Compressing the Spring

By Nikolay

On Monday Robert Gates met with President Putin and other officials in Moscow to discuss US plans to deploy the US ABM complex in Europe, and most importantly to offer cooperation on the issue: a potential linking of Russian and US systems and the ability for Russia to initiate inspection checks to the newly-built facilities. These plans were publicly rejected by Russia‘s newly-appointed Minister of Defense Anatoliy Serdyukov and Mr. Ivanov (Russia‘s first-vice-premier). Russia continues to remain skeptical that Iran possesses any type of threat to Russia and to Europe. Similarly, the US, in the face of Secretary of State Rice has called Russia’s concerns over plans to deploy the ABM systems “ludicrous”, the New York Times reported.

In his annual address to parliament, President Putin made it clear that Russia will respond immediately to US plans by withdrawing from the Adapted Conventional Armed Forces Treaty in Europe, which was based on an earlier treaty of 1990 during the dissolution of the Cold War and the Soviet Union. Russia‘s claims are that it is the only nation to have fully ratified the treaty and refuses to continue to fulfill its obligations unless other members (specifically NATO members) ratify it. NATO has declared its surprise over such actions as it believes Russia was never fulfilling its promises under the treaty.

Because of numerous confusions in the press, it is important to go back and determine the realities of the treaties. An adapted copy of both treaties (1990) and (1999) can be found on the Arms Control Association Websites. The New York Times reports that:

 

The agreement in question, the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, known by the initials C.F.E., was signed in 1990 by the N.A.T.O. nations and the nations of the former Warsaw Pact, including Russia. It required the reduction and relocation of much of the main battle equipment then located along the former east-west dividing line, including tanks, artillery pieces, armored vehicles and attack aircraft. It also established an inspection regime.

Under the treaty, more than 50,000 pieces of military equipment were converted or destroyed by 1995. With its initial ambitions largely achieved, it was renegotiated in 1999, adding a requirement that Russia withdraw its forces from Georgia and Moldova, two former Soviet republics where tensions and intrigue with Moscow run high.

 

The fact of “force withdrawal” remains very controversial. NATO members in 2002 had accepted that Russia fulfilled all of its requirements under the treaty, specifically regarding the fact of withdrawal of TPE (treaty prohibited weapons) from Georgia and Moldova and other territories. Russia claims that its obligations essentially stop here, and a withdrawal of forces is a gesture of goodwill; NATO members claim that Russia made promises to withdraw its troops also. The treaty was originally signed to ensure the collective security of Europe and security from a “blitzkrieg-type” attack when one state would concentrate a large number of weapons on another’s border. Thus, severe caps on TPEs were implemented (specifically tanks, jet fighters, light-armored vehicles, cannons, etc.) Consequently, troop presence would not be an issue to collective security, neither would the US ABM bases (clearly a missile deterrent system).

In addition to the above, Russia’s attempt to withdraw from the treaty is set to completely confuse all negotiations, as the treaty seems to be read differently by both sides. With Russia having ratified it but slow on implementation and NATO members, having not ratified it accusing Russia of slow progress. Even before Russia’s announcement, the Guardian reported that:

 

The Bush administration has this week been struggling to convince sceptical European partners that the missile shield is a good idea.

In an interview yesterday, Germany’s deputy foreign minister, Gernot Erler, revealed that at least six allies, including Germany, raised doubts about the project at a Nato meeting last week — amid fears of another cold war on European soil.

 

The CFE treaty is not the first treaty Russia has threatened to withdraw from. Russian officials initially opened up their protests by suggesting likely withdrawal from the 1987 treaty limiting medium-range missiles. It is a paradox that both treaties are virtually outdated, with Russia and US having mostly scrapped their medium-range missiles, while six other countries still possess them. With regard to the CFE treaty, the militarization and force-withdrawals have mostly been achieved already, and Russia remains the beneficiary under the treaty due to its massive territory. While other countries had to scrap their weapons, Russia shifted its TPEs beyond the limit-free Urals in Siberia. Yet the treaties are highly symbolic and are the essential foundations of collective security in the post Cold War period.

The Financial Times reports that, the US was the first country that began breaking such treaties, through its 2001 unilateral withdrawal from the ABM treaty:

 

However, Thursday’s decision is strategically important because it signals Russia’s growing readiness to tear up the post-1990 diplomatic order. Moscow believes today’s strong Russia can revisit the deals done in the 1990s by a weak Russia. The Kremlin also argues the US has repeatedly acted unilaterally, including over Iraq and over recent plans for Czech and Polish missile defence bases. If the US can set aside bilateral or multilateral pacts, says Moscow, so can Russia.

These developments take the world into perilous waters. While there is no open ideological conflict between east and west, there are deep differences over democracy and the rule of law. It will be dangerous if these disputes prevent Russia, the European Union and the US co-operating on matters of mutual interest, including energy, the war against terrorism and nuclear non-proliferation.

 

The US is entitled to look after its own security. But it must accept security is often easier to build in partnership with others than alone. America, not Russia, was the first to pull out of a cold war arms pact when in 2001 it abandoned the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Washington’s recent effort to explain its missile defence plans to sceptical European states, including Russia, is long overdue.

