Russia’s Stance on Disputed Territories: Just How "Hypocritical" is it?

By Michael Averko

As of late, there has been a good deal of action on matter pertaining to post Communist bloc land disputes. Within the confines of the former Soviet Union, representatives of Nagorno Karabakh, South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Trans-Dniester regularly meet, with some of their discussions occurring in Russia. On another front, former Yugoslavia is embroiled in an international dialogue on whether Kosovo should be allowed to separate from Serbia. This has no doubt encouraged Republika Srpska to consider breaking away from Bosnia.

Certain elements in the West accuse Moscow of showing a bias for pro-Russian independence movements and recalcitrance towards not so pro-Russian ones. The New York Times’ C.J. Chivers (“Sun and Surf, but Also Lines in the ‘Russian’ Sand,” Aug. 20) and Publius Pundit’s Robert Mayer (“Russia’s Kosovo Double Standard,” Nov. 14) are among those suggesting such. The title of Mayer’s article is enough of a hint to his view. Chivers cites Russia’s refusal to let Chechnya become formally independent, while sympathizing with some independence movements elsewhere. Chivers’ point is non-parallel, since most Chechens aren’t supportive of independence because of what “independence” had twice done to their republic over the last decade. On two different occasions during that period, Chechnya operated as an independent entity. In each instance, there was an enhanced chaos that made life more miserable for Chechnya’s population. Like it or not, a greater Russian control of Chechnya has led to an increased stability in that republic.

Those arguing in support of the Russian position (myself included) stress that each of the disputed former Soviet and former Yugoslav regions have different degrees of legitimacy for independence. Under this very same belief, there are those going against Russia. A critical review of these areas is therefore required.

The Kremlin hasn’t formally recognized the four disputed former Soviet territories as independent states. With the exception of Nagorno Karabakh, the other three have shown an interest in reunifying with Russia. Nagorno Karabakh is interested in unifying with Armenia. In this sense, these regions aren’t necessarily seeking to become independent.

Nagorno Karabakh’s separatist drive has the least enthusiasm among Russian political elites. It’s a landlocked area within Azerbaijan’s Communist drawn boundaries, thereby making its separation from Azerbaijan all the more difficult. The Russian city/region of Kaliningrad is an example of how a territory can exist outside of its affiliated country. However, unlike Nagorno Karabakh – Kaliningrad hasn’t been involved in a violent dispute for decades (towards the end of World War II, under its former name Konigsberg and as a part of Germany, it was the scene of a violent ethnic cleansing campaign against the ethnic German population).

As the Soviet Union broke up, old hatreds between Orthodox Christian Armenians and Turkic Muslim Azeris re-ignited. Up to 30,000 were killed over who would govern Nagorno Karabakh. In the end, the Armenian government supported Nagorno Karabakh Armenians defeated the Azeri government forces. For well over a decade, there has been a cold peace between Yerevan and Baku.

Russia’s position on that dispute is tempered by conflicting realities. Armenia has historically been more pro-Russian than Azerbaijan. Materialistically, fossil fuel rich Azerbaijan is of greater value. Current Azeri foreign policy appears motivated to play the West and Russia off with each other. It’s not out of the realm to hypothesize that a “deal” (official or otherwise) could be made where Russia could tacitly support an Azeri takeover of Nagorno Karabakh in exchange for Azerbaijan becoming geo-politically closer to Russia. Azerbaijan is using its energy revenue to enhance its military.

South Ossetia and Abkhazia share a border with Russia. These two regions were part of a pre-19th century independent Georgia. Between 1801 and the Soviet breakup, South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Georgia proper were affiliated with Russia as parts of the Russian Empire and the USSR. South Ossetia’s majority ethnic Ossetian population is related to the majority Ossetian population in the neighboring Russian republic of North Ossetia. The two Ossetias share the same flag and coat of arms.

When in office, the three post-Soviet Georgian presidents have advocated closer ties to the West and a lessened dependency on Russia. South Ossetia and Abkhazia prefer the opposite. As is true with the Armenians and Azeris, there’s animosity between Georgians and the Abkhaz and South Ossetian communities. These differences could be attenuated with an improvement of Russo-Georgian relations. This isn’t impossible because many Georgians welcome close ties with Russia.

As part of a March 1, 2006 Russia Blog feature on Moldova, my article “Moldova: The Most Overlooked of the European Former Soviet Republics” detailed Trans-Dniester’s excellent case for independence. This region was never part of an independent Moldova. Trans-Dniester’s captial Tiraspol, was founded in 1792 by Russian Field Marshall Alexander Suvorov. (arguably Russia‘s greatest military commander) At the time, Tiraspol served as a fortress marking the border on the Dniester River between Imperial Russia and Ottoman Empire ruled Moldova. In a recent referendum, Trans-Dniester’s peaceful, multi-ethnic and democratic society expressed the desire to reunify with Russia.

For a variety of reasons, Kosovo doesn’t have a great case for independence. It has been a continuous part of Serbia since 1912. Prior to that, it had been under Ottoman occupation for a lengthy period. Centuries earlier, Kosovo was an integral part of Serbia. It was never an independent entity unto itself or a part of an independent Albania. For decades, Kosovo’s non-Albanian population has lived under constant threat from extreme Albanian nationalists

Since the end of the Bosnian Civil War, Republika Srpska has been at peace as a good number of Muslims and Croats have resettled in that republic. The 1995 Dayton Peace Accord governing Bosnia gave Republika Srpska the right to establish its own relations with other states.

In comparison, UN Resolution 1244 governing Kosovo states that the province is a continued part of Serbia. This resolution also calls for a return of Serb military and civilian administration to that province. Serbia is internationally recognized as the de facto successor state of the now defunct Federal Republic of Yugoslavia which had signed UN Resolution 1244. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia consisted of Serbia and Montenegro. At the time and to the present, Kosovo is recognized as a part of Serbia.

On the matter of hypocrisy, there’s a recent New York Times editorial (“No More Delays for Kosovo,” Nov. 17) which nonchalantly supports Kosovo independence. “The paper of record” has yet to endorse Trans-Dniester’s independence even though it has a much better case than Kosovo.

*****

Michael Averko is a New York based independent foreign policy analyst and media critic. His commentary has appeared in the Action Ukraine Report, Eurasian Home, Intelligent.ru, Johnson’s Russia List, Russia Blog, The New York Times and The Tiraspol Times.

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34 Comments.

  1. Thanks for the note Mike.

    Your piece is the kind of commentary that should create a ripple effect.

    Good job Sean. I have come across your blog before and like it.

