There are few new details in the Paul Joyal shooting. It turns out that Joyal wasn’t shot in the belly but in the family jewels. If nefarious spooky Russians did do this, they are either cruel or just bad shots. Joyal’s wife
’s police, who are handling the investigation, would not confirm whether anything was stolen from Joyal during the shooting. Prince George
‘‘The investigators are obviously aware of his background,” police spokeswoman Cpl. Debbi Carlson said.
‘‘It’s hard to determine what exactly took place there,” spokesman Cpl. Stephen Pacheco said, adding that the neighborhood where the shooting took place is typically a ‘‘quiet” residential area.
FBI spokeswoman Michelle Cornkovich confirmed that
’s police are leading the investigation, and said the FBI has offered to provide any assistance the department needs. Prince George
Of course, this hasn’t stopped the wild media speculation and accusations. It seems like everyone has an opinion about
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By Sean — 11 years ago
I stumbled across Artyom Borovik’s The Hidden War in a Santa Monica used bookstore on Thursday. Not knowing much about the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, I quickly placed in my stack of must haves. Though I’ve only gotten through the introduction, Hidden War looks to be an excellent read.
Borovik was one of the Soviet Union’s best investigative journalists. Thanks to perestroika he was able to practice his craft to the fullest. In post-Soviet Russia he was an outspoken critic of the Chechen War and ultimately of Putin. He was killed in a plane crash in 2000 while accompanying oil executive Ziya Bazayev. The Guardian wrote of the crash:
‘I don’t think oil magnates use unreliable aircraft,” said Vsevolod Bogdanov, head of the Russian journalists’ union.
Such remarks encouraged speculation that the crash was caused by a criminal plot, though there was no fire or explosion. Commentators surmised that enemies of the oil executive in Russia’s notoriously ruthless business mafias were responsible for the deaths, or enemies of Borovik whose newspapers and television shows crusaded against corruption in Russia’s political and economic elites.
‘Power in Russia is not in the hands of the democrats or the communists, it’s in the hands of organised crime and the mafia,” Borovik once famously declared. He was well connected politically and a respected, outspoken opponent of Mr Putin.
I don’t bring up Borovik to rehash theories of his death. Rather, I wanted to share something he wrote in the introduction of Hidden War. It reads:
Anyone who stayed in Afghanistan for a long period of time, or who was sent there on a regular basis, typically went through four phases.
The first stage (which would usually last up to three months) went something like this: “The war is proceeding on a normal course. If only we can add another twenty or thirty thousand men, everything would be fine.”
Several months later, the second stage: “Since we’ve already gotten ourselves in this jam, we should get the fighting over with as quickly as possible. Adding another thirty thousand men isn’t going to do it. We need at least one other army to shut off all the borders.”
Five or six months later, the third stage: “There is something desperately wrong here. What a mess!”
Then, half a year or so later, the fourth and final stage: “We’d be wise to get the hell out of here—and the sooner the better.”
I went through all these stages too.
I can’t help point out the prescience of Borovik’s four stages. If Iraq replaced Afghanistan and added some lag time (the American polity is still in stage one for Afghanistan) I believe one could say that the Republican leadership is stuck at stage two, the Democrats at three, and the American public, stage four.Post Views: 375
By Sean — 12 years ago
Will Putin seek a third term? The question comes up often in the Russian and Western press. The speculation will only intensify as 2008 approaches. For Putin to stay changes to the Russian Constitution are required. As Kommersant notes, the voices calling for him to remain in office are already starting. In July, the pro-Russia Chechen parliament passed a resolution calling for the Constitution be changed to allow for a third term. Earlier this month Chechen President Alu Alkhanov told Interfax that “the country and the nation” need Putin even though he agreed that Putin did not want a third term. In
, a civil organization called “Patriots of Petersburg” has begun a campaign to collect signatures to get the Constitution changed. St. Petersburg governor and strong Putin ally Valentina Matviyenko has voiced her support as has legislator Igor Rimmer for a third term. All seem to be unanimous as to the reason why Putin should continue: stability. Petersburg
Putin 3.0, therefore, might not be entirely up to him. His staying or going might be the result of the very system the man has fostered irrespective of his personal ambitions. The very house that Putin rebuilt is also what gives those calling for a third term under the slogan of stability do have a strong case.