Russia is behaving irresponsibly in a diplomatic sense and is severely threatening collective security in Europe. But the US is doing the same, yet indirectly. Analysts have rightly pointed out that withdrawal from both treaties will make Russia‘s position worse: it has barely the right capital to finance development and deployment of medium-range ballistic missiles, and to engage in a large-scale rearmament of its European part. These capabilities are dwarfed by 10 times by the US military budget. But clearly Russia has no choice. Its policy of countering NATO’s dominance must start now, at a time when relations are moderately cool. The fact of no ideological difference between the East and the Wets means no serious threat of confrontation will occur. Yet, it is worrisome if Russia and the US scrap their commitments to security in Europe, especially given the experience of the 20th century. We are living in a different world, but relations among countries sour easily, and alliances and counter-alliances form just as fast.

The end goal of its diplomatic game is not to scrap its commitment to European security, but to make the rest of Europe aware that such issues as the ABM deployment if pushed unilaterally by the US without NATO approval could bring instability. Yet, the threats that Russia has made show that it is engaged in almost full-scale bluff, the US knows and understands this. Germany understands this even better. This poker game is very long, and the stakes may rise with every passing day. Unless serious negotiations start soon, Russia will turn its bluff into action. If a treaty withdrawal will occur, there is a marginal prospect of US rearmament in Europe. This would be quite an unfortunate prospect.

Nikolay, Student, Boston U., Business Major, Russian. Interests: International Relations (1930-1945); Russian 20th century History, Capital Markets, Private Equity. He also runs the blog Russia’s True Tales of Terra.

Leave a comment

127 Comments.

  1. Heribert Schindler

    I want to have my Russians back. Please, dear “WGT”, please come back.

  2. The US is entitled to look after its own security. But it must accept security is often easier to build in partnership with others than alone.

    It think all the evidence suggests that the US has already accepted that security is easier to build in partnership with others than alone, hence it is:

    …struggling to convince sceptical European partners that the missile shield is a good idea.

    The very fact that the US is trying to convince Europeans and Russians – albeit unsuccessfully – to take part in the missile shield is evidence that the US is not simply going it alone, but is trying to gain the approval and possibly partnership of others.

  3. Michael Averko

    From the 4/28 MT, the below commentary has a different take than Nikolay’s

    Clear Sign the Treaties are Obsolete
    http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2007/04/28/005.html

    I never said that all of The MT material is bad.

  4. I think the US has been so far past the realm of looking after its own security, for so many decades since the end of WWII, that our (American) perspective is hopelessly skewed. Staging missles and radar systems in Eastern Europe has absolutely nothing to do with the “US (looking) after its own security”. It might be considered looking after the security of Western Europe – yet, even Western European nations are questioning the value of the system.

    To me, this system is clearly intended to plant a US flag in what was a Russian (or Soviet) sphere of influence.

    It makes little sense for Russia to feel threatened by what has been described as 10 missle interceptor rockets. They have come out and said that they have ballistic missle capabilities that would render this system ineffective, and obviously their missle inventory could overwhelm the interceptors entirely. However, there are endless tactical military scenarios where Russians missle capacity (even non-nuclear) would be impinged within Eastern Europe, the Caucuses, and Russia itself.

  5. Staging missles and radar systems in Eastern Europe has absolutely nothing to do with the “US (looking) after its own security”.

    Gotta disagree here, Wally. It’s one thing to assume that the politicians are lying through their pants when they say they want the missile system to protect against rogue missiles from the Middle East.

    But I’ve not seen much opposition in military circles to the plans, and I’ve read quite a few military briefings (which only military geeks pick up, they’re not grandstanding announcements) which suggest the top military figures – many of whom have little time for Bush and his mates – believe the plans to be sensible.

    There is no doubt that the trajectory of a rogue missile from the Middle East on the way to the US would pass through Europe; so all that is left to argue about is whether the threat is real and whether the missile system will defend against it. Enormous progress has been made in the field of anti-ballistic missile systems in the US military over the past few years, and a successful test was carried out last year which demonstrates such a system could be built and deployed.

    So all the argument should centre around is whether the threat is credible, and not the location of the system or its plausibility. I would take with a pinch of salt anything Bush says regarding potential threats to the US, but the military seem to be concerned as well.

    If Russia and Europe don’t think the US faces any threat from Iran and refuses to allow them to set up this system in Europe, the next step is for the US to attempt to put the system into space. If they do this, and incur the enormous expense it will involve, I think we can safely say that the US actually does think there is a credible threat and the whole thing is not just a ploy to annoy the Russians.

    Interestingly, in saying that future Iranian missiles pose no threat to the US, the Europeans are effectively saying they pose no threat to Europe either. I’m not convinced they generally believe this, especially given Chirac’s outburst about nuclear retaliation last year. If they do believe it, they’d better hope they are right; if not, I’d be interested to see what plans they are putting in place to do about it.

  6. It seems like a classic situation where the US could perhaps have accomplished what it wanted in a different way or style that would ruffle fewer feathers.

    On the other hand, I guess from inside the Beltway I should say, “Being a superpower means never having to say you’re sorry!”

    But I actually disagree with that logic, because one day the US may no longer be atop the pile, and at that point we may wish we’d been nicer to some of the other kids back in the day.