  2. Well, what do you know?

    Hi Andrew! You must be on the same list (hehe).

    I second Andrew’s motion. An excellent article at an excellent blog.

    I’m interested in knowing why views like Mike’s aren’t evident at major American news organizations? The answer seems clear. However, maybe there’s a new one out there.

  3. >>I’m interested in knowing why views like Mike’s aren’t evident at major American news organizations? The answer seems clear.

    I am not sure I undestand if you know the answer or not, Alexandra, but let me offer an explanation.

    It is very difficult for a Western and especially an American mind to wrap itself around the concept of a small country longing not for independent self-government, but instead, wishing to join an authoritarian vertically structured behemoth.

    In the US nationalistic, ethnic and religious prejudices and ties that play critical roles in all conflicts Averko mentions, are usually obscured by personal preferences, interests or prejudices and don’t get addressed, explained and criticised as often as they deserve for the rot they are. In large because many journalists do not understand them.

  4. Unfortunately, Cyrill’s explanation is largely inapplicable, because his attempt to label Russia “an authoritarian vertically structured behemoth” does not represent a sincere belief on the part of the western elites, but rather a collection of meaningless cliches used by some western politicians to justify a more hostile policy toward Russia.

    That is, they understand a lot. But what they say and do does not necessarily reflect their understanding. It’s just your regular hypocrisy. The real reason for the double standards approach to Kosovo and post-Soviet unrecognized statelets is Russia, obviously. If this situation were taking place in Africa, no one in the west would care. But when Russia is involved, that changes the equation completely. Three of the four statelets (S.Ossetia, Abkhazia, Transnistria) want closer ties with Russia. They are routinesly demonized. The fourth one, Nagorno-Karabakh, doesn’t really have any relations with Russia. It is ignored (except in your general travelogues). If Nagorno-Karabakh ever announced its intention to join Russia, I am certain we would quickly be informed that a) it is a Stalinist regime stuck in the Soviet past; b) the thugs who rule it earn their living by “smuggling”; c) Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity is inviolable. Thus, the mainstream opinion of the western media and policy circles is that the right of nations to self-determination is valid only if they self-determine correctly — away from Russia.

    The situation with Kosovo is entirely different. Russia supports Serbia not because Russia wants to stick it to the west, but because Russians genuinely care about Serbs. In contrast, the idea that the west genuinely cares about Georgia or Moldova is ludicrous.

  5. I am not “attepting to label” (smells like Pravda-speak) Russia as an authoritarian vertical behemoth, I simply call it for what it actually is.

    >>Thus, the mainstream opinion of the western media and policy circles is that the right of nations to self-determination is valid only if they self-determine correctly — away from Russia.

    This is exactly what I said, just in other words. You do not have to ascribe any insencerity or hypocracy to this. Just like it is completely impossible for you to even consider that the West might care for Georgia or Moldova (while claiming that Russians do care for Serbs – all in one breath), it is extremely difficult to imagine why would a recently liberated colony go back and rejoin its former metropolis.

    There is apparently a natural pendulum effect at work in history: communists would get elected several years after an anti-communist wave, emperors or lord protectors are crowned several years after popular revolutions. After all the talk about democracy and freedom a “managed democracy” eunuch becomes popular. It is tough to be on your own. It takes guts to take on responsibility for yourself – it is much easier to surrender it for a guaranteed lunch.

  6. F. Kruikov leads on to a valid point about how the West can just as easily drop a country it currently supports. Russia also has its share of whores and out and out idiots in high positions of influence.

    Good to see Mishka having a forum.

  7. Cyrill:

    1. There’re mannequin like media people (usually found on TV) who uncritically say/write what’s being communicated to them by the higher ups. How knowledgeable some of them are of the news they cover is an open ended question.

    2. There’re others in media, who have a definite slant, based on a partisan knowledge of a given topic. The professional survival of this type is based on whether its views agree with the people in charge of what gets communicated in mass media.

    3. There’re others in the field who can shift in the direction of whoever is employing them.

    4. Relative to 2., a number of sincere journalists openly going against mass media establishment fault lines is extremely limited from a center stage for obvious reasons. Is it not a valid talking point to note how The Moscow Times hasn’t had one Russocentric columnist while employing others having a contrary view? One can find other such talking points.

    The ideal situation is to have as fine a balance of plausible views as possible. The public at large isn’t so well versed on the issues raised on subject matter like the above article. However, make no mistake about it, Anglo-American mass media elites controlling the information flow have definite fixated views of the former Yugoslavia and former USSR.

    I will gladly give examples upon request.

    ****

    F. Kruikov:

    Regarding your point on Nagorno Karabakh: it’s easy to overlook that conflict because of its being geographically more east from the others. Part of what you say (anti-Russian bias) is true. The other part has to do with Western prejudices of concentrating on more Western situated areas. There’s also the geostrategic factor as well. Nagorno Karabakh’s real estate is not so great to some others areas.

    All:

    I’ve had a few good private email discussions on this piece. One of them (involving a fairly well known analyst) challenges my take (expressed elsewhere and related to the above article) on what transpired in Kosovo before the war. Here’s what I said (some self edit from the original which doesn’t affect the content).

    In the year and a half of Kosovo fighting prior to NATO’s aggression (let’s call it for what it was), between 1,500-2,000 died in fighting out of a 2 million Kosovo population. Of that 1,500 – between 500 and 600 were Serbs. Serbs make up 10% of Kosovo’s population (thanks in large part to anti-Serb ethnic cleansing campaigns over the past 120 years, combined with a massive illegal Albanian immigration during that period). In per capita numbers, the murder rate in some major American cities was/is greater than what was evident in Kosovo prior to the NATO aggression. Dmitri Simes, who is no radical said (around the time of the NATO aggression) that Kosovo was an ugly little civil war and not a genocide.

    Hitler? With all due respect ***** (I greatly admire your wisdom, which I’d love to see applied on a more regular basis):

    - up to 40,000 Kurds killed and over 2 million Kurdish refugees from 1975-2000, care of NATO member country Turkey.

    - you know what some say of Israeli actions (towards Palestinians) and Russian actions (in Chechnya)

    Serbia proper is the most multi-ethnic part of former Yugoslavia. Albanian dominated Kosovo has been a living hell for non-Albanians.

