My newest article on Pajamas Media, “The Short Happy Life of a Russian Anti-Corruption Investigator,” is now up.

Presidential Archive of the Russian Federation, f. 3, op. 3, d. 65, l. 25-26

To: Cde. Stalin
Copy to Cde. Kaganovich

On 16 October an employee of the Special Department, Cde. Sentaretskaya, opened the daily mail addressed to Cde. Stalin.

In one of the open packages there seemed to be a letter with a small piece of brown colored mass, which appeared to be excrement. According to Cde. Sentaretskaya and other employees, a strong order emanated from the opening of the package.

Appalled and upset Cde. Sentaretskaya, taking the mass, carried it to the bathroom, where she threw it in the toilet. According to her, Cde. Sentaretskaya got dizzy upon exiting the bathroom. Entering the room, she fell on the floor hitting the back of her head. Coming to after several minutes, she said that she was blind. A doctor was sent for, who looked at Cde. Sentaretskaya and not finding any sign of injury, declared that it was necessary that Cde. Sentaretskaya go to the hospital for further observation and examination.

After Cde. Sentaretskaya was taken to the Kremlin hospital, an envelope with leftovers of the mass was taken for examination in the NKVD laboratory.

According to the medical examination (enclosed) and observation in the hospital Cde. Sentaretskaya’s blindness was allegedly caused by hysteria and not from the effects of a chemical substance.

At the present time, since 22 October her sight gradually returned to her.

In regard to safety precautions for employees, workers who open mail are taking the following measures.

1. Those who open mail will be provided with rubber gloves which must be worn with opening letters.

2. A supply of disinfectants has been acquired.

26.10.1935

Deputy OS TsK Poskrebyshev

There is a resolution on the document: “To Cdes. Molotov, Andreev, Mikoian, Kaganovich” The document was sent to Molotov, Andreev, and Mikoian.

This document was published in Istochnik, 3, 1993.

I’ll be appearing on Political Vindication Radio at 6:10 pm PST to talk about Putin and the state of Russia. Political Vindication Radio emphatically portends to be “doing the work blue blood Republicans just won’t do.” I’m not sure what that means but having a stanch lefty like myself as a guest should certainly prove to be interesting radio.

Sergei Mironov, the leader of Just Russia, calls it “Socialism 3.0″.  An interesting choice of words considering that this year marks the 90th Anniversary of the Russian Revolution.  Anniversaries tend to function as both remembrance and rebirth, and the talk of “socialism” at Just Russia’s party congress might certainly be a rebirth of sorts.  Even if the revival of “socialism” in Russia might simply be political verbiage rather than possessing any real material content.

Be that as it may, what is clear is that talk of “socialism” is a way for Just Russia to position themselves politically as Russia’s left wing alternative to the Communist Party.   To see this all one has to do is peek into Mironov’s historical positioning of Just Russia in the “history” of socialism.  In his 30 minute speech to congress delegates he spoke of how the Russian Revolution ushered in Socialism 1.0. This version was something called “war socialism”.  This was later countered with Socialism 2.0, a western intervention, presumably to quell the attractiveness of version 1.0 among its populations, that was  more “humanitarian.”  Both of these, however, “proved to be unsustainable and inviable.”  Now Mironov and his party are going top all those with “Socialism 3.0″.  Not only will this socialism be the most humanitarian to date, it will do so by recognizing that the “socialist idea is supported by not only economics, but also cultural endeavors of our people.  We are for a dignified and secure life for Russians.”  Judging from this rhetoric, I fail to see what the upgrade features 3.0 portend to offer.

It doesn’t take a keen observer to notice how all of this sounds familiar.  So much that Svetlana Goriacheva, former Communist Party member and now State Duma deputy for Just Russia, made a point to emphasize that Just Russia’s platform is different from the Communist Party’s.