    A lot of the goals that the US has alienated allies and others to accomplish in the past few years could probably have been accomplished with less friction if a bit more investment had been put into diplomacy and finding ways to show other actors how our way can work out well for them.

    I understand our guys are supposedly trying to work with the Europeans and Russians on this, but I fear we may have alienated the Russians long ago with the disavowal of the ABM treaty. On the other hand, maybe the Russians are just spending years nursing an unjustified grudge. As for the Europeans, maybe they just like being in a position of us having to ask them for something. Who knows.

    Anyway, I’m glad to see Wally’s back (or perhaps you never left) – hey, bring back AR! Come on, I’ve started blogging again, you can do it, too. It starts with just a couple of posts, and before you know it mission-critical things are getting put off because you are finishing up some news roundup or something. Actually, maybe that tells you why you should not start blogging again…

  7. Michael Averko

    “But I actually disagree with that logic, because one day the US may no longer be atop the pile, and at that point we may wish we’d been nicer to some of the other kids back in the day.”

    ***

    Brzezinski has said the same. Keeping the subject of Russia aside, he makes some salient points.

    BTW, in a recent CSPAN interview, he noted that a Phd isn’t by itself a guarantee for having great political insight.

  8. Bib Black Bear

    Heribert:

    Sarcasm doesn’t work here. You forgot how “your Russians” got to be in your land. They left b/c Germany is no longer a threat (BTW I can see why your defend “EBH” legacy — Russians left, good for Germany — but you should thank Gorby for that not EBH. There is nothing wrong with “peeing” into this man’s grave from the perspective of a Russian — he should have thought about it when he had the power and ran things). US bases didn’t leave meaning that Russia is still viewed as a threat — that fact partly explains the current paranoia with the radar. I suppose Russians still had enough common sense to secure some strategic adavantages. If not persuaded about radar purpose, I am sure we’ll see tactical nukes in Kaliningrad in 5 years or so. It just seems rational — let’s check on that in a few years.

  9. Heribert Schindler

    Big Black Bear

    Sarcasm ? There was no sarcasm intended. I honestly wish the Russian would return.

    Germany lost WW II. Period. Everybody with a sane mind knows that. The Russian were fair enough to accept the fact that the reunified and independent Germany no longer poses a threat and, after roundabout 60 years of democracy, fully deserves to be independent and to be free of occupying forces.

    Let me make this clear. I grew up in an environment where there were more Americans around than German nationals. Those Americans acted (and to some extend still act) like being an occupying force. I fully understand (although I do not appreciate) the atrocities commited by Soviet troops in Germany during and after WWII. Had I been a Soviet national entering Germany during / after WWII and given all the atrocities committed by Germans (in the name of Germany) in the USSR I wouldn’t have acted any different.

    I fully understand the will and the need to retaliate for the crimes comitted by Germans in the USSR.

    Now, the Americans pretend, and believe, to be so much different.

    They aren’t !

    There were and are crimes committed by Americans in Germany. And ? Americans are beyond German juristiction. Rape ? Murder ? Violence ? Americans can’t be held responsible by German law or by German courts. Americans have to be handed over to the American military police and are sent home with a “no no” and do not face any serious consequences. This pisses me off. The entire ASPA (American Servicemen Protection Act) pisses me off.

    In the same period I am talking about, in East Germany under “Soviet Occupation”, an offender (of the Soviet Army) was taken behind the house and received 9 grams of lead to the back of his head.

    The American is / was sent home and was considered being completely innocent by American law. Is this acceptable ? Is this lawful ? NO.

    The Russians (Soviets) left. The Yanks are still here. This is a fucking shame.

    Yankee Go Home. Right Now. Immediately.

    I want to have my Russians back. No sarcasm. No joking.

    I prefer any Russian influence in Germany / Europe to Americsn influence any time.

    Whenever I read the obnoxious, derogatory, offending and insolent commentary of Americans (not all but most) in the press, on blogosphere or wherever I sincerely feel the need and wish to vomit.

  10. I can see no sensible way that staging interceptor missles in Eastern Europe, to defend against mid-range weapons, protects US Security.

    They are designed to intercept weapons that can not even REACH the US from that region of the world. So obviously, someone it operating from a game plan that carries a very different definition of protecting US security, than my own.

    Again, I think this is clearly about spheres of influence and the US planting the flag in Eastern Europe and doing so unilaterally without even the support of NATO. You’ll have to come up with some more substantial evidence regarding the range and capability of this interceptor system, and the capabilities of so-called rogue states to launch ICBMs to convince me otherwise.

    If the US were truly concerned about national security from missles launched from “rogue states”, this system would be placed in Alaska, where North Korea has already shown they are close to being able to launch viable missles capable of hitting mainland US.

  11. If I were the collective German government, I would have kicked the Amis out ages ago. I realize it’s an excuse for not spending money on Germany’ own military, but still.

    I suppose the Economist would blame it on “resurgent German imperialism” and try to link it with skinheads or somesuch.

  12. “I prefer any Russian influence in Germany / Europe to Americsn (sic) influence any time.”

    This pretty much dates Herr Schindler. I lived in what was West Germany for 6 years in the late 70′s and early 80s. At that time, there really wasn’t serious talk against American presence in the country – most Germans had a readily available foil in East Germany to see what the situation could have been without British and American troops in their country. The US essentially gave a great, great economic benefit to West Germany for some 50 plus years after the end of World War II. I don’t see any debate in that, and attempts to distort it into anything else is entirely revisionist.