has more or less reached a position of economic and political stability under Putin. Many Russian politicians, business leaders, and bureaucrats, not to mention ordinary Russians (a recent poll reported that 56 percent of Russians want him to stay on, up from 44 percent last year.) see no alternative, and with fresh memories of the 1990s still fresh, might not be willing to take a chance on even a handpicked successor. Putin may not be perfect but he is predictable. Russia
Yet as Kommersant argues the chattering about whether Putin will remain or not is a product of the President’s own ambiguity on the subject. In a television broadcast a year ago, Putin told the country, “I don’t consider it appropriate to introduce any changes in the constitution,” but in regard to his future he said, “Let’s maintain the suspense.” Then, the most probable scenario was for Putin to name a successor, probably Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov or First Deputy Prime Minister Dmitrii Medvedev. As for post-presidential life, some have suggested that Putin would become the head of Gazprom or lead United Russia. The former still remains a possibility while the latter seems to not be of Putin’s liking. He has yet to even join the party, though there is no question that his influence is unchallenged. The Gazprom option is far more ambitious anyway. Why settle on merely having power over
when you can effect the geopolitics of energy? After all, he could put all that knowledge he acquired when, um, er, “writing” that dissertation. Still speculation lingers like Jen and Vince’s wedding. As the business daily explains, Russia
And now the certainty that Putin will leave is melting away. It’s something in the air: an infection in the brain provoked by the ambiguous position taken by Putin. The fateful transfer of power is coming ever closer, but Putin has yet to give a signal how, to whom, and with what consequences and calculations he intends to effect that transaction. The curtain of secrecy around the special operations he has devised for resolving the crisis in 2008 has not been parted even by a millimeter. The president is moving away from any clear answers and is instead only radiating certainty about his strength. And everyone is on edge.
The edge is right. The whole question about the future of
Russiawith or without Putin looks to keep watchers gainfully employed for the next several years. If his legacy is not in terms of his policies, it will certainly be in the fact that every Russian president in his wake will be measured against him. This fact will eventually put Putin, for better or for worse, in the pantheon of Russia ’s great leaders. Russia
A lot of Putin however is more about image rather than substance. This works well in our postmodern times when the former is more politically valuable over the latter. Putin’s personal modesty, intelligence, and temperance is admired by many Russians. His verbal wit and unmoving stance to defend
’s interests, however they may be defined, has made Russians proud. But when it comes to politics or ideology, it is difficult to point to anything Putin stands for. He shines radiant brilliance next to a mush mouth like Bush. In fact, many attribute his success to the complete absence of ideology. Ideology, after all, is what sent Russia into the whirlwind of Communist modernization. Like I already stated above, Putin’s lack of ideology makes him predictable. Russia
The secret to Putin’s image might be more. According to Paul Starobin, in probably one of the best articles I’ve read on Putin,
Putin is a difficult character study. An ex-KGB colonel, he is at times deliberately indistinct. And his secretive and tight-knit court tends to operate according to the old Russian village principle of “Iz izby soru ne vynesi“—literally, “Do not carry rubbish out of the hut.” In the emerging
, theories abound as to what makes him tick. Many analysts emphasize his intelligence training and his Soviet-era background. Alexander Rahr, the author of a biography of Putin calling him “the German in the Kremlin,” sees him instead in the context of his KGB posting in Dresden and his affinity for German culture (he speaks German fluently). Others see a somewhat ambivalent Putin, split—as Russians often are—between an outward-facing Western orientation and an inward-looking Slavophilic one. The boisterous, red-faced Yeltsin—that bear of a man—more naturally fit the Western idea of a Russian leader. But Putin is as much a product of the Russian environment and heritage as Yeltsin was. In fact, Putin’s Russianness, in the broadest sense, is the key to his character; in certain respects his rule is re-enacting distinctive Russian political traditions. schoolof Putinology
For Starobin, Putin’s ambivalence is a product of his three integrated personalities: the Fighter, The Chekist, and the Believer. These allow for a manageable balance between Russian patriot but still a stable bulwark against the political extremes of the Russian Left and the Right.