But Just Russia can split hairs over this “socialism” and that “socialism” all it wants.  The truth of the matter is that the party, which is nothing more than a Kremlin creation, is there to gradually whittle away at the Communist Party’s electorate.   After all, Kremlin doesn’t call it “managed democracy” for nothing, and while many seek to dismiss the notion as simply ideological hot air, there is something very real in the concept.

What is “managed democracy”?  Its meaning is right there in its name.   It means that in the eyes of Team Putin, the Russian State will erect the building blocks for a stable democratic system that many Western states enjoy, but took decades to develop.  As a great power swimming in a sea of “democratic states” Russia can’t afford to waste time taming the groundswell of democracy from below, as say the United States did to its many labor and civil rights struggles of the 20th century, by subsuming little “d” democracy back into the hegemonic machine of big “D” democracy.  Such efforts require tolerating the chaotic and sometimes unpredictable nature of social movements long enough for them to fizzle out and reside themselves to work within the system rather than against it.  The Russian elite is clearly not ready, or at least confident enough in their power, to give a little in the short run for grander riches in both power and money in the long run.  Since the democratic lie can’t be formed organically, it must be manufactured from above.

In this sense, then, the architects of Russian democracy are working from a political position akin to Alexander Gershenkron’s ideas about the benefits of economic backwardness.  Here the Russian state is privy to all the bells and whistles that most “mature” democratic states possess and use so effectively to keep their populations gleefully bathing in their own repression.  Mass media, the internet, political PR firms, consultants, advertising, pundits, spokespeople are all available in Russia to package and repackage democracy as a slick, smooth, and shiny object, all consumable in one bite, or at least in one sound bite.  If postmodern life is a characterized by a litany of single servings, then there is nothing to suggest that “single serving democracy” can’t be one of the choices available at the smörgåsbord of affective chimeras that constitute the modern political subject.  With this in mind, if “democratic backwardness” is truly an advantage, then the Russian elite’s ability manipulate democracy’s most advanced technologies to overcome that backwardness might prove to be nothing less than revolutionary.

This is where the Just Russia’s “Socialism 3.0,” Nashi’s DMD militias, the fiction of the “specter of colored revolution,” Zubkov’s nomination, “Operation Successor,” the demonization of Berezovsky, Litvinenko, Other Russia (as if they have any power), the curtailment of NGOs, the Public Chamber, and many, many other forms of “democratic management” all enter the picture.  All of these little pawns are put into motion with the hope that democracy will function in Russia like it does elsewhere else–a predictable, well oiled machine where the people are made to believe that they do the choosing, when in reality the range of choices is no more diverse than one between Coke and Pepsi.

This is by no means to suggest that Russia is any less democratic than their Western counterparts. It’s that the mechanisms for realizing democracy in Russia are much more visible, harder, and violent.  With that in mind, as Mironov announces “Socialism 3.0″ as part of global history of socialism, one can’t help wonder what political upgrades “managed democracy” looks to bequeath upon the world.

Rubashov from Darkness at Noon has been hibernating for the past month or so after returning from research.   He has returned with an great post titled “The Sound of Marching Boots . . .” about DMD and Nashi and their role in the upcoming Duma elections.    He also links the informative Moscow Times article on the  subject.  I strongly urge readers to check out Rubashov’s discussion.

The pawns are moving into place. Kommersant reports that Nashi’s “muscle”, the Voluntary Youth Militia (Dobrovol’naia molodezhnaia druzhina, DMD) has offered its “help” to the Moscow police in maintaining order during the parliamentary elections in December. According to DMD’s leader Oleg Lobkov, Nashi “is worried that extremist organizations such as Red Youth Vanguard, the National Bolsheviks, and their pro-fascist allies will mobilize on the eve of the elections.” “It is our civic duty to resist these organizations and help the police,” adding, “We will work with the police and district militia officers. It is now a difficult time and it will become more difficult, and they have few people.”