    However, familiarity has a way of building contempt (just ask Estonia what they think of Russian influence) and recent generations of Germans have found numerous ways to focus on the negatives of generations of US military presence. It doesn’t change the fact that Germany would essentially be Poland, economically speaking, but for the US and British influence in Western Germany for those generations.

    So sure – if your secret desire is to be like Poland, turn back the clock and bring the Soviet troops all the way to Alsace-Lorraine, Herr Schindler. I suspect you’ll find the American boot treaded considerably lighter than the Russian one, however. This makes for little wonder as to why Eastern Europe is so anxious to ally itself with “the West”.

  13. “There were and are crimes committed by Americans in Germany. And ? Americans are beyond German juristiction. Rape ? Murder ? Violence ? Americans can’t be held responsible by German law or by German courts. Americans have to be handed over to the American military police and are sent home with a “no no” and do not face any serious consequences. This pisses me off. The entire ASPA (American Servicemen Protection Act) pisses me off.”

    Sorry, but you truly don’t know what the fuck you are talking about.

    German laws are light compared to the US Uniform Code of Military Justice, and ANYONE would prefer to spend time in a German prison than be sent to Leavenworth. You demonstrate a complete and utter lack of knowledge, laws, and punishments to suggest otherwise.

  14. Just to clarify some points – Tim, you are talking essentially about Iran being able to launch ICBMs onto the US.

    1) My understanding of this interceptor system is that it is completely incapable against such long range weapons.

    2) Iran can’t even stage credible mid-range missle attacks at this time, let alone ICBMs.

    3) North Korea has shown limited capabilities in this (mid) range of missle and is closer to hitting the US mainland.

    4) Yet, we (the US) are staging a mid-range missle interceptor system in Russia’s former playground, without NATO consent.

    As Ricky used to say … Lucy, you gots som’ ‘splain’ to do. This just doesn’t add up to protecting US security. It adds up to posting a big “US is here” sign in former Warsaw pact nations.

    As for military briefings – I grew up in the US Army and never met a soldier who didn’t love having a new weapons system.

  15. Heribert Schindler

    How can I possibly debate Mr. Shedd and alike ?

    Talking in the boot therms, I definately and without any doubt would prefer any Russina / Soviet boot to an Amrican / British boot.

    May you be as much influenced by your American point of view. You are an American. What is there else to say by you ?

    You are very much entitled to say what an American thinks / sees / believes to be correct / a fact / a theory.

    You, dear Mr. Wally Shed, aren’t the least bit entitled to tell a German what he has to think about the presence of US American troops on German soil.

    Are you a German ? No, you aren’t.

  16. I am seriously disturbed by some of the comments made by Heribert Schindler.

    Heribert Schindler writes: “Let me make this clear. I grew up in an environment where there were more Americans around than German nationals. Those Americans acted (and to some extend still act) like being an occupying force. I fully understand (although I do not appreciate) the atrocities commited by Soviet troops in Germany during and after WWII. Had I been a Soviet national entering Germany during / after WWII and given all the atrocities committed by Germans (in the name of Germany) in the USSR I wouldn’t have acted any different. I fully understand the will and the need to retaliate for the crimes comitted by Germans in the USSR.”

    And yet — wait for it — “Whenever” Heribert Schindler reads “the obnoxious, derogatory, offending and insolent commentary of Americans (not all but most) in the press, on blogosphere or wherever” he “sincerely feel[s] the need and wish to vomit.”

    It’s rather strange (and regrettable) that some of Heribert’s own words don’t provide him with “the need and wish” to vomit.

  17. Heribert Schindler

    Anonymous, you American Hero, gibe your name and identity. You fucking coward.

    Yeah. THe barve American challenges my view and doesn’t dare to say who or what he is .

    How brave you are !!! .

    Yes, this American bravery wants to make me vomit.

  18. Heribert Schindler

    Ok, I see that there is nothing else to add. Please shove your the one and only superpower attitude and your America the beautiful, the land of the free and the home of the brave up your American asses.

    Hold your breath you fucking cowards Good bye !

    Shove your American language Russian blogosphere up your asses.

    Good bye ! Fucking American Fascists ! The Nazis of the 21st century are to be found on the North American continent. You are lecturing us about Auschwitz ?

    Take care about Guantanamo (and the other illegal yet to be known American concentration / torture camps around the globe) before you start to lecture Russians about the Gulag or Germans about the Holocaust.

    Good Bye !

  19. In fairness to Heribert, if I believed his version of history regarding the Americans and Russians in Europe, I’d be extremely angry and wanting the Americans out and Russians back in.

    Unfortunately for Heribert, his version of history is one which clearly has not been gained by consulting the works of credible historians, and his views reflect that.

  20. Just to clarify some points – Tim, you are talking essentially about Iran being able to launch ICBMs onto the US.

    Yes, that’s right.

    1) My understanding of this interceptor system is that it is completely incapable against such long range weapons.

    As I said above, last year the US military successfully completed an end-to-end test of its long-range missile defence system. This is the only system I see being talked about by the US ate present.

    2) Iran can’t even stage credible mid-range missle attacks at this time, let alone ICBMs.

