to swim unassisted. they believed that a life preserver and other flotation devices would be needed to prevent russia’s going straight to the bottom like a rock. thus the control of the media, thus the managed elections. has some of that been taken to ridiculous extremes? sure it has. as gogol used to say, fools and bad roads r russia’s twin banes. and bureaucratic fools r a species apart. they r ad nauseam obsequious and always burning with the desire to please their superiors, taking sensible order from above and, more often than not, distorting them beyond any recognition and/or good sense. plus, i don’t think putin had a detailed clear design of what he wanted russia to become by the end of his second term. he put it together on the go, sometimes haphazardly. if the result is a smorgasbord of conflicting ideas and ideals, it is a testament to the system’s evolving to respond to the challenges of the now. he intentionally segmented the elite thad had jumped on his bandwagon to better control them, because in the absence of any institutionalized checks and balances – that had been sacrificed for stability early in his reign – that was the only way to concentrate and maintain power. many believe that the system was built around him as the supreme ruler and arbiter, and without him it is prone to collapse. i agree, but with a caveat: authority in russia has never been personal. in other words, power emanates from office, not from any individual who happens to hold that office at the time. there r exceptions, of course. lenin and stalin were such charismatic forceful personalities that they transcended institutions. as a result, during succession, power sharing and instability ensued. it took stalin 10 years to cement his hold on power (recall the so called congress of winners and murder of kirov). khrushev had to share power for 3 years before asserting himself fully at the cpsu XX congress. today’s system in russia was built by putin, and were her to leave the political stage altogether, no one, to even an anointed successor, can step in and fill the vacuum right off the bat in his wake. it will take time, during which all the competing factions could sense the opportunity to make a grab for power, leading to instability (although coups or civil war seem highly unlikely, it’s more science fiction than political analysis). however, instability is something the new system can ill afford. its legitimacy, much like in china’s, rests on its ability to bring prosperity and maintain stability. minus the stability, its credibility with the population at large will be shot. and if there is anything the elites learnt from the traumatic experience of the late 80s and 90s, it is that legitimacy once lost can never be recovered. that’s why puin is staying on. and its speaks to the weakens of the system he beget that it requires his constant tending to strive. it’s just nobody bothered to look that far ahead in 2000. more pressing concerns were monopolizing the political agenda. i’m sure the system will be overhauled now to make sure that the next succession does not require political acrobatics from the incumbent to guarantee a smooth transfer of power. so yes, the system is clearly deficient, and putin deserves blame for it, but the system is what it is, and he needs to do what needs to be done to make it work within its present configuration. whether the west likes it, is irrelevant. putin will not sacrifice stability to placate the west even if he very much wanted to, which he does not anyway. and there’s precious little, if anything, the west can do about it. so there, my two cents on the subject.
noticed a couple of typos upon re-reading it after posting. so u’ve got to excuse me. my quick fingers always manage to get the better of me, darn them.
there’s just one typo that i can see that is nonsensical
today’s system in russia was built by putin, and were her (it should read, HE) to leave the political stage altogether, no one, to even an anointed successor, can step in and fill the vacuum right off the bat in his wake.
No cause for alarm, logorrhea is not contagious.
u seem to be safe. i hope i’ll be equally immune to ur early onset senile dementia
Actually I think astana, although he/she could benefit from capitalization and paragraph breaks, is pretty much correct all the way down the line.
.kz is Kyrgystan, isn’t it?
.kz is the on-line country domain for kazakhstan. but u were tantalizingly close
I knew it was one of those!
I have no idea whether the substance of Astana’s writings are interesting or not because I have not read his long comments.
Astana, I know we all write in a hurry when online and my own grammar and style needs much improvement, but please be more considerate to your potential readers. If you want to be read by more of us, slow down a bit, use capitalizations, paragraph breaks, and all that old fashioned stuff that makes it easier to read.