    This is a matter of record: In 1998, the OSCE brokered a cease-fire, which led to a withdrawal of many JNA troops from Kosovo. Shortly thereafter, Albanian terrorism increased. Inclusive to these acts was the fatal shooting of Serb teens at a Kosovo disco. On NPR, I had a brief exchange with Daniel Serwer (employed by the so called US Institute for Peace), who glossed over this by saying that JNA forces remained in Kosovo after the OSCE brokered cease-fire. I was cutoff and couldn’t note that the cease fire arrangement didn’t call for a total withdrawal of JNA forces from Kosovo. Of course no one challenged him on that.

    ***** – you’re well aware of what happened TWICE in the last decade when Chechnya was allowed to essentially act as an independent state.

    AS FOR THE OTHER WARS OF THE LAST DECADE IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, FEEL FREE TO CLICK MY NAME AT THIS POST, WHICH WILL LEAD TO MY FACT BASED COMMENTS ON WHO STARTED WHAT.

  8. I think labeling western reporting of these issues as subject to an anti-Russian bias is somewhat true, but a bit off the mark. It’s more because of journalistic inertia/laziness that hasn’t really moved far beyond the Cold War and because of the media’s desire to frame things in terms of conflict rather than cooperation.

    Still, I think Kruikov and Averko overstate their cases. Russia is no more the misunderstood force for all that is good that they see than it is the reemergent evil empire sometimes presented in the western media. It’s a power that simply acts in ways that it perceives to be in its interest.

    Is Russia’s embrace of Transdnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia purely altruistic or cynically motivated to point out the hypocrisy of the West in favoring Kosovar independence, but no self determination for these places? If Russia had more amiable relations with Moldova and Georgia would any of us be more than marginally aware of these places?

    You undercut your cases a bit by directly relating self-determination/absorption by Russia in the ex-Soviet lands to independence in Kosovo (well not quite, but I’ll get to that in a minute). Surely merging with another state is different than independence, and wouldn’t carry all the baggage with dejure or defacto independence (smuggling, terrorism, a la Chechnya).

    However there are important differences as well. I’m not going to get into who started what in Kosovo or how many people died or how bad Serbs are and good Albanians are or the other way around. Still, Serbia lost a war and agreed to put Kosovo’s future into question at least. There’s been no bilateral agreement on this concerning Moldova or Georgia (and I don’t think founding a city over 200 years ago counts as a good claim Transdnistria was incorporated into the Moldovan SSR, not the RSFSR. Plus, I somehow think that if Napoleon happened to found a city during the War of 1812, you wouldn’t be so keen on giving it to France). Also, you’re mistaken in concluding that Kosovo’s independence is coming, or favored, or that it will turn into some lawless haven. The consensus is that it will probably have something more than autonomy from Serbia and less than outright statehood.

  9. >>1. There’re mannequin like media people (usually found on TV) who uncritically say/write what’s being communicated to them by the higher ups. How knowledgeable some of them are of the news they cover is an open ended question.

    Yes, there are a plenty of types like this. However, my experience with the media, tells me this is mostly true of “news desks”. Contrary to that, opinion columns (not editorials) and commentary broadcasts are largely independent from editorial positions of newspaper or station management. One of the best examples is the KGO/KSFO combination in San Francisco. One is decidedly lefty, the other is decidedly right wind. Run from the same place, by the same manager, owned by the same outfit.

    Newspaper opinions come in a large part from syndication and it would be extremely difficult to attach forced unanimity to these.

    It is true that attitudes towards Russia seem much more similar across the board between very different writers or broadcasters. I see two possible explanations:

    a) Deliberate editorial policy across the whole media. This explanation requires hell of a lot of other explanations of why, who for what purpose and most importantly HOW such unanimity could be forced on otherwise completely diverse and unruly bunch of opinionated policy commentators.

    b) Similarity of opinions is based on the history of Russia/USSR behavior over the years. I t boils down to giving Russia a benefit of a doubt. Does it deserve one? Apparently most people would say no; be it in the media or in the street. It has been pointed out that the Litvinenko affair pointed out how few people in the world had any compunction to point finger at Putin. Perception is the key: Putin and what he made of Russia in the last several years is perceived to be capable of just that. Now, one can run around and blame phobias for this, but I would recommend a mirror instead.

    REGARDING KOSOVO and how it fits within the set of ethnic enclaves that supposedly want to reunite with Russia; I would agree that there might not have been enough of killings to warrant the genocide claim. The West might have overreacted, but please do not forget that Kosovo situation came in the wake of atrocities Serbians committed in Bosnia. Should I say Karazic and Mladic? There was no guarantee or even an indication that something just like that would not repeat in Kosovo.

    Overall, this whole situation, be it Kosovo, Bosnia, Ossetia, Transdniestra or whatnot stems from how we understand the concept of sovereignty. At this moment in history the “international law” embodied in the UN Charter and other treaties still consider sovereignty along the lines similar to the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia that defined in the large degree relations between a sovereign ruler and his subjects.

    Many notions have changed since 1648 in particular relations between state and individual had seen dramatic realignment. But that happened mostly inside sovereign borders. Some attempts were made to reevaluate this relationship across national borders with UN Human Rights Declaration, the Helsinki Accord, etc.; but sanctity of national borders, sanctity of a sovereign state to do what it pleases inside these borders remained intact. Kosovo was all but the first major attempt to reevaluate this outside of the existing international law.

    The need for reevaluation, for reexamination and eventual change comes not from politics, not from egalitarian notions of freedom, not from religion or culture. The imperative to reevaluate the concept of sovereignty comes from capitalism gradually taking over from feudalism as the dominant economic model. Developed capitalism does not care much about national borders. Instead, it attempts to create a trade system with as many participants as possible and artificial restrictions sovereign states create internally are all but roadblocks to that end. The ultimate goal is to make every human being a private property owner with equal opportunities to engage in commerce. Feudalism/Socialism with its principle of state ownership or control of means of production stands in the way and will eventually be destroyed.

    Kosovo might not have been the best case; the West should have intervened with appropriate force in Bosnia earlier. That’s theory; in practice, however, it is very easy to see why Russia is so supportive of the cases of Abkhazia and Ossetia. The Caucauses isthmus potentially offers an alternate route for Central Asian energy resources to reach world markets. Russia perceives the status quo as being beneficial to its interests and thus regards all attempts to threaten its monopoly as threats to its national interests. Thus it becomes essential to destabilize the Caucauses isthmus as a matter of state policy. Hence, Chechnya, Ossetia and paranoid assault on Georgians.

    Unfortunately, interests of Russia are somehow been substituted with interests of Putin Inc. While becoming a free capitalist state is in the ultimate interest of Russia for its people, preserving oil and natural gas monopoly for Gazprom is the ultimate interest of the Putin Inc.