With that purpose in mind, Kommersant says, Lobkov met with Viacheslav Kozlov, the deputy head of the Moscow Main Department of Internal Affairs (GUVD) to offer DMD’s support. Kozlov is famous for leading detachments of OMONtsy against a Dissenters’ March protests in Moscow. Nashi’s integration into Moscow security forces, Kommersant explains, will occur thus: Nashi members will first join the DMD, who will then be placed under UVD detachments. Under Russian law, the activists can involve themselves in public conflicts granted that they are deputized as members of the Moscow “people’s militia”. The law allows for “citizens to demand public order” and “use physical force” to ensure it.

We first heard of DMD as Nashi’s internal security from Kommersant’s interview with “Ivan,” an expelled Nashi member who pointed to DMD’s role in maintaining order in Nashi’s Camp Seliger. About DMD, “Ivan” said:

[The]Voluntary youth guard, well [are] a type of cleaners. There have already been cases when they’ve beaten people who have spread information against Nashi. They can probably catch you anywhere. They are football fanatics, athletes, and ordinary thugs. They enforce the ideology and they fulfill their duties with pleasure.

[Their duties include] to keep order in the movement and its borders, instigate disorder in meetings and marches, which hasn’t been approved by those in power. For example, in the spring DMD arranged provocations in practically all the “Dissenters’ Marchers,” they provoked the police and threw smoke bombs, and as police approach they planted them in the bags of marchers.

According to the DMD website, the group defines themselves as such, only with much softer language. In the Voluntary Youth Militia, “youth have the chance to participate in the live of the country, can prevent and stop the misdeeds that surround us, can help in the struggle with crime and with manifestations of nationalism and xenophobia.” This includes working with the police to fight crime and maintain public order. DMD has chapters in 19 provinces, and according to documents “Ivan” gave to Kommersant, their funding comes directly from Nashi. For example, the budget for the Moscow DMD for the months of June, July, and August 2007 amount to 768,000 rubles or $29,538. No small operation.

More importantly, DMD’s cooperation with the Moscow police gives a better indication as to what Nashi’s role in the upcoming elections will be. Should we expect fighting in the streets?

The following is a fascinating article titled “Time of the Strikebreakers” by Oleg Aronson published in the Russian edition of the Index on Censorship. Aronson argues that the biopolitical nature of contemporary Russian politics has turned democracy into a limit rather than a means of political action. This rendering of democracy has made revolt the only politically viable negation of the state’s biopolitical grip. As he writes, “life itself uses revolt to falsify politics, to point out the falsity of its claims.” The philosophical echoes of Negri, Agamben, Foucault, and Deleuze in Aronson’s treatise brings an fresh analysis of present Russian political condition.

Aronson is a kandidat in philosophy and a senior research fellow at the Institute of Philosophy and the Russian Anthropology School. He is the author of many articles on contemporary philosophy, film theory, and mass media. His most recent books are Bogema: opyt soobshchestva (2002) and Metakino (2003).

Thomas Campbell provided the English translation. Campbell is the author of many articles on Russian film in the journal KinoKultura and currently serves as the English language editor of The Contemporary Art in Russia newsletter.

Because of the article’s length, I provide an excerpt with a link to a complete .pdf version.

Oleg Aronson
Time of the Strikebreakers
Index on Censorship (Russian edition), 26 (2007)

It is difficult to write about Putin’s Russia, something one does reluctantly. One hesitates to use the word Putin because by this act alone you intrude into the political arena, where your least utterance doesn’t remain mere hot air but can also turn on you and make you regret what you’d said. Such regret doesn’t arise because you were wrong or unfair, or because you were misinterpreted, but because your words are always addressed not to those who listen, but rather to those who eavesdrop. Some might be inclined to detect paranoia in this last phrase, to interpret it in the light of conspiracy theory, the “rise of the secret services,” or something of the sort. I have in mind something else, however: the specific shift in Russian political sensibility that has taken place before our eyes. A hypersurplus of mutually repetitive utterances has now been stockpiled, and their lack of content underwrites their existence in the mediaverse. It is simply impossible to listen to them any longer, just as listening itself has become a chore.