But like I’ve said, Putin is mostly image. And while image can sustain a country and while it may enthrall the functionaries and the populace with the idea that “he has a plan” such ambiguity has limits. This is best seen when Putin has faced crisis. He seemed physically shaken and political frozen during Beslan. The
tragedy was handled in pure Soviet fashion—refuse international aid because it is a sign or weakness and suppress criticism. Many of the real ills in Russian society—poverty, demographic decline, health, AIDS, concentration of wealth, immigration, military reform, etc.—have not been adequately addressed. One may give Putin credit for pacifying Kursk and praise for the policy of “Chechenization,” but one must ask at what cost? The conflict has spilled over in to neighboring regions. A Kremlin victory has not solved the problem of ethnic/national autonomy. In fact, all accounts point to a resurgence of Russification. Perhaps all of the real and growing social and economic problems that confront Chechnya have not been dealt with is because such ills require an unambiguous leader. They require ideology. Russia
That said, it is much easier to attend to the macropolitics of geopolitical maneuvering than it is to the micropolitics of daily life. It is on the macro level that Putin has fared well.
is now back on the global stage and its influence can be felt in the explosion of articles that warn of its geopolitical ambitions, whether they be in politics or economics. Like his Chinese counterparts, Putin has sat quietly by as George Bush entangles the Russia United Statesfurther into the quagmire of the Middle East. In fact, Bush’s policies have proved how dangerous ideology can be. The quietism and restraint of Putin’s “War on Terror” to not extend beyond Russian territory has allowed him to maintain good relations with Muslims within and outside . Rather than joining the American global anti-terrorist chorus, Russia Russiahas chosen to form political, economic, and military relationships with the emerging global powers of Iran, China, and . The alliances have created a de facto Eurasian bloc. One also shouldn’t discount Putin’s recent warm welcoming of Venezuelan president and Left darling, Hugo Chavez. Chavez goal of fortifying his nation’s defenses against American meddling was bolstered with $3 billion in AK-47s. Despite what detractors may say, Putin has returned India ’s foreign policy independence. Russia
If Putin does lack ideological substance on the domestic end, how has he been so successful? Two things have allowed for the stability that most Russians associate with their leader: the long tradition of Russian political centralization and petrol. The two are intimately connected. The riches generated by oil and natural gas have given
the economic surplus to pull it out of the economic crisis of the 1990s. Oil prosperity has also greased the wheels of political centralization. Nationalized oil makes oligarchs superfluous. The smashing of the oligarchs and the jailing of Yukos chair Mikhail Khodorkovsky has played on the tried and true method of scapegoating the nobility that preys on the weak. Peter the Great did this in the 18th century as did Stalin the 20th. It is no surprise that most Russians feel that the oligarchs deserved it. Selective justice is better than no justice at all. Russia
Can one blame Putin? Running
like a mafia don has worked time and time again that to fiddle with the abstractness of democracy can breed more demons that it can vanquish. Lent by the country’s vast territory and still archaic communications network, democracy in Russia ’s regions quickly translates into fiefdoms. Stalin found this out in the 1930s, when his own party secretaries defied and at times simply ignored Russia ’s directives. Their mini cults of personality were viewed by the center as potential challenges to its legitimacy. Stalin solved the problem through a combination of political violence from above and mobilizing the masses from below against their bosses. The mice toppled the cats, but not without slews of mice getting grinded up along the way. Moscow
The real lesson of how to deal with the regions does not come from Stalin, but from Khrushchev. The latter gained a lot of political clout for denouncing terror. But that act also relinquished one of the few monopolies a General Secretary had. There was no reason to fear Khrushchev and when he decided to shake up the Soviet bureaucracy, they sacked him.