  10. Johnnie B. Baker was having trouble posting the following comment and asked me to do it for him.–Sean

    Sean – I welcome your idea of allowing outside submissions. It is
    difficult to carry the ball alone, though you do an excellent job.
    Unfortunately, this piece I find very simplistic, all descriptive with
    no real analysis. This could be an undergrad essay.

    Now for specifics -

    - “…most Chechens aren’t interested in independence.” Should we just
    take Averko’s word for this? There are plenty of refugees in
    Azerbaijan who still can’t return home. Whatever stability they have
    now perhaps could have been achieved with before the initial conflict
    with Dudayev, before the Russians invaded and destroyed the region and
    the Chechen leadership. Why are the arguments in this essay for the
    independence of the other separatist regions, which as a whole I do
    not accept, apply to Chechnya? This shows a complete lack of
    analytical coherence in the entire essay.

    - Karabakh’s first with is for independence, not unification with Armenia.

    - The comparison of N-K with Kaliningrad is absurd. For one thing,
    Kaliningrad was given to the USSR and the end of a World War, and was
    immediately recognized by the international community. This is not
    true of N-K. Secondly, N-K is de facto connected to Armenia, as
    Armenian forces (not N-K forces) control all the area between N-K and
    Armenia. The Lachin corridor in particular is one of the major
    indepediments to solving the conflict, that and the return of the
    Azeri refugees.

    - The Armenian gov’t did more than support N-K; they fought alongside
    with their troops. Russia supported the Armenians with arms during the
    period and today, and maintains a military presence in Armenia. And
    what is meant by “takeover” of N-K? By violent means? Nobody,
    including Russia, would support this. And A-jan would never become
    closer to Russia and inhibit its ties with the West, especially
    America. Then Aliev wouldn’t be able to play the middle
    diplomatically, and they would lose American military support they
    desperately need.

    - The Azeri-Armenian antagonism is much deeper than between Georgians
    and Ossetians/Abkhaz, going back over 100 years. Both Abkhaz and
    Ossetes were encouraged to rebel by the Russians; N-K needed no
    encouragement. Again, a simplistic comparison of a very complex region.

    - Trans-Dinester: “”A peaceful – multi-ethnic – democratic society”???
    This is a joke, right? How about a country ruled by a gangster whose
    only economic foundation is smuggling (goods and girls) and only
    reason for existence is to give Russia leverage and influence in the
    region? Who cares if the Tiraspol was founded by a Russian? So were
    the vast majority of the cities in Kazakhstan, including the current
    capitol. So was Tashkent. So I guess they should be part of Russia as
    well. Wait a minute. Who founded Istanbul? The Greeks? The Romans? Hey
    Turks! Give it back! Furthermore, Crimea was never a part of an
    independent Ukraine (for that matter, neither was Lviv or
    Trans-Carpathia), so does that mean Crimea should be returned to the
    Russians? Averko probably thinks so. And I love how Averko sites his
    own article as an “excellent case”. That’s real journalism.

    How can T-D or N-K or Abkhazia/Ossetia have any more case for
    independence than Kosovo? There has never been an independent Kosovo?
    Well, also the same for Croatia, Bosnia, Macedonia, Slovenia,
    Slovakia, East Timor, most of the countries of Africa, etc. Using this
    logic, any country that didn’t have independence before its
    independence doesn’t have the right to exist. C-ya Brazil! India –
    bye-bye! If the Serbs in Kosovo feel under threat, which they do,
    Kosovars were definitely a persecuted minority within Serbia. After
    all, who started the ethnic cleansing in Yugoslavia? Indeed, Kosovo
    was neglected under Yugoslavia as well for development. And Kosovo was
    part of Serbia, yes, centuries ago. Many centuries ago. So I guess all
    boundaries should revert to what they were 400 years ago. Greater
    Serbia, anyone?

    - While some refugees have returned to Srpska, it is very little
    compared to the Serbs who have been allowed to return to Bosnia and
    Sarajevo.

    - If this was a paper from one of my undergrad students, I would give
    it a B-. No thesis, no sustained argument. But for someone who
    considers himself an “analyst” – an F. You have made not a single real
    point to maintain any coherent argument. You have simply tried, badly,
    to create an opposition argument to every general political consensus,
    flawed though they may be. None of the referendums in any of the
    post-USSR separatist regions have been accepted by anyone in the
    international community outside of their Russian (or Armenian)
    backers. While there are definite ambiguities in who gets to be
    independent or not, nothing Averko has written clears these questions
    up. One cannot make a blanket policy covering every case; the
    complexities of each situation deserve a solution of their own.

  11. James:

    So, Russia then is no more different than other great powers acting in their own self interests? Only that’s not how this is often presented in Anglo-American mass media.

    Trans-Dniester, Abkhazia and South Ossetia have had a prolonged togetherness with Russia. The people inhabiting those three territories maintain close ties to Russia. For comparative media/politics sake: American mass media doesn’t question the sincere desire of Israel showing concern for world Jewry at large? Why then should it second guess the relationship between Russia and the three mentioned disputed territories?

    You say that Serbia “lost” a war. Did the Albanians win it or was the victory a misguided NATO policy which can be corrected? UN Resolution 1244 governing Kosovo recognizes that province as a continued part of Serbia. It also calls for a return of Serb civilian and military personnel.

    On Trans-Dniester: in addition to the points raised in my cited (in the above article) Russia Blog piece, note that the territory of Trans-Dniester was part of ancient Russia (Kievan Rus). You overlook how Trans-Dniester’s multi-ethnic, peaceful democracy is a sharp contrast from the violent ethnic intolerance found in Kosovo. In no way, shape or form does Kosovo “deserve” independence over Trans-Dniester. The opposite is true.

    Your very last point is in the still yet to be firmly determined either way category.

    Cyrill:

    First of all, let me say that I appreciate being on your mailing list, regardless of whatever disagreements I have with some (not all) of your views.

    Bosnia was much more complex than the simple matter of overwhelmingly evil Serbs against comparatively more innocent Croats and Muslims. I outline the particulars in the link at my name in my prior posted comment at this venue.

    Johnnie:

    And some say I know how to compliment?

    Robert Bruce Ware, Nicolai Petro are two among several scholars who agree with my take on how the Chechen independence movement has significantly deflated for reasons expressed in my piece. Offer me a valid point to the contrary and I will reconsider.

    Nagorno Karabakh seeks independence from Azerbaijan and sympathizes with being a part of Armenia. Show me where I’m wrong on those two points. I’m also aware of the Azeri refugees. Are you aware of the Armenian suffering in that conflict?