It is not so much the political situation (in which power, capital, and the mass media are concentrated in one and the same hands) that I would like to discuss, as it is the “nonpolitical” situation. When we examine the zone of the nonpolitical, the lifeworld of the ordinary man, however, politics is, all the same, one of the conditions that shape it. Politics has long since ceased being something in which people take part; instead, it has become something that shapes people. It has ceased being a clash of parties, social groups, views, and convictions; it has ceased being a concern only of the state and its institutions. Politics courses through our bodies—bodies that vote, work, watch TV, sit in cafés, smoke cigarettes, sleep, die, etc. Politics has long ago become biopolitics. This is not news. It is always the time you live in that is the news.

It is this that makes us speak out today: this strange time that we didn’t anticipate and where we find ourselves now. One struggles to find a precise description for this time. Or even an imprecise description, one that would nevertheless capture the situation of the time. In our case, defining even a few of the situation’s peculiarities means giving a chance to the absolutely mute, feeble forces of the nonpolitical. It means revealing the possibility of another politics—not a politics devised by the political scientists and political operatives, but one that grows out of the life of society itself. In our time it is extremely hard to imagine such a thing. For a start, however, it would be good to describe this “strange” time in some way. When does it begin? In what sense is it strange?

We would be mistaken to think that the time of this new political sensibility begins with the rise to power of the new politicians. Their rise is a symptom, rather. Many still remember (although the mass media have done everything they can to make us forget) Gorbachev’s perestroika and the first years of the Yeltsin administration. It was a romantic period, when the experience of democracy became part of our lives. And it was precisely because this experience was new that the very idea of democracy itself was perceived romantically. Ours was an anarchic democracy, one without the institutions that democracy depends on. In this sense it was a popular democracy independently of the fact that a significant part of the population might not have supported it. In turn, the spontaneity and popular character of the democracy in the late eighties and early nineties might not have manifested themselves had not revolt become a vital necessity in Soviet times (especially during the Brezhnev years).

I consciously use the word revolt here, rather than “resistance” or “social change,” because the latter were the bailiwick only of society’s politically active members. Revolt, on the contrary, is always nonpolitical in nature: it springs from life itself, not from its political realities. Revolt is born of hunger and fear, of humiliation and injustice that exceed the individual and thus become social phenomena. Revolt is a resistance of bodies that marks the limits of biopolitics.

Download a complete .pdf version.

Initial reactions to Putin’s naming Viktor Zubkov Prime Minister quickly dismissed the latter as a potential successor.  It is now emerging that perhaps this was a bit hasty.  Kommersant is reporting that Zubkov is not ruling out a run for the Presidency, though he has no intention to join a political party.  “If I achieve something as prime minister, I cannot rule out that this could happen,” Zubkov said when asked about his political aspirations.   As of now, however, Zubkov is intent on focusing on restructuring the Russian cabinet.  “I think that the structure of the government is faulty, and the administrative reform that is carried out isn’t very effective.  Structural changes will be necessary and personnel will also be looked at.”  Who exactly in the administration will be subject to scrutiny is as of now unknown.  But the issues Zubkov intends to tackle include “the development of the country, social coalitions, sport, veterans, pensioners, and the military.”  Now that the situation in Russia is stabilized, he says, “it is time to move forward.”  And if he is the one to facilitate this “moving forward” he will do it as a non-partisan.  “I am non-partisan and I will concentrate my attention on the work in the government,” he said. Spoken like a true technocrat.