    Quite, but as the US has been making abundantly clear, this system is not designed to protect against current threats but future threats. As the system will take a decade or so to finalise and install, it will protect against credible threats in 2017. The US, rightly or wrongly, believes Iran will have ICBM capabilities by then. This is what we should be arguing about, not whether today’s threats warrant the system.

    3) North Korea has shown limited capabilities in this (mid) range of missle and is closer to hitting the US mainland.

    Indeed, hence a similar system will be installed in the US East Coast, Alaska, and the Pacific Islands. But given these are on US soil, they don’t need to ask permission.

    4) Yet, we (the US) are staging a mid-range missle interceptor system in Russia’s former playground, without NATO consent.

    Yes, it is very contentious. But as I said above, the only argument should be about whether the threat of an Iranian ICBM is credible in a decade. If the Europeans and Russians think it isn’t, then they should tell the US to take a running jump. If they think it is credible, but tell the US to shove off anyway for political purposes, they might end up regretting it.

    It adds up to posting a big “US is here” sign in former Warsaw pact nations.

    It does, but this is based on speculation; anyone can dream up alternative motivations for plans that the US government without any evidence. There are more than a few people out there who say the US invaded Afghanistan in order to build a pipeline. Such speculation IMO just muddies the waters and doesn’t add much to understanding the situation.

    As for military briefings – I grew up in the US Army and never met a soldier who didn’t love having a new weapons system.

    This is true, and hence the military’s enthusiasm must be taken with a pinch of salt. But we cannot just ignore these briefings, like the one I linked to above, when we are trying to understand the US’ position on protecting against future missile threats.

  21. Sorry, in the above post:

    Indeed, hence a similar system will be installed in the US East Coast…

    should read:

    Indeed, hence a similar system will be installed in the US West Coast…

  22. “Unfortunately for Heribert, his version of history is one which clearly has not been gained by consulting the works of credible historians, and his views reflect that.”

    You don’t need historians for this. It’s living memory.

    For the record, I’m half-German, half-American, and my relatives in West Germany always viewed the Russians much more favorably than the Americans. My grandfather was a fan of Stalin.

  23. You don’t need historians for this. It’s living memory.

    I disagree. Living memory serves well to provide anecdotal evidence, some of which might be worthwhile in understanding a situation.

    But to understand the role and intentions of the US in Europe it is essential to either consult the works of historians who have spent the necessary time trawling the archives, interviewing the major players, reading their memoirs, consulting the actual documents which confirm the orders, etc.; or you must do the research yourself.

    No matter how good your living memory is and how many US soldiers were based in your town, this does not give you any authority on, for example, the manner in which NATO was formed and the US involvement in it.

    Of course, Heribert’s anger at the Americans might be entirely fuelled by anecdotal evidence that he has witnessed in Germany, but in a comment on his own blog he was making such pronouncements as:

    Berlin, in the Cold War, was a sting in the USSR’s rear end. And this was the only reason the USA (together with the British and the French) held Berlin. They wanted to remind the USSR that they had also been the victors of WW II and wanted to remain the “4 power status” of Berlin.

    and:

    From the very beginning NATO was a tool of USAnian foreign policy.

    Which displays a woeful knowledge of the American role in Berlin and the formation of NATO.

    So as I said, if I believed Heribert’s version of history – regardless of any anecdotal evidence witnessed first hand – I’d be angry too and wanting the Americans out.

  24. Michael Averko

    Germany was a major player on the losing side in two major wars.

    It paid a price for such and regrouped well.

    Russia has been a frequent victim of aggression and in turn sought buffers at the expense of some.

    Along with some others, Poland and the Baltics suffered, while not being complete innocents themselves.

    Wally did set the record straight on the Amercian military policing of itself versus what Heribert believes as being true.

    Despite the Nevsky era and two world wars, Russia and Germany (particularly Prussia) have actually had good overall historic relations.

  25. I’m wondering if the United States has a better track record with the world treaty’s than they do with the ones they made and broke with the Native Americans.
    I did notice that Russia was not considered to be as bad an influence as the U.S. on a poll done by the BBC.
    Aah, the plans of mice and men.
    your humble servant,
    ancient clown

  26. I’m wondering if the United States has a better track record with the world treaty’s than they do with the ones they made and broke with the Native Americans.

    I’m wondering what world treaties you are referring to. Care to explain?

  27. Tim, probably that person meant the CFE treaty, which was not exactly a “world treaty,” as it involved only NATO and former Warsaw Pact countries. They also might have meant the ABM treaty, which I mentioned a while back on this thread. I think that was just a bilateral US-USSR treaty, though, so maybe they had something else in mind.

  28. I think that was just a bilateral US-USSR treaty, though, so maybe they had something else in mind.

    Indeed. The ABM treaty was between the US and USSR, and was signed for the specific purpose of ensuring one another that they would not be in a position to alter the status quo of mutually assured destruction (an anti-ballistic missile system would render MAD invalid).

    For those that haven’t been paying attention, one of the signatories to the treaty no longer exists, and mutually assured destruction is not considered relevant in today’s relations between Russia and the US. The ABM treaty is as irrelevant as MAD in conducting policy between Russia and the US in 2007.