    On Russian support for Armenia, you overlook recent developments. This summer’s CIS summit in Moscow saw the presence of the Azeri president as Armenia’s leader stayed at home. The past year has seen several one to one meetings between the Russian and Azeri presidents. As per the above article, I make what I feel to be a very good analytical suggestion. You didn’t reply to it. Can you acknowledge it without my having to specifically repeat it?

    Your views on Trans-Dniester are way out of sync with reality for reasons firmly detailed. The Tiraspol Times and British Helsinki Human Rights Group offer some spot on analysis regarding Trans-Dniester.

    Russocentric Crimea is content with remaining a part of Ukraine provided that Russian language rights are respected and that Russo-Ukrainian relations aren’t heavily by anti-Russian vibes evident among SOME (stress some) in Ukraine.

    After reading your comments in their entirety, you come across as a rather prejudiced person, who has difficulties in directly sticking to the topic, while engaging in unsubstantiated personal attacks. Unlike some others, I’m not thin skinned and will therefore not hide from such vitriol.

    Sean:

    I’m reminded from someone out there in cyber (wink, wink).

  12. johnnie b. baker

    test

  13. Mike -

    I don’t care how many “experts” you puul out that my agree with you, I’m not one of them. The fact of the matter is, we will never know if Checnya may have become a stable entitiy, because Russia refused to leave them alone. The complete destruction of Groznyy made the siege of Sarajevo look like a day in Paris. Instead of granting the Chechens a semblance of autonomy from the beginning, like Russia did with the Tatars, an incredible use of wanton force was used. Dudayev was assasinated, as well as the only man who worked towrd peace with the Russians, the democratically elected leader, Maskhadov, though by then things had definitely spun out of control . yes, today the people of Chenchnya are warry of war, and some may accept Kadyrov and his thugs as a stabilizing force. But my point is that Russia was bent on crushing the Chechens by whatever means, and this created a power vaccuum within Chechnya and greatly radicalized certain portions of the population to the point where we have the situation where it is today. And by the way, in the early 19th century there was a state (though not a recognized nation-state by contemporary standards) under the leadership of Imam Shamil, with laws and a government. There was also the Mountaineer Republic after the revolution (which included the North Ossetians). So one of your rationales for whether a seperatist state deserves independence, the existance of a previous state, fits Chechnya.

    In your response to my point about N-K, that is not what you said in your piece. Ypu said N-K wants to be part of Armenia. You said nothing about independence. And yes, of course, I am aware of the suffering of Armenians, many people suffered on both sides. But which country occupies which country? Azerbaijan was vastly more refugees from the conflict than Armenians. Travelling around Azerbaijan, they are everywhere. In Armenia, this is not the case.

    And furthermore, what did I not reply to? I don’t understand. Like you said, Azerbaijan plays the powers of each other. With this I agree. And that’s why they will not become an ally of Russia.

    I do not find the Tiraspol Times to be an objective source on T-D. Maybe the Helsinki group makes valid points regarding what you said. But my criticisms of the points you made in the article regarding who founded Tiraspol and so forth, you don’t address.

    As far as your comments regarding what James said, you stated “Abkhazia and South Ossetia had a prolonged togetherness with Russia.” This is just a basic lack of knowledge of the history of the region. How was that Abkhaz-Russian togetherness evident in the early-med 19th century when Russia was engaed in a proloned slash/burn/kill campaign against the Circassian tribes of the Caucasus (of which the Abkhaz are one) that some even call genocide. The vast majority of those who weren’t killed fled to the Ottoman Empire, which is why you have Circassian communities in places such as Iraq, Syria, and Turkey today. Not all were killed or fled, of course, such as the Abkhaz, Adegey, etc., but they’re numbers are very small. Even in Abkhazia.

    And during the civil war period and the time of the first five-year plan, both Abkhaz and Ossetians (both North and South) fought the Russians as much as any other group in the Caucasus. And they also felt the full repression of the Russian-dominated Soviet state as did the other ethnic groups. On this period of the Cuacasus, I have archival evidence to prove my point, but you’ll have to wait for my published article to read them. Or do the reasearch yourself. (I found RGASPI fond 17 opis 87 and 89 to be particluarly helpful.) While the Christian Ossetinas (and there are Muslim ones) certainly have had an affinity with the Russians, this has not stopped them from violent resistance in the past. And the Abkhaz definitely have no historical love for the Russians. The current alliance with the Russians is based solely on post-Soviet politics.

    And your comparison with Israel is not valid as well. While it may, loosely, fit with the Russians in T-D, the Ossetians and Abkaz are not Russians. And Israel, for all its myriad faults, does not attempt to destabilize or annex New York City or the Fairfax district in LA. Israel wants Jews to emigrate to Israel.

    And if I went on about everything you didn’t reply to in my comment, I would be sitting here for the next hour. Name one place in my comments where I made a personal attack. One. I addressed your essay, and only that. I did not call you prejeduced, as you called me (and I’d like to know how you came up with that). I can’t stick to the topic? Whatever. Why don’t you just disregard what I say and compare me to the russofope. That’s the easy way out.

  14. Johnnie:

    You aren’t fully comprehending what has been clearly communicated. In the last decade, Chechnya TWICE had been independent from Russia in everything other than formal status. In both instances, the chaos enhanced. That’s not the fault of Russia. In retrospect, Russia should’ve militarily acted sooner and firmer. Instead, the chaos was allowed to brew.

    Your bringing up of Tatarstan is ironic given how I’ve used that Russian republic as a text book case of Russian tolerance. BTW along with Kalmykia – Tatarstan proves that being more independent of Moscow doesn’t necessarily mean greater political rights. Chechnya TWICE in the last decade had more autonomy than Tatarstan and Kalmykia.

    You misinterpret what I said about Nagorno Karabkah. The direct passage: ” With the exception of Nagorno Karabakh, the other three have shown an interest in reunifying with Russia. Nagorno Karabakh is interested in unifying with Armenia. In this sense, these regions aren’t necessarily seeking to become independent.” Nagorno Karabakh is interested in unifying with Armenia. This doesn’t mean that it’s 100% set in doing so. Kapish?

    As per The Tiraspol Times, what source do you find as more objective? I don’t find your comments more objective.

    My point about Israel is valid because the peoples in Trans-Dniester, Abkhazia and South Ossetia are (at least in many instances) Russian citizens. Yes, the Ossetians and Abkhaz are ethnically different than the Russians. However, Italian-Americans and Irish-Americans are Americans nevertheless. During the terrorist siege of a school in North Ossetia – ethnic Russians showed great sympathy for their fellow non-ethnic Russian citizens. You can’t comprehend that sentiment? You acknowledge the ethnic kinship between Trans-Dniester and Russia.