And while Zubkov’s bureaucratic demeanor may make him dull, it also makes him a politically safe bet according to the Duma’s sitting parties.  The pro-Kremlin parties–United Russia, Just Russia, and the Liberal Democratic Party–all seem to approve in unison.  Zubkov is assured Duma confirmation on Friday.  The only lone voice of dissent is the Communist Party, which promises to cast its 50 votes against Zubkov.   But such a protest vote will merely be a symbolic gesture.  Zubkov only needs 226 votes to be confirmed.  A number easily achieved by United Russia alone, which holds 300 votes. Still, United Russia’s parliamentary dominance hasn’t stopped the praise from Russia’s political establishment.   LDPR head Vladimir Zhirinovsky stated that “I think that this will be the best government of Russia, it will be of time tested professionals.”

And just like that the previously unknown head of the Russian Financial Monitoring Office has been catapulted into the Russian political stratosphere.  Not a bad birthday president for Zubkov, who turns 66 on Saturday.  And of course speculation about Zubkov possible future as Putin’s successor has given fodder to a number of potential theories about Russia’s political future.  Namely, that the Zubkov selection is part of a grander scheme for Putin to remain puppet master after he leaves office in 2008.

But I think that the view that Putin is puppet master belies the reality of Russian elite politics.  Even though there is constant talk of clans, factions, silovki, and other nefarious, but nevertheless corporate, political forces, the road always leads back to Putin as some kind of omnipotent Tsar that is not beholden to any those groups’ interests and influence.  Reducing Russian politics to one man, as it’s been done since Kremlinology was first imagined, is such a misnomer that it verges on naivety.   If the Russian elite is indeed a network of clans, then even the most powerful individuals are set with the task of juggling, adjudicating, and mediating those clans’ often disparate interests.

And if Zubkov indeed becomes a presidential “dark horse,” there might lie the genius of choosing him rather than one of the presidential front runners, Sergei Ivanov and Dmitiri Medvedev.  The latter two are big fishes in the pond, who, without a doubt, have their own khvosty (tails) of patrons and clients trailing behind them.  Having one of them lead the show will only tip the balance in favor of one faction over another.  But naming an technocratic “outsider” like Zubkov might be the perfect solution to maintaining a delicate balance.  After all, the Russian elite has class and political interests to maintain, and creating a situation that could spill into elite civil war is bad for everyone’s business.  What a better way to keep the juices of elite prosperity flowing than to appoint someone as faceless, uninspiring, and technocratic as Putin was when he was named Prime Minister in 1999?  Because if there is any lesson that should be learned from Putin’s tenure as President, it’s that his power stems from his ability to keep the forces balanced; to let the elite have their cake and eat it too.  So in the end perhaps the search of a “successor” is really about finding the right manager.

I’ve was recently hired as Pajamas Media’s Russia correspondent.  My first article, “Fall ‘Cleaning’ in Russia” can be found there.

Russian youth’s embrace of Nazism doesn’t just happen in Russia. It’s also happens where one might not initially expect: Israel. Haaretz reports that Israel’s Interior Ministry arrested eight members, all aged 16 to 21, of a Nazi gang in Petah Tikva, a suburb outside of Tel Aviv. The arrests are the result of a year long investigation into street attacks and vandalism of the suburb’s Great Synagogue. The group, who is responsible for attacks on religious Jews, immigrants, homosexuals, homeless, and drug addicts, which they filmed, was found in possession of Nazi literature and posters, five kilos of explosives, a pistol, and an M-16. The M-16 was acquired when one of the youths was drafted into the IDF. He has since fled Israel back to Russia, leaving the rifle with his comrades. The Israelis plan to seek his extradition. Six of the eight have confessed their crimes to police. One of the two holding out is the gang’s leader, Eli Boanitov, who told police, “I won’t ever give up, I was a Nazi and I will stay a Nazi, until we kill them all I will not rest.”