    The US believes it will face new threats from entities to whom MAD is not a deterrent, i.e. suicidal fanatics in the Middle East, and wants to develop a system to protect against that. Russia should not be concerned about the demise of the ABM treaty unless Russia geniunely believes that MAD is still relevant in relations between the countries. If they do, I’d be interested to see how many references were made to it in the years between 1991 and the missile shield first being touted. I predict very few.

  29. Tim,

    You are right to say that Russia does not think in terms of the MAD psychology, and the ABM treaty like most of the Cold War treaties is outdated. Yet the issue is that relations between countries deteriorate quickly; look at the “progress” in Russia-US relations in 2001-2007; Russia asks itself the “what-if” question for the relationship withe the US in the future.

    Second, Russian officials have never been against installment of such ABM systems in Turkey, where they claim they will have the same ability to monitor Middle Eastern missile launches. Why not also expand the US ABM capabilities in GB?

    Third, dealing in a military sense with Poland is a bad idea. The Polish government, especially the Kazcinsky bros. will use the situation to play-off on the aggressive reaction of its Eastern neighbor provoking large-scale disputes within the EU (not a great benefit to the US, who is trying to unite the EU members in a common opinion toward Russia). Poland has already demanded the US provide it with Patriot missiles to protect itself from future threats (not Iran); this will spark more Russian diplomatic protests this week.

    Finally, Russia’s main concern is the ability of the new system to track most of the missile activity in its Western territory. Russia believes such a right must remain only with Russia. If the US believes Russia is not the target of the system, why is the system covering Russia’s strategically important territories. Russia’s stance is in no way different had the US been in its place; the US I am sure is not optimistic about potential countries monitoring missile launches and having the ability to shoot those missiles down close to US borders no matter how minuscule that system may be compared to the US or Russian nuclear arsenal.

    I am no military expert, and so woudl like to see a more-or-less down to earth and unbiased report on the pros and cons of locating the ABM system in Poland vs. Turkey, and maybe other locations; otherwise some of the discussion is useless.

  30. Nikolay,

    There is a little I can find fault with in your last comment. It invokes some interesting thoughts regarding the objections to the missile defence system, and is a far more erudite than most of the articles I see printed on the subject.

  31. It’s been my conclusion after the last few years since 9/11, that America will never get the benefit of the doubt, no matter what it does. America is the tall poppy and it must be cut down. This “anti-Americanism” or whatever you want to term it will be around until America is no longer the top dog. Then again not much has really changed, Europeans have looked down their noses at Americans since Plymouth Rock. After all, America was the depository of all the unwanted types that didn’t fit into European society.

    This “anti-Americanism” is probably a good thing, actually, when it comes to the mental health of the rest of the world. History has shown that people need a scapegoat to blame their problems on. In the past, the scapegoat was usually some minority group of people who couldn’t defend themselves. Now, the scapegoat can defend itself, so being the scapegoat is no big deal. If Americans would just get over the notion of wanting to be liked by the rest of the world, and just assume that we are going to be hated no matter what we do, we would be able to be more honest and successful in our dealings with other countries.

    As for the missle shield, I swear I read a RIA-Novsti article about a month back that said that the US had been in talks with both western european countries and Russia about the possibility of installing missle defenses in eastern Europe for over a year before Russia started raising a stink. Maybe it was the fact that Poland and the Czech Republic agreed to host the sites that finally set off the Russians.

    Given the events of the 20th Century, I have a lot of sympathy for the Poles and Czechs, and not so much for the Russians or Germans. Americans like defending the little guy, it gives us a way to use our power and wealth for good. If the Poles and Czechs don’t want the missle defense systems, America is not going to force them to. But if the Poles and Czechs do truely want our help and protection, I don’t think America would decline it, no matter how much it pisses off the Russians.

  32. Americans like defending the little guy, it gives us a way to use our power and wealth for good. If the Poles and Czechs don’t want the missile defense systems, America is not going to force them to. But if the Poles and Czechs do truely want our help and protection, I don’t think America would decline it, no matter how much it pisses off the Russians.

    Jason,

    The US initiated the system as a protection from missile launches from rogue states (in the Middle East). The US has said on numerous occasions that the system will not be aimed at Russia. So the logic fails when we assume that the US puts the system in Poland to protect the “little guy” (from Russia) while the real goal is to protect Europe/US from Iran…

    Also, it is very unclear what the reality is in Polish and Czech public opinion on the issue. Several polls show less people want the system and feel it will protect Poland/Czech Rep. I know for sure that Polish and Czech states will not be holding referendums on the issue.

  33. Nikolay, I agree with your comments. The missile shield will not protect the countries it is based in directly. However, with high-value American assets placed in these countries, America would be providing some economic benefit and would be required to protect the sovereignty of the countries in question. Kind of like the Rammstein base in Germany during the cold war.

    The proper thing to do would be to hold referendums in each country, but that is up to the country’s elected officials. All the US can do is work with the proper officials from each country. I have read news accounts of polls that show a majority of the Czechs are against the installations, but polls are pretty easy to manipulate if the organization taking the poll is using loaded questions. A referendum would give a better indication of public opinion. If the referendum shows that these installations are not wanted, no problem, other places will be found.