    You’re deflating the extent of personal venom in your initial comment. I think the record shows my having done a much better job in directly replying to you as opposed to vice versa.

    You’re right about how the Abkhaz haven’t always been so pro-Russian. This underscores how likes and dislikes can change.

  15. J. Baker claims that Transdniestria is a country ruled by a gangster whose only economic foundation is smuggling (goods and girls). That is the common wisdom that years of pro-Moldovan, English-language blackballing wants us to believe.

    But where is the proof?

    Transdniester is landlocked, so any “smuggling” must necessary happen with the cooperation of either of its two neighbors, Moldova and Ukraine.

    There has been (for a full year now) a large multimillion high tech control mission from the European Union on the border, EUBAM. They have failed to turn up any weapons smuggling, any drugs smuggling or any human trafficking whatsoever. The only smuggling they found so far was a Ukrainian reexport racket of frozen American chicken (from Tyson Foods, no less). This was to avoid paying VAT.

    Baker also claims that the only reason for existence is to give Russia leverage and influence in the region. This is the typical Vladimir Socor argument, and it is wrong. Transdniestria was not founded by Russia. Yeltsin was against it (he sided with Moldova) and his vice president was, at best, ambivalent.

    To say that Transdniester is “made by Russia” and that it wouldn’t exist if Russia didn’t need it offensive to the 555,000 inhabitants of Trandniester.

    If Montenegro (with 600,000 people) has a right to self determination, then why not Transdniester.

    In Montenegro’s case, just over half of the voters wanted it. Whereas in Transdniester’s case, 97% voted in favor of independence. It is no wonder that the folks in Tiraspol are starting to think that all of us here, in the English world, are full of … double standards.

  16. Among others, Nebojsa Malic and Mike Averko noted that up to a half million Montenegrin citizens in Serbia were blocked from voting in the Transdnestr referendum.

    Johnnie would do his cause more good if he eased up on the personal insults.

  17. johnnie b. baker

    where are the personal insults? where?

  18. You asked for it:

    “Unfortunately, this piece I find very simplistic, all descriptive with
    no real analysis. This could be an undergrad essay.”

    If you consider that a complement, or a respectful response, then you have some big time problems. There’s plenty of “analysis” in that piece. The type of which is very much underrepresented elsewhere.

    ****

    “‘most Chechens aren’t interested in independence’.” Should we just
    take Averko’s word for this?”

    Of course not! Nor should we just take David Satter’s word or yours. Ditto Vladimir Socor. Kapish?

    ***

    “Why are the arguments in this essay for the
    independence of the other separatist regions, which as a whole I do
    not accept, apply to Chechnya? This shows a complete lack of
    analytical coherence in the entire essay.”

    I address all of that in the article. Each situation should be looked at on a case by case basis with a comparative breakdown included.

    ****

    “The comparison of N-K with Kaliningrad is absurd. For one thing,
    Kaliningrad was given to the USSR and the end of a World War, and was
    immediately recognized by the international community.”

    “Absurd”? You omit a key point made in that segment. It had to deal with enclaves not bordering the entity it’s a part of.

    ****

    “The Azeri-Armenian antagonism is much deeper than between Georgians
    and Ossetians/Abkhaz, going back over 100 years. Both Abkhaz and
    Ossetes were encouraged to rebel by the Russians; N-K needed no
    encouragement. Again, a simplistic comparison of a very complex region.”

    “Simplistic”? I don’t dispute your point about the Azeri-Armenian hatreds being greater than the two involving Georgia. Where do I say differently? There’re still antagonisms in those other two. Hence, the reference to them.

    ****

    “Trans-Dinester: ‘A peaceful – multi-ethnic – democratic society’???
    This is a joke, right? How about a country ruled by a gangster whose
    only economic foundation is smuggling (goods and girls) and only
    reason for existence is to give Russia leverage and influence in the
    region?”

    ***

    Your know it all commentary on this point is the bigger “joke.” Those Moldovan inspired propaganda claims have been proven false. But then again, you’re someone who dismisses The Tiraspol Times, the only English language news site regularly reporting from Trans-Dniester. It’s arguably more credible than The Moscow Times (will detail upon request).

    I can continue on with your somewhat unruly manner. Others would’ve just flat out ignored you. I’ve actually provided you with a constructive service.

    Between the two of us, you’ve carried on like an immature undergrad. Your delivery will score you no points in a formal academic setting. Many media folks would shun you as well. All this is said from someone who is pretty loose in accepting sharp manner.

  19. johnnie b. baker

    mike –

    none of these things i wrote were atttacks on you as a person. they were directed at the essay itself. yes, i can at time be quite acerbic and overly blunt in my criticisms, but that was simply because i was astouded at what you were saying. but again, never did i make any personal attacks on you. i did not call you prejiduced, as you called me, and i did not link you with the russofope, as you did me, or say you carry on like an immature undergrad, again like you did me. those are personal attacks. i do not know you as a person, you can be a great guy for all I know. but the essay i found simplisitic, without a coherent argument, and with many rather bizarre statements. but i am not calling you these things, but the essay. there is a difference.

    and don’t worry about me in academia, i do just fine. as far as the media is concerned, i don’t care what they think.

    this being said, i will retract my statement about the Tiraspol Times. of all the regions in this discussion, Moldova is the one I know the least about.

  20. In reading back on this discussion, Mike has done Johnnie a pro bono service. For Johnnie’s sake, he will hopefully some day recognize this.

    Why not stick to the specifics of the essay? I believe Mike’s article to be the best yet on who is being the more hypocritical on the recognition of disputed territories.

  21. Find a better article on the subject Johnnie.

    Also, people who rudely behave rarely acknowledge their rudeness.