If Khrushchev’s removal was the return of the repressed, the Brezhnev era and Gorbachev’s fall was the repressed triumphant. Ironically, the KGB was the center of Soviet reform because unlike their counterparts in Gosplan, they could really see how far the
Soviet Unionwas behind the West. Gorbachev was tumbled by the same conservative streak that runs through Russian bureaucrats. Again the preeminence of the word stability comes to mind.
Stalin’s two pronged assault on the bureaucracy is no longer feasible in the post-Soviet world. Khrushchev’s and Gorbachev’s only led to defeat. Putin would have to adapt politics to a more media savvy polity that still held on to tenets of na?ve monarchism. Unlike his Soviet predecessors, Putin has attended to the problem of regional fiefdom through legalism. United
’s slavish support allowed him to legally disarm regional opposition. Governors are now appointed by the Kremlin. Make no mistake, Putin’s political war against the regions is not about improving the quality of Russians’ lives or with preventing mini cults of personality. It is about securing the power of the center though the appointment of loyal captains ready to give patronage to their godfather. Russia
It is perhaps this last point which makes the political climate so fragile. The inherent flaw in Russian system in general and Putin’s system in particular is the very thing which makes his leaving seem so impossible. Without the knot tying all political forces and rivalries, the whole thing could unravel. There are enough precedents in Russian history to suggest this possibility. When Ivan Grozny’s heir accidentally died or was killed (explanations vary), and kingdom was left without a legitimate heir, the nobility erupted in civil war until they came to their senses in 1613 and elected the Romanovs. In 1825, Nicholas I’s heavy hand prevented the Decembrists from erecting the foundation for a constitutional monarchy. In 1924, Lenin’s death allowed the deep tensions between Trotsky and Stalin to burst asunder. Stalin’s ability to forge strategic alliances resulted in Trotsky’s removal (and perhaps prevented civil war in the Party) and gave birth of the triumvirate of Kamenev-Zinoviev-Stalin, that is until the latter politically and then physically liquidated the formers. One gets the feeling that the reticence many Russians have for transferring power comes from having this history in the back of their minds.
Given all of this, the question should not be whether Putin will stay or leave. This question only elicits betting the odds and tabloid drama. Rather the question should be, what will occur if Putin stays or leaves? If Putin stays,
might continue to successfully negotiate the contradictions engendered by its successes and failures. Or the thin crust that serves as its political foundation may begin to show cracks as Putin’s image begins to wear thin with time. Here Putin might learn a lesson from Lukashenka and Leonid Kuchma and begin to seriously begin to foster political alternatives and openness. Or to prevent the slow erosion of Russia Russia, Putin might have to firm up control like ’s Islam Karimov. Uzbekistan
Sadly, Putin’s departure might bring more rapid disaster. Any new leader will begin at a disadvantage. A period of uncertainty will follow along with the constant evaluation of the new leader against the old one. Unlocking the political patronage networks that Putin has secured might push formerly muted political rivals out of the woodwork. And by political rivals, I don’t mean Western darlings the likes of Garry Kasparov. In such situations one might better look at the military or security apparatuses. The problem is that since we are all so obsessed with Putin, many of the behind the scenes actors remain faceless.
