The New York Times continues to follow the windy road of the murder investigation. Including the notion that Litvinenko or one of the people he met shortly before his illness was trafficking polonium. So far, who exactly possessed said polonium remains unclear. Was it Dmitry Kovtun, Andrei Lugovoi, or Litvinenko himself?
German police have summoned Kovtun to discuss this question. But according to the NY Times, Kovtun calims “It wannit me.” In fact,
Mr. Kovtun says they have it backward, maintaining that Oct. 16 was the day that Mr. Litvinenko exposed him to the poison, polonium 210. “I am far from thinking that something was premeditated,” Mr. Kovtun said. “I think things that were not premeditated were happening.”
That said, Kovtun and Lugovoi also have no idea how he was exposed or whether Litvinenko had the polonium on him. Quotes the Times, “I want you to understand one thing,” Mr. Lugovoi said. “Myself and Dmitri Kovtun, we consider ourselves an injured party.”
And the band played on . . .
You Might also like
By Sean — 12 years ago
The absence of Hama and Hezbollah from Russia’s “List of 17” terrorist organizations was been met with charges of hypocrisy, suspicion, and scorn. The omission certainly didn’t sit well with the Israelis or the Americans. The absence of the Kurdish Workers Party even angered Turkey. Such is the problem with the term “terrorism.” Its application is completely relative in relation to national interests, foreign and domestic policy, and cultural and historical factors. Russia has been curt in its explanation. Hamas and Hezbollah weren’t listed because they don’t pose a direct threat to Russia’s national security.
Andrei Smirnov doesn’t buy it. Writing for the Jamestown Foundation’s Eurasian Daily Monitor, Smirnov accuses Russia of listing mostly “virtual groups”, groups whose existence can no longer be confirmed. Two of Russia’s top ranked groups, the Supreme Military Council of the Caucasian Mujahideen and the Congress of the Nations of Ichkeria and Dagestan, have not been heard from since 1999. There is question whether the Islamic Party of Turkestan or the Egyptian Al-Ghamia-al-Islamia still exists. Further, Smirnov charges that the list makes one wonder if Russia really knows who they are fighting in the North Caucuses since they don’t list the three most active organizations in the region: the Chechen State Defense Council-Majlis-ul-Shura, Dagestani Sharia Jamaat and the North Ossetian Kataib-al-Khoul.
In addition, if Russia’s list only includes groups that pose a direct threat to Russia, then how do they explain including the Pakistani group Lashkar-e-Toiba or Jamaa al-Islamiya but not the Shura of Iraqi Mujahideen, which claimed responsibility for the kidnapping and execution of Russian diplomats in June. Smirnov goes on to point out more inconsistencies in the Russia terror list.
But the real issue is their leaving Hamas and Hezbollah of the list. This is where politics enters the fray. Even though FSB terror chief Yuri Sapunov admitted that Hamas and Hezbollah both “use terrorist methods in their national liberation struggle,” according to the Ekho Moskvy, this statement was omitted from the published interview in Rossiiskaya gazeta though it was in the original Interfax interview. Here is Smirnov’s explanation why Hamas and Hezbollah are absent:
It is not surprising that Hamas and Hezbollah are excluded from the Russian terror list, as the Kremlin is known to be sympathetic towards these organizations. Earlier this year Russian President Vladimir Putin invited Hamas representatives to Moscow to meet Russian officials, while Hezbollah is supported by Syria and Iran, two countries that have close ties with Russia. Nevertheless, Sapunov hinted that the Russian government could add the two groups to the list in the future. He said, “We recognize international terror lists, for example, the lists of the United Nations and the lists of such superpowers as the USA and the European Union. We consider them when we communicate with the special services of various countries.”
The Russian authorities do not recognize Hamas and Hezbollah as terrorist organizations not only because they believe they pose no threat to Russia, but also because the Kremlin is very angry at Western countries that do not recognize the Chechen rebels as terrorists. During a press conference after the G-8 summit in St. Petersburg in July, Putin crossly said that if Syria and Iran are branded state sponsors of terrorism, then Great Britain should also earn that designation because London refuses to extradite Chechen rebel envoy Akhmed Zakaev to Russia (Newsru.com, July 16).
The Kremlin’s decision to omit Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Iraqi insurgency from the list of terrorist organizations sends a clear message that terrorist threats to the West will be recognized only if Western officials recognize the Chechen insurgents as terrorists.
As it stands now, the US State Department List of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO) does not list a single Chechen or Caucasian terrorist group.