  22. as a former ska, i acknowledge my rudeness. rude boy! but, maybe until this post, i never made no personal attacks. i myself am able to separate criticism of my work from myself.

    y’know, i was gonna let this one be. y’know, let sleeping dogs lie. but now i’m drunk. so who gives a fuck?

    mike – i did not ask to be on your mailing list, so why am i on it? save me from your shit. i have enough stuff in my email from professionals, thank you very much.

    and i see mr. averko has plenty of friends to defend his amateur rants. very good, he must be a nice guy. however, where do nice guys finish?

    as far as his pro bono advice (since it seems, most of what he write is pro bono), blow me. i will not head mr averko’s advice, or any other loser. (that’s a personal attack, compendia? panamas? anladirsinizmi?) rude, yeah, maybe i’m rude. at times, yeah, i need to tone it down a bit. believe me, i do, when i’m dealing with an equal. with someone who’s ideas and logic i can respect. where’s my smokes? … oh, found them. i should pass out now, as zavtra is my last day in the archives before i go home (blessed cali), and zavtra i have 1923 bak robochii to deal with (not that all you who want to vilify me would know about primary document research). i should probably stop now, but why? sean, i’m sorry, but i know you will have a good laugh. some people want to tear me apart. fine. but sometimes i lack in polite discourse. but that essay was amateur. and averko can send an email out to all his friends (and he has alot, so he must me a cool guy) so that they can chime in and defend him. so be it. but in the real world it would get him nowhere. (that monolithic media! god damn them!) i ask, mr. averko, how do you pay the bills? i pay them through huge grants for my research and by teaching at university. (oh shit! I’ve drank that $40,000 grant away. Gonna have to rely on that next one for my next drink!) but then, i’m sure i’ll fail in academia. (much like the director of the area studies program at georgetown told me, when she asked me to apply for a postdoc). Inogda ya seriozni cholovek, no ceichas, net!) for averko and his people to offer their advice to me is not the ultimate in arrogance, because, truth be told, they can’t out arrogant me. my cock is the biggest in the land! :)

    sorry sean, if i’ve gone to far. if i’m pushing miss bliss land. no ya piani.

    i will not apologize for completely deconstructing mar. averko’s argument. (love that primordialist kieven rus’ bit) either you get it or you don’t. and i can’t sweat those who don’t. nevertheless, i will stomp the terra firma damn what all else say. i sleep well at night. (but not last night “a history of violence” fucked me up.)

    so now i’ll do an averko thing. if any of you want to see what is i do, go to http://www.budgetfile.budgetpress.net

    there’s plenty of idiocy, as well as some serious shit. and ask yourself. yeas, this guy may be a bastard, but might he know his shit? and in the end, isn’t that all that matters?

    c u in the archives! c u when i teach your kids!

  23. Suit yourself. People who carry on like jackasses don’t realize it. The record shows that you were unable to successfully debunk anything in the commentary, while resorting to the lowest common denominator.

    To followup on a recent request: find a better commentary on the topic.

  24. johnnie b. baker

    1. i admit, i am a jackass.

    2. the rcord shows that you live in a fantasy world if you think that absolutely none of my sober critcisms of your work are valid.

    3. since i’m obviously going to fail in my endavors, i guess i’ll be seeing u in the gutter!

  25. Mike!

    He’s a big time loser. It’s best to ignore him.

    Congrats on getting this article of yours referenced at ruusiaissues.com, EIN and Robert Amsterdam’s site.

    Keep up the great work.

  26. The comments here are entertaining. Thanks, Sean, for posting this, although the original article does contain some misstatements or at least omissions. Without going sentence-by-sentence, a few things that jumped out at me:

    1) The Tiraspol Times? Are you kidding me? Mr. Averko, just becaue you have been “published” in this (as far as I can tell, online-only) “newspaper” does not make it an actual newspaper or a legitimate source of news. As has been noted elsewhere (and as a cursory look at the TT website will tell you) it is an obvious propaganda project, and I challenge anyone to prove that their bylined writers with American- or British-sounding names really exist and are actually in Tiraspol. For example, did “Jason Cooper” really report from Dubossary on Dec 29 (http://www.tiraspoltimes.com/node/486)? They clearly have native-English speakers involved at some point, but I am very skeptical that they have found actual foreign journalists (even washouts, rookies, or amateurs) willing to live in and report from the PMR. And yes, I’ve seen this – http://groups.drupal.org/node/2014 – which could easily be an attempt to create the internet version of a fraudulent paper trail.

    Anyway, the TT is transparently biased in its reporting and links to various pro-PMR sites which range from humorously and clumsily biased (e.g., straight-facedly posting howlers such as statements heralding the PMR as “like the Riviera” – http://pridnestrovie.net/howisthepeople.html) to somewhat professional-looking. While someone is clearly paying handsomely for a top-notch internet PR campaign (the credibility of which has been exhaustively dismantled by the Economist), citing a source like the TT makes it hard to take this piece seriously.

    2) If you want to invoke UN resolutions, it might make sense to note that in the case of Abkhazia, the UN has consistently declared it to be a part of Georgia for over a decade. I haven’t read up on this aspect of the other no-longer-entirely-frozen conflicts, but I would imagine there are UN SC resolutions to the same effect.

    3) “Azerbaijan is using its energy revenue to enhance its military.” – isn’t Russia doing the same thing at the moment? And so what? Why is that sinister or even particularly relevant?

    4) Citing oneself (specifically, the Averko piece about Transnistria on Russia Blog) is also not a great credibility builder, especially when other sources are not cited, and when your original piece leans heavily on reporting by the BHHRG, which is an organization that has been disavowed by the actual Helsinki Committee.

    5) “Trans-Dniester’s captial Tiraspol, was founded in 1792 by Russian Field Marshall Alexander Suvorov. (arguably Russia’s greatest military commander) At the time, Tiraspol served as a fortress marking the border on the Dniester River between Imperial Russia and Ottoman Empire ruled Moldova.”

    A couple of problems here – who cares when the city was founded and by whom? It has very little relevance to the future of this narrow strip of land. Further, by omitting relevant historical facts, you seem to suggest that present-day Moldova was outside of Russia (and separate from Transnistria), when it was in fact part of the Russian empire for over 100 years before the Revolution.

    6) “In a recent referendum, Trans-Dniester’s peaceful, multi-ethnic and democratic society expressed the desire to reunify with Russia.”

    Methinks thou dost protest too much. Peaceful, multi-ethnic, _and_ democratic? I hear echoes of the Foreign Languages Publishing House (Moscow, circa 1960).

    7) OK, this is already more points than I wanted to make, but I keep looking at this essay and finding more things that bother me. For example, the following quotation:

    “most Chechens aren’t supportive of independence because of what “independence” had twice done to their republic over the last decade. On two different occasions during that period, Chechnya operated as an independent entity. In each instance, there was an enhanced chaos that made life more miserable for Chechnya’s population. Like it or not, a greater Russian control of Chechnya has led to an increased stability in that republic.”