In the end, there might be more at stake if Putin leaves than if he stays. I think that the final paragraphs of the Kommersant article sums up the situation nicely,
The general understanding that there is no reason, apart from subjective reasons, for Putin to step down is gaining strength. Not for nothing are analysts more and more often interpreting Putin’s departure from a psychological point of view: that he is not power-hungry, that he is tired of protocol, etc. The opinion of the West? The danger of becoming another Lukashenko? Hardly: the West is in no condition to isolate
Russialike it is doing to . After all, the Kazakh leader Nazarbayev does not feel himself to be an outcast. This is a question of politics. The problem, as a significant portion of the elite sees it, is in two lines of text on a piece of paper. And that’s it. A small legal splinter in a healthy body, a smoothly functioning vertical. Belarus
But how to understand where the legal collision is – an empty rule, but where does the it hold the boundaries of the historical process? And where are these boundaries going after the revisions of the government that took place in the 1990s? Do they exist at all? What was that? Where are we – in a modernized and spiffed-up
, in which leaders went out feet first, or in a country that lives according to new principles? The crisis facing society in the guise of the dead end of 2008 is linked with the necessity of giving these questions about the competence of the organs of power a simple answer. USSRPost Views: 1,620
By Sean — 11 years ago
Here is a sad statistic. As reported in Kommersant,
According to INSI [International News Safety Institute] ,
Iraqleads with 138 murders and unexplained deaths of reporters occurred from 1996 to 2006, 88 reporters perished in Russiaand 72 in over the period. The global news media toll exceeded 1,000. Columbia
The alarming trend is the rising number of news media deaths. The death toll was 103 in 2001, but it widened to 117 in 2004 and to 167 in 2006.
, the problem of reporters’ safety is really grave, said INSI Director Rodney Pinder. Another incident of this kind happened in Russia one of these days, Pinder said, reminding about the unexplained death of Kommersant journalist Ivan Safronov. The INSI director also mentioned the recent murder of journalist Anna Politkovskaya. Moscow
is not the only country that has a deplorable record when it comes to journalists. The survey, “Killing the Messenger,” demonstrates the global disregard for journalists. Some of its overall finding are Russia
- One thousand news media personnel have died trying to cover the news around the world in the past 10 years*.
- Only one in four died in war and other armed conflicts.
- The great majority died in peacetime, covering the news in their own countries.
- Most of those killed were murdered because of their jobs; eliminated by hostile authorities or criminals.
- Nine out of 10 murderers in the past decade have never been prosecuted.
- The news media death toll has increased steadily since 2000. The last full year covered by the report, 2005, was a record with 147 dead. It has since emerged that 2006 was even worse, with 167 fatalities, according to INSI’s annual tally.
- The Top 21 bloodiest countries over the past 10 years have been Iraq (138), Russia (88), Colombia (72), Philippines (55), Iran ** (54), India (45), Algeria (32), the former republic of Yugoslavia (32), Mexico (31), Pakistan (29), Brazil (27), USA (21), Bangladesh (19), Ukraine (17), Nigeria, Peru, Sierra Leone & Sri Lanka (16), Afghanistan, Indonesia & Thailand (13)
- Shooting was by far the greatest cause of death, accounting for almost half the total. Bombing, stabbing, beating, torture, strangulation and decapitation were also used to silence reporting. Some men and women disappeared, their fate unknown.
- In war, it was much safer to be embedded with an army than not – independent news reporters, so-called unilaterals, accounted for 92 per cent of the dead.
- Overall, armed forces – regular or irregular – police and officials accounted for 22 per cent of killings.
- The death toll was evenly split between press and broadcast. But news agencies, which are fewer in number, were relatively badly hit with six per cent of the total.
- Most of those who died were on staff — 91 per cent against 9 per cent freelance — and one-third fell near their home, office or hotel.
*INSI’s researchers counted all news media personnel — journalists as well as support workers such as drivers, translators and office personnel, whether staff or freelance — provided they died because of their work gathering or distributing the news. All causes of death were included, from murder through accidents to health-related.
‘s figures were swollen by one air accident in December, 2005. A military aircraft carrying news teams to cover exercises in the Gulf crashed in Iran , killing 48 journalists and media technicians aboard. TehranPost Views: 337