    As an American, I would like to see us improve relations with all former Warsaw Pact countries and soviet republics. These people generally know what real freedom means and don’t take it for granted. I would also like to see America’s relations with Russia improve, but we all know that will never happen, at least not until Russia stops needing an “enemy threat from the outside” to conduct its internal affairs.

    It seems to me that Russia’s objections are all about “spheres of influence.” Russia still sees Poland and the Czech Republic as its property and the US should stay out.

  34. Jason, I mostly agree with your comments. However, a small detail. Russia has in essence admitted its inability to influence Europe, and Eastern Europe in particular. NATO is the real reason for this.

    Its main interest now is to leave the security balance in Europe as is. Russia’s key concern is to influence the ex-Soviet nations (Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia); These are the nations that Russia regards as its sphere of influence, because of the large Russian population in each country. This may be bad this may be good; but this is what Russia will put all its effort to. If the US continues or starts (depends how you see it) to push its expansion into ex-Soviet republics, it will lead to Russia isolating itself from Europe; something no one wants.

    I sincerely hope Russian foreign policy will develop more tact and cool temper; the US can contribute to this and thus contribute to a better process of negotiations and consultations on delicate issues with Russia.

    It may seem simplistic, but Russia likes when people/nations admit to them that they (Russia/Russians) are respected. The best way to deal with Russia is to assure your respect and push your issues forward. The US pursued such a policy with Russia in 2001-2003, it later broke down with Iraq and the Ukrainian election crisis.

  35. Nikolay, you have to be one of the most decent and considerate blog commenters, I have ever had the pleasure of coming across. Your last comment makes a lot of sense.

    The thought occurred to me that the reason the West still fears a powerful Russia, is that Russia has never really tried to make up for its sin of trying to force communism on the rest of the world. Germany has fully come to terms with their Nazi phase and have gone to extremes to convince both themselves and the rest of the world that they will never be such a threat again. Now, if you ask me, I think Germans could stand to lighten up a bit and should embrace their nationality without having to feel guilty. That said, if Russia were to turn its ambitions inward and try to improve things internally, and not try to influence world policy, I think the West would be more forgiving. It’s just too soon, after the end of the USSR, for Russia to be trying to control what happens in other countries. It plays right into the fears of the West that Russia hasn’t changed, that it is still the same old bear, and that it will continue to be threat to others.

  36. The conversation at this thread is an example for us all.

    It may seem simplistic, but Russia likes when people/nations admit to them that they (Russia/Russians) are respected.

    True – this is a really basic but critical point that is too much ignored by US policymakers. Too many Americans throughout the ’90s wanted to kick Russia while it was down. The US did not do a good job IMO of weighing the need to satisfy the small East European nations’ desire to join NATO against the damage this would cause to the US-Russia relationship. I think NATO expansion was seen as a chance to lock in the gains of “winning” the cold war, plus the Poles and Balts had much stronger lobbies in the US Congress than the Russians. Plus, once Russia was no longer a threat, it became just one of many foreign policy priorities in a busy and chaotic world, all vying for attention from a ’90s White House that was often, ah, distracted by other matters.

    Germany reformed, but don’t forget about the Marshall Plan (not to mention the fact that the restorative justice of Nuremburg was externally imposed) – Russia did not get a similar coordinated assistance program (and it would have been hard to provide one for certain pride issues). Since Russia wasn’t formally “defeated,” it was in this bizarre limbo – we gave money, but couldn’t exactly manage where it went, and there was no self-imposed restorative justice (like in Poland, where I think they had a process called “lustration” where they kicked out old party elites).

    Another big problem with the transition in Russia is that while Russians suffered more in raw numbers than any other Soviet nationality, they did not have anywhere to point a finger once they became “independent.” The very holiday – June 12 – “Independence Day” for years, now renamed “Russia Day,” I believe, was something that people usually laughed ambivalently about.

    Russia’s key concern is to influence the ex-Soviet nations (Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia); These are the nations that Russia regards as its sphere of influence, because of the large Russian population in each country.

    A small nit-pick here (but important if you’re Georgian) – what large Russian population in Georgia?

  37. I agree, the quality of this discussion is encouraging.

    Russia did not get a similar coordinated assistance program (and it would have been hard to provide one for certain pride issues).

    The USSR and all the soon-to-be Eastern Bloc countries were offered the Marshall Plan: Stalin turned it down flat. When the fledgling independent Czech government accepted it, Stalin engineered the coup which installed the Communists, who then withdrew from the program.

    Perhaps more surprisingly, Britain was offered it as well and turned it down, almost certainly because it would have destroyed morale.

  38. Oh interesting, I didn’t know about the post-WWII details – I was referring to the early-’90s discussions about a “Marshall Plan for Russia” (among some Russians and fewer westerners), by which was meant a coordinated program of assistance and “reconstruction” (though to hear today’s young Putinistas tell it, things were hunky-dory in ’91) – all of which came to naught. See this article for a mention of the high hopes in the context of the more recent reality check.

  39. The period of European history immediately post WWII is very interesting. I can highly recommend John Lewis Gaddis’ The Cold War: A New History, or if you want something which goes into more detail, his earlier book, We Now Know (the former is essentially a summary of all his earlier works).

    It is surprising how little is known of this period in history, especially given its importance at the time and its relevance to understanding what is happening in Europe today.