    Let’s try a little experiment – substituting just a few words (“Russia” and “Russian Federation” for “Chechnya” and “Chechen Republic,” “democracy” for “independence,” “authoritarian” for “Russian,” and a couple of small changes to refer to just one period of “chaos” as opposed to two) consistently throughout:

    most [Russians] aren’t supportive of [democracy] because of what “[democracy]” had [...] done to their [federation] over the last decade. [...D]uring that period, [Russia] operated as a [democratic] entity. [...T]here was an enhanced chaos that made life more miserable for [Russia]‘s population. Like it or not, a greater [authoritarian] control of [Russia] has led to an increased stability in that [federation].

    So, this is an argument that is at least unoriginal. In any event, aside from playing games with the words of someone who would try to justify Kadyrov’s rule in Chechnya (oh, right, I’m sure he was “democratically elected,” too), let’s return to the actual relevance of Chechnya to this discussion. The relevance is that throughout the 1990′s, when Russia was worried about losing its grip on Chechnya (and for a period of time some of the other ethnic republics), it was unflagging in its public proclamations of the territorial integrity of its neighbors. Now that Russia has resolved its own secessionist issue, some elements there seem willing to move ahead with a project to dismantle the same countries whose territorial integrity was once proclaimed with conviction (and is still proclaimed, although less convincingly) by Moscow. How is that logically consistent?

    Furthermore, the argument advanced by the Russians during the 1990′s (and the only one which leads to a consistent outcome in the post-Soviet space) is to respect the Republic boundaries as they were in 1991 as the basis for the borders of the newly independent states. Any modifications should be negotiated with the internationally recognized capitals, not with self-proclaimed leaders, however much apparent credibility they may have acquired by hanging on to power for the past 10+ years.

    One final note – I’ve said little or nothing about Kosovo here, mainly because I don’t know very much about the situation on the ground. Although, given the tone set by the original post, maybe I shouldn’t have let that stop me…

  27. Lyndon:

    Your comments are hypocritical and demagogic.

    On propaganda, find something at TTT which is factually wrong. Prove that Jason Cooper and the rest of TTT staff don’t live there. If I’m not mistaken, the not so Russia/TT friendly Edward Lucas acknowledges their presence in Trans-Dniester.

    In terms of my own stated achievements, you overlook the other sources listed in the two sentence bio of myself at the end of the article. Whether you like it or not, Russia Blog as been frequently posted at Johnson’s Russia List and Russia Profile. Two rather establishment like outlets.

    BTW, on the matter of disclosure, what are your credentials in terms of posted material?

    Trans-Dniester was a part of ancient Russia (Kievan Rus) and has had a rock solid Russocentric Slavic majority for centuries. Show me how Kosovo has a better case for independence. It’s hypocritical to support Kosovo independence, while denying such for Trans-Dniester. It’s not hypocritical to advocate the reverse.

    Regarding my referencing of the Azeri military buildup, you show a lack of comprehension. As per what was stated in that segment: the knowledgeable analyst will surmise the Armenian-Azeri conflict and how the rapid Azeri military buildup appears geared to possibly retaking Nagorno Karabakh by force. In per capita terms, I believe that it can be shown that Russia’s military buildup is nowhere near as great as Azerbaijan’s.

    Your long winded gobbly gook about Chechnya fails to address the facts and fact based points in the article.

  28. I guess we’ll have to agree to disagree. I’m not sure why my comments were “hypocritical,” though, since I don’t think you’ll find that I advocated independence for Kosovo anywhere. And “demagogic”? I thought I kept a pretty reserved tone, relative to the level of discourse elsewhere in the comments here.

    Anyway, for someone who protests personal attacks (in response to an earlier comment), you seem happy to go down that road – calling someone’s comments “long winded gobbly [sic] gook” does not exactly constitute sticking to the facts or displaying sterling polemical skills.

    I’d rather not get into it, though, since it’s the holidays and all, and would just mention that with my comment on the Tiraspol Times, I was not going after your credentials (they speak for themselves), but was simply making the point that the TT is not exactly an authoritative source.

    And I think it’s laughable to get into a battle of credentials while posting in the comments section of a blog – all the more so because I am certain you will not accept my points as valid no matter what credentials I trot out.

    Anyway, have a happy new year.

  29. You end on a good note and on that point I’ll say the same to you

    The way you scope TTT is hypocritical. Here’s an excerpt from an email project of mine:

    As a repeat thought: it’s journalistically circumspect to see that material from the Trans-Dniester based English language venue hasn’t (to date) been posted at Johnson’s Russia List and the Action Ukraine Report.

    RFE/RL and Edward Lucas have negatively reviewed TTT. Has this somehow influenced JRL and AUR? TTT gives ample space to Trans-Dniester’s political opposition. If I correctly recall, it recently gave an objective report of a Russian government decision which supported Moldova in a land dispute with Trans-Dniester. TTT is “biased” in the sense that it reflects the general mood in Trans-Dniester. In this sense, it’s less biased than the RFE/RL and Lucas preferred Vladimir Socor, among some others.

    As per RFE/RL’s and Lucas’ criticisms, why is it wrong to cite a high profile enough person without telling them? Has Lucas ever questioned who funds The Moscow Times and some of the outlets it’s affiliated with? More precisely put: a critical review of the kind of slant found at those venues. How about directly critiquing some of the actual content at TTT? Specifically, the substantive accuracy (or lack thereof) of its reporting and commentary? An example would be to factually question (as in stating facts and fact based opinions) Lucas’ suggested view (at his blog on Oct. 26) that the Captive Nations Committee is an earnest organization. Why the one sided criticisms? In terms of accuracy: IMO – TTT more correctly reflects the views in Trans-Dniester when compared to The Moscow Times’ coverage of Russia.

    ***

    What exactly was your point about Chechnya, relative to what was said about it in the article?

    I’ll gladly accept valid points contradicting my own. Show me where I’m wrong. Besides TTT, my referencing the Azeri arms buildup and what might be motivating it.

  30. johnnie b. baker

    glad to see i’m not the only one who found this piece problematic, at the very least.

  31. “Problematic” in the sense that it successfully goes against the politically correct view that Kosovo is a valid “special case” unlike the other former Communist bloc territories in dispute.

    As a kind of sequel, there’s my recent Tiraspol Times commentary, which can be accessed by clicking into my name at the end of this comment.

    HAPPY NEW YEAR!

    For ’07, look for more progressive journalism from yours truly.

  32. johnnie b. baker

    you certainly do love yourself, don’t you

  33. What’s not to like?

  34. There’s nothing wrong with your work Mishka.

    I don’t always agree with you. However, I very much admire your fair minded approach in engaging other views.

    Keep cranking them out.