Reports on the story are quick to deny the perpetrators’ “Jewishness.” Haaretz states that all eight youths “have distant ties to Judaism and nonetheless immigrated to Israel from the former Soviet Union under the Law of Return.” Y-Net states that all but one are “are non-Jewish immigrants” from Russia. The Jerusalem Post also emphasized that the youths were “immigrants” and not bona fide Jews. Such assertions have led Israeli politicans to call for a tightening of the definition of the Law of Return. Some are considering to revoke the youths of their Israeli citizenship. Parliamentarian Effi Eitam, a member of the right wing National Religious Party, said that the Law of Return has allowed Israel to become “a haven for people who hate Israel, hate Jews, and exploit the Law of Return to act on this hatred.” Another deputy, Eli Yishai, the ultra-Orthodox Minister of Trade and Industry told reporters, “We have to rid ourselves of this Satan who lives in the heart of Israel.” This is despite statements from Prime Minister Olmert that the incident shouldn’t be used to “criminalize an entire population nor make generalizations.” Instead, he said, “Israel, as a society, failed in educating the youths discovered to be neo-Nazis.” Other commentators were quick to stress that the incidents were isolated and not indicative of a wider trend.

While this may be true, the uproar such an isolated incident has caused signifies the youths’ apostasy. And the fact that the gang’s leader, Eli Buanitov is in fact a Jew makes his sin all the more significant. Eli Buanitov told police “I won’t have kids. My grandfather is half yid, so that this piece of trash doesn’t have ancestors with even the smallest percent of Jewish blood.” In interview with Israel’s Channel 10, Buanitov’s mother denied that her son was a Nazi and that “he is simply a boy and maybe he didn’t fully understand what [Nazism] is and maybe for him it was like a game.” She also emphasized that her son was indeed Jewish. “He was born in a Jewish family and was raised in a Jewish family. And he knows a lot about the war.” In response to a question about whether her mother was a Holocaust survivor, she replied, “Yes. When he was young he heard a lot of stories about it. And he knows very well how terrible it was. And how many Jews were killed.” As far as his Nazi tattoos, Mrs. Buatinova explained that they read in Yiddish, “God is with us.” In addition to his mother’s statements, Buatinov’s lawyer attempted to boost his client’s patriotic credentials. He stressed that the Buatinov family immigrated eight years ago, his client even has a brother serving in IDF combat units, that Eli attended a yeshiva high school for a twelfth grade, and has been working in a “security office in a very sensitive position” for the last year.

What is interesting about this case is not whether the youths indeed committed the crimes or if they sincerly embraced neo-Nazism as an ideology. What is at issue is whether the perpetrators are Jewish or not. The fact almost all of the youths are Russian immigrants with dubious Jewish connections allows many Israelis to rest easy. They can reason: Neo-Nazism is not some homegrown phenomenon but a disease injected into the body politic by the infiltration of some outside Other. But Buatinov’s existence threatens to rock the conceptual foundation of Jewishness itself. The idea of a neo-Nazi Jew is such an anathama that Israel has no law against it. If a Jew can also be a neo-Nazi, and worse become one in Israel, then what does that say about the conceptual coherency of Jewishness itself? The fact that Israeli society could breed its very negation seems to call into question the stability of its justification for existence. Put simply, the gang’s existence posits the question: in a post-Holocaust world, can a Jew be a Nazi?

The question, it seems, is too horrifying to ask, let alone answer. And this is why the gang’s non-Jewishness and antisemitism is being emphasized and not the fact that non-Jewish immigrants were also their victims. After all, Israeli racism against immigrants, especially Asians, Africans, and Russians, is common. The idea that Nazism could be embraced as an expression of that racism toward reveals the fact that two absolute contradictions–Jew and Nazi–are perhaps not so absolutely contradictory after all.

But these questions are likely to be ignored. If reader responses are any indication, targeting Israel’s Russian immigrant population as the breeding ground for wayward youth seems to be the comfortable route. Somehow, however, I doubt explaining racism with racism will do much to alleviate the problem. It will only shroud it further with nationalist fetishisms that will only inflame calls to exact the Russian cancer from Israeli’s otherwise healthy body politic.

Maya Haber provided all Hebrew translations.