    A lot of people who comment, usually critically, on the US role in Europe and in the wider Cold War have a woeful knowledge of the the actual history as supported by scholarly research and documentary evidence. Reading Gaddis’ books would certainly remedy this.

  40. True enough. Gaddis has a good reputation, and I feel like I remember reading something by him in college, but that was a long time ago. My knowledge of that period was never strong and has clearly atrophied. One thing I know for sure is that a lot of people also forget about the US’s support for the Red Army’s effort in WWII, also, via Lend-Lease. I’m fortunate enough to have a Soviet Army uniform button, made of olive-green plastic with the hammer-and-sickle inside a star on the front, and with “U.S.A. 1943″ stamped on the back. Not the most important bit of strategic assistance, perhaps, but a nice symbol of past partnership.

  41. This is a good thread and I’m learning an awful lot of stuff. My own mother at home, who’s elderly, often told us that the US rebuilt Europe after the war and we should always be grateful to them for it. I’ve also read that at the time the US had an enormous budget surplus, zero debt and was entirely self sufficent. In the light of the help the US gave, its easy to see why they lost patience with the French in 2003. Eaten bread is soon forgotten as the Irish say. I wasnt aware either that there were Marshall plans for Eastern Europe both after the war and in 1991. Clearly this was an opportunity lost by everyone really. A great pity. The world might be an entirely different place had either been taken.

    Where’s Mike Averko? Surely he’d have some info on that post-war period in the USSR too.

  42. I hadnt read all the thread from the top, but having just read it now, what a rant from Heribert!He just went crazy!

  43. Michael Averko

    Jason:

    You remind me of the Jason commenting at another blog.

    Russia doesn’t see Poland and the Czech Republic as their “spheres of influence”. Russia doesn’t want them to become strategic beach heads against it.

    Your view of Poland is off. In 1919, Poland took advantage of the Russian Civil War by attacking Russia. In 1938, Poland joined Hungary and Nazi Germany in the dismantling of Czechoslovakia. Earlier, in 1934, Poland and Nazi-Germany signed a non-aggression pact.

    Going back a bit, in 1812, anywhere between 50,000-100,000 Poles joined Napoleon in his aggression against Russia. Prior to that, Poland attacked and occupied Russia BEFORE Russia had ever done such to Poland.

    In the present, Russia bashing in Poland is a greater reality than vice versa.

  44. “though to hear today’s young Putinistas tell it, things were hunky-dory in ’91)”

    Really? I’ve never heard anyone say such a thing.

  45. Sorrt, “anonymous” was me. Hit the wrong button.

  46. I’ve never heard any actual person say such a thing in conversation with me, either.

    But certain Kremlin-backed forces are at work rewriting history and using youth organizations to promulgate a distorted view of the recent past. Let me refer you to a brochure distributed by Nashi at a mass event earlier this year (scanned in online). Look at the fourth picture from the top – on that page, the following statement is made:

    “??? ???? ? ?????? 1991 ????.

    ????? ?????? ? ??????. ? ??? ??? ??? ????? ??? ????.”

    That’s what I was referring to. Not to mention the ridiculous anti-American propaganda in the subsequent pages of the brochure.

  47. Interesting. I’ve never looked at any of Nashi’s literature. It’s surprising to me, because everyone knows the economic collapse (to which I assume this is a reference) started during Gorbachev.

    (Now, if that was written by a teenage member of Nashi, that could just be youthful ignorance speaking.)

  48. The blogger I linked to and others have some good comments on the contents of the brochure at the post I linked to in my last comment. At first I thought the whole brochure might be some kind of a hoax, but I’ve seen parts of it – and of similar brochures – elsewhere on the internet (of course, given the “reliability” of things on the internet, it could still be a hoax, but I have no reason to think that).

    Without wanting to overstate Nashi’s significance (especially in light of Sean’s recent post about the poll on the topic), printing thousands of copies of a 50-some-page glossy pamphlet is not something that a bunch of teenagers can do on their own. It’s definitely salient that the new generation does not have a first-hand memory of the late-Soviet era; what that means is that they can be told lies by the (slightly or much older) Nashi organizers, who do have official backing, and might believe them.

  49. Sean Guillory

    Btw the Nashi website is working again for people outside Russia. I have to say that the redesign is pretty sharp. I especially love how the refer to Estonia as the “Fascist Government of Estonia”. Those crazy kids.

    But Lyndon is abolsutely correct that Nashi has some major financial help from the Kremlin. I would love to see their budgets. I was in Moscow when they did their “Bez slov” campaign for Beslan. They had ads for it in every metro car. On the anniversary, they set up a stage off of Red Square with bands, speakers, etc. It seemed like the center of Moscow was flooded with Nashisty with black “bez slov” t-shirts.

    I’m hoping to write something on Nashi and Estonia when I get some god damn time. As a few of you know I just moved into a new place. All I can say is moving sucks.

  50. “It’s definitely salient that the new generation does not have a first-hand memory of the late-Soviet era; what that means is that they can be told lies by the (slightly or much older) Nashi organizers, who do have official backing, and might believe them.”

    Why would they do so? Insofar as Putin has an ideology (not much, I don’t think), a positive assessment of the Soviet socio-economic system is not a part of it.

    (That assumes of course that the people running Nashi share Putin’s worldview.)