Perhaps a better explanation for certain groups’ absences on Russia list has to do with its policy in the Middle East. According to Pavel Baev, Putin’s Middle East policy has to do with a pragmatic approach to the region that is balanced with ensuring high oil prices and arms sales. Instead of the active role Putin hoped for in nuclear talks with North Korea in 2000, the Kremlin is now much more cautious with the Middle East. Even media coverage of the Hezbollah-Israeli war has been “remarkably balanced.” Writes Baev,
Moscow’s self-confidence is also supported by the assessment of the conflict dynamics in the Middle East that suggest a very probable strengthening of its quietly advanced position in a matter of a few weeks. This position is by no means moral but entirely pragmatic: No international framework for Lebanon could be negotiated without involving Syria; no agreement with the government of Lebanon could be implemented if Hezbollah is not a part of it; no stable arrangement for Gaza could be hammered out against the resistance of Hamas. The Kremlin calculates that it would take a few weeks for Israel to recognize that the spectacular devastation of Southern Lebanon could not significantly weaken the military capabilities and political influence of Hezbollah, much the same way as the full-blown invasion in 1982 did not bring about the destruction of the PLO. Meanwhile, the outrage in the Arab states and the indignation in Europe about the scale of the unfolding humanitarian catastrophe would predictably reach such levels that a ceasefire becomes imperative whatever reservations Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice might state. That is why Moscow was not in the least upset by the failure of the Rome conference last week, where Syria was not represented, expecting that the forum would be reconvened when Washington is forced to swallow its objections against sitting at one table with a representative from Damascus.Post Views: 625
By Sean — 13 years ago
Let me see if I get this straight. Prominent Kazakh opposition member, Zamanbek Nurkadilov, is found dead with two gunshots to the chest and one to the head and it’s ruled a suicide!? I mean forget the fact that shooting oneself in the chest not once but twice and then turning the gun to your own dome seems utterly impossible, this is what an investigation into his death has concluded. Opposition leaders are correctly calling his death a “political assassination.” And this all important caveat supports such a claim: Nurkadilov was about to make a “bombshell” announcement about sitting President and election frontrunner Nursultan Nazarbayev’s involvement in corruption. Sounds like the Kazakh Presidential elections, which are next week, are getting off to a rather predictable start.Post Views: 543
By Sean — 13 years ago
News reports are confirming the obvious: last week’s attacks in Nachlik were carried out, or at least according to his own words provided “operational guidance”, by Shamil Basayev, Islamist, terrorist, and, since the killing of Aslan Maskhadov, defacto leader of the Chechen nationalist movement. One report from Radio Free Europe however is of special interest.
The title of Jeremy Bransten’s article poses a simple, yet vital question: Who carried out the Nalchik raids and why? Most of the time the answer we get is simple: Islamists who use terror to strike fear in Russia society because they are evil, inhuman etc, etc. Unfortunately, for the Russians the answer just isn’t so and as long as they take a Bushite analysis of Chechnya they will never extricate themselves from that quagmire.
Bransten quickly points out that whether Basayev masterminded the attacks or simply provided operational guidance means little. The truth of the matter is that the attack was carried out by local men. The spread of the conflict into neighboring Dagestan, Ingushetia, North Ossetia, and now Kabaradino-Balkaria is often blamed on Chechens crossing the border to cause havoc. However, this time the violence seems homegrown. Worse, Nalchik signals a possible unification between Kabarins and Balkars against Moscow. Bransten writes,
“Nalchik remains under a Russian security lockdown, so obtaining reliable facts remains difficult. But initial indications are that most of the attackers were young locals, including many young Kabardins.
If true, this could be significant because until now, most militants were believed to be Balkars, who make up about 10 percent of the population. The Balkars have historical grievances against Moscow. Like the Chechens, they were deported to Siberia by Stalin during World War II. Ever since returning to their homeland, they have faced discrimination and remained on the economic margins of society. The Kabardins, by contrast, who make up 50 percent of the population, were favored by the authorities. Both groups — naturally — have remained wary of each other.
But if Balkar and Kabardin militants are now making common cause under the banner of the radical group Yarmuk Jamaat, this could portend trouble for Moscow.”
Call it the dialectic of disintegration. When the Soviet Union imploded, all of the external ethnic groups that had their own republics, and perhaps most important their own Communist Parties, broke away. The internal ethnic groups, like the Chechens, Balkars, and Kabardins who have long historical grievances with Moscow, were left to fend for themselves in the periphery. The Chechens sought political independence. Others like the Tatars reconciled themselves to the new Russia. And most like the Balkars and Kabardins were mostly left in economic squalor.
It seems from Bransten’s account that the youth of Kabaradino-Balkaria are less and less willing to put up with it anymore. It is possible that Basayev’s call to holy war is having some resonance among them.
As always, economics is playing a decisive role for the youth’s taking up of arms. But that is not all. The conflict is spreading throughout the region in as a result of another dialectical process: repression. As Bransten notes,
“So what drives young Kabardins and Balkars to answer Basaev’s call for holy war? Paradoxically, say experts, it is the government’s campaign against Islamic extremism that is driving some young men to radicalism.
Human-rights activists say that under the guise of rooting out extremism, police have become notorious for their brutal tactics against the local population — especially young men. This, combined with a hopeless economic situation, has bred a sense of anger and alienation that Basayev has tapped into.
Accuse an unemployed young man of being a Wahabbi, bring him in for a brutal interrogation session — and if he wasn’t a Wahabbi at the beginning, he will likely become one by the time he is released back out onto the street the activists say.”
Police brutality is “rampant” in Kabaradino-Balkaria, pushing otherwise innocent and non-political young men, who’ve been humiliated by the police and security forces, to take up arms to avenge themselves. We shouldn’t be a bit surprised by this. One need only read some of the classics on anti-colonial struggles, namely Franz Fanon, to understand this. He wrote in his classic, Wretched of the Earth:
“At the individual level, violence is a cleansing force. It rids the colonized of their inferiority complex, of their passive despairing attitude. It emboldens them, and restores their self-confidence” (51).
It is this use of violence, even if it only contains a miniscule hope for liberty, can quickly unleash a cycle where the “theory of the ‘absolute evil of the colonist’ a response to the theory of the ‘absolute evil of the native.’” Once it begins to be fueled by its own logic, it can prove so impossible to break, expect through the complete replacement of one group by the other.Post